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FreeBSD Handbook - Chapter 30 Firewalls

January 6th, 2009

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Contributed by Joseph J. Barbish. Converted to SGML and updated by Brad Davis.


30.1 Introduction

Firewalls make it possible to filter incoming and outgoing traffic that flows through your system. A firewall can use one or more sets of “rules” to inspect the network packets as they come in or go out of your network connections and either allows the traffic through or blocks it. The rules of a firewall can inspect one or more characteristics of the packets, including but not limited to the protocol type, the source or destination host address, and the source or destination port.

Firewalls can greatly enhance the security of a host or a network. They can be used to do one or more of the following things:

  • To protect and insulate the applications, services and machines of your internal network from unwanted traffic coming in from the public Internet.

  • To limit or disable access from hosts of the internal network to services of the public Internet.

  • To support network address translation (NAT), which allows your internal network to use private IP addresses and share a single connection to the public Internet (either with a single IP address or by a shared pool of automatically assigned public addresses).

After reading this chapter, you will know:

  • How to properly define packet filtering rules.

  • The differences between the firewalls built into FreeBSD.

  • How to use and configure the OpenBSD PF firewall.

  • How to use and configure IPFILTER.

  • How to use and configure IPFW.

Before reading this chapter, you should:

  • Understand basic FreeBSD and Internet concepts.


30.2 Firewall Concepts

There are two basic ways to create firewall rulesets: “inclusive” or “exclusive”. An exclusive firewall allows all traffic through except for the traffic matching the ruleset. An inclusive firewall does the reverse. It only allows traffic matching the rules through and blocks everything else.

Inclusive firewalls are generally safer than exclusive firewalls because they significantly reduce the risk of allowing unwanted traffic to pass through the firewall.

Security can be tightened further using a “stateful firewall”. With a stateful firewall the firewall keeps track of which connections are opened through the firewall and will only allow traffic through which either matches an existing connection or opens a new one. The disadvantage of a stateful firewall is that it can be vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks if a lot of new connections are opened very fast. With most firewalls it is possible to use a combination of stateful and non-stateful behavior to make an optimal firewall for the site.


30.3 Firewall Packages

FreeBSD has three different firewall packages built into the base system. They are: IPFILTER (also known as IPF), IPFIREWALL (also known as IPFW), and OpenBSD’s PacketFilter (also known as PF). FreeBSD also has two built in packages for traffic shaping (basically controlling bandwidth usage): altq(4) and dummynet(4). Dummynet has traditionally been closely tied with IPFW, and ALTQ with PF. Traffic shaping for IPFILTER can currently be done with IPFILTER for NAT and filtering and IPFW with dummynet(4) or by using PF with ALTQ. IPFW, and PF all use rules to control the access of packets to and from your system, although they go about it different ways and have different rule syntaxes.

The reason that FreeBSD has multiple built in firewall packages is that different people have different requirements and preferences. No single firewall package is the best.

The author prefers IPFILTER because its stateful rules are much less complicated to use in a NAT environment and it has a built in ftp proxy that simplifies the rules to allow secure outbound FTP usage.

Since all firewalls are based on inspecting the values of selected packet control fields, the creator of the firewall rulesets must have an understanding of how TCP/IP works, what the different values in the packet control fields are and how these values are used in a normal session conversation. For a good explanation go to: http://www.ipprimer.com/overview.cfm.


30.4 The OpenBSD Packet Filter (PF) and ALTQ

Revised and updated by John Ferrell.

As of July 2003 the OpenBSD firewall software application known as PF was ported to FreeBSD and made available in the FreeBSD Ports Collection. Released in 2004, FreeBSD 5.3 was the first release that contained PF as an integrated part of the base system. PF is a complete, full-featured firewall that has optional support for ALTQ (Alternate Queuing). ALTQ provides Quality of Service (QoS) functionality.

The OpenBSD Project does an outstanding job of maintaining the PF FAQ. As such, this section of the Handbook will focus on PF as it pertains to FreeBSD while providing some general information regarding usage. For detailed usage information please refer to the PF FAQ.

More information about PF for FreeBSD can be found at http://pf4freebsd.love2party.net/.


30.4.1 Using the PF loadable kernel module

Since the release of FreeBSD 5.3, PF has been included in the basic install as a separate run time loadable module. The system will dynamically load the PF kernel module when the rc.conf(5) statement pf_enable="YES" is present. However, the PF module will not load if the system cannot find a PF ruleset configuration file. The default location is /etc/pf.conf. If your PF ruleset is located somewhere else put pf_rules="/path/pf.rules" to your /etc/rc.conf configuration file to specify the location.

Note: As of FreeBSD 7.0 the sample pf.conf that was in /etc/ has been moved to /usr/share/examples/pf/. For FreeBSD versions prior to 7.0 there is an /etc/pf.conf by default.

The PF module can also be loaded manually from the command line:

# kldload pf.ko

The loadable module was created with pflog(4) enabled which provides support for logging. If you need other PF features you will need to compile PF support into the kernel.


30.4.2 PF kernel options

While it is not necessary that you compile PF support into the FreeBSD kernel, you may want to do so to take advantage of one of PF’s advanced features that is not included in the loadable module, namely pfsync(4), which is a pseudo-device that exposes certain changes to the state table used by PF. It can be paired with carp(4) to create failover firewalls using PF. More information on CARP can be found in chapter 29 of the handbook.

The PF kernel options can be found in /usr/src/sys/conf/NOTES and are reproduced below:

device pf
device pflog
device pfsync

The device pf option enables support for the “Packet Filter” firewall (pf(4)).

The device pflog option enables the optional pflog(4) pseudo network device which can be used to log traffic to a bpf(4) descriptor. The pflogd(8) daemon can be used to store the logging information to disk.

The device pfsync option enables the optional pfsync(4) pseudo-network device that is used to monitor “state changes”.


30.4.3 Available rc.conf Options

The following rc.conf(5) statements configure PF and pflog(4) at boot:

pf_enable="YES"                 # Enable PF (load module if required)
pf_rules="/etc/pf.conf"         # rules definition file for pf
pf_flags=""                     # additional flags for pfctl startup
pflog_enable="YES"              # start pflogd(8)
pflog_logfile="/var/log/pflog"  # where pflogd should store the logfile
pflog_flags=""                  # additional flags for pflogd startup

If you have a LAN behind this firewall and have to forward packets for the computers on the LAN or want to do NAT, you will need the following option as well:

gateway_enable="YES"            # Enable as LAN gateway

30.4.4 Creating Filtering Rules

PF reads its configuration rules from pf.conf(5) (/etc/pf.conf by default) and it modifies, drops, or passes packets according to the rules or definitions specified there. The FreeBSD installation includes several sample files located in /usr/share/examples/pf/. Please refer to the PF FAQ for complete coverage of PF rulesets.

Warning: When browsing the PF FAQ, please keep in mind that different versions of FreeBSD contain different versions of PF:

  • FreeBSD 5.XPF is at OpenBSD 3.5

  • FreeBSD 6.XPF is at OpenBSD 3.7

  • FreeBSD 7.XPF is at OpenBSD 4.1

The FreeBSD packet filter mailing list is a good place to ask questions about configuring and running the PF firewall. Do not forget to check the mailing list archives before asking questions!


30.4.5 Working with PF

Use pfctl(8) to control PF. Below are some useful commands (be sure to review the pfctl(8) man page for all available options):

Command

Purpose

pfctl -e

Enable PF

pfctl -d

Disable PF

pfctl -F all -f /etc/pf.conf

Flush all rules (nat, filter, state, table, etc.) and reload from the file /etc/pf.conf

pfctl -s [ rules | nat | state ]

Report on the filter rules, nat rules, or state table

pfctl -vnf /etc/pf.conf

Check /etc/pf.conf for errors, but do not load ruleset


30.4.6 Enabling ALTQ

ALTQ is only available by compiling support for it into the FreeBSD kernel. ALTQ is not supported by all of the available network card drivers. Please see the altq(4) manual page for a list of drivers that are supported in your release of FreeBSD.

The following kernel options will enable ALTQ and add additional functionality:

options         ALTQ
options         ALTQ_CBQ        # Class Bases Queuing (CBQ)
options         ALTQ_RED        # Random Early Detection (RED)
options         ALTQ_RIO        # RED In/Out
options         ALTQ_HFSC       # Hierarchical Packet Scheduler (HFSC)
options         ALTQ_PRIQ       # Priority Queuing (PRIQ)
options         ALTQ_NOPCC      # Required for SMP build

options ALTQ enables the ALTQ framework.

options ALTQ_CBQ enables Class Based Queuing (CBQ). CBQ allows you to divide a connection’s bandwidth into different classes or queues to prioritize traffic based on filter rules.

options ALTQ_RED enables Random Early Detection (RED). RED is used to avoid network congestion. RED does this by measuring the length of the queue and comparing it to the minimum and maximum thresholds for the queue. If the queue is over the maximum all new packets will be dropped. True to its name, RED drops packets from different connections randomly.

options ALTQ_RIO enables Random Early Detection In and Out.

options ALTQ_HFSC enables the Hierarchical Fair Service Curve Packet Scheduler. For more information about HFSC see: http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~hzhang/HFSC/main.html.

options ALTQ_PRIQ enables Priority Queuing (PRIQ). PRIQ will always pass traffic that is in a higher queue first.

options ALTQ_NOPCC enables SMP support for ALTQ. This option is required on SMP systems.


30.5 The IPFILTER (IPF) Firewall

Note: This section is work in progress. The contents might not be accurate at all times.

The author of IPFILTER is Darren Reed. IPFILTER is not operating system dependent: it is an open source application and has been ported to FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, SunOS, HP/UX, and Solaris operating systems. IPFILTER is actively being supported and maintained, with updated versions being released regularly.

IPFILTER is based on a kernel-side firewall and NAT mechanism that can be controlled and monitored by userland interface programs. The firewall rules can be set or deleted with the ipf(8) utility. The NAT rules can be set or deleted with the ipnat(1) utility. The ipfstat(8) utility can print run-time statistics for the kernel parts of IPFILTER. The ipmon(8) program can log IPFILTER actions to the system log files.

IPF was originally written using a rule processing logic of “the last matching rule wins” and used only stateless type of rules. Over time IPF has been enhanced to include a “quick” option and a stateful “keep state” option which drastically modernized the rules processing logic. IPF’s official documentation covers the legacy rule coding parameters and the legacy rule file processing logic. The modernized functions are only included as additional options, completely understating their benefits in producing a far superior secure firewall.

The instructions contained in this section are based on using rules that contain the “quick” option and the stateful “keep state” option. This is the basic framework for coding an inclusive firewall rule set.

An inclusive firewall only allows packets matching the rules to pass through. This way you can control what services can originate behind the firewall destined for the public Internet and also control the services which can originate from the public Internet accessing your private network. Everything else is blocked and logged by default design. Inclusive firewalls are much, much more secure than exclusive firewall rule sets and is the only rule set type covered herein.

For detailed explanation of the legacy rules processing method see: http://www.obfuscation.org/ipf/ipf-howto.html#TOC_1 and http://coombs.anu.edu.au/~avalon/ip-filter.html.

The IPF FAQ is at http://www.phildev.net/ipf/index.html.

A searchable archive of the open-source IPFilter mailing list is available at http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=ipfilter.


30.5.1 Enabling IPF

IPF is included in the basic FreeBSD install as a separate run time loadable module. The system will dynamically load the IPF kernel loadable module when the rc.conf statement ipfilter_enable="YES" is used. The loadable module was created with logging enabled and the default pass all options. You do not need to compile IPF into the FreeBSD kernel just to change the default to block all, you can do that by just coding a block all rule at the end of your rule set.


30.5.2 Kernel options

It is not a mandatory requirement that you enable IPF by compiling the following options into the FreeBSD kernel. It is only presented here as background information. Compiling IPF into the kernel causes the loadable module to never be used.

Sample kernel config IPF option statements are in the /usr/src/sys/conf/NOTES kernel source and are reproduced here:

options IPFILTER
options IPFILTER_LOG
options IPFILTER_DEFAULT_BLOCK

options IPFILTER enables support for the “IPFILTER” firewall.

options IPFILTER_LOG enables the option to have IPF log traffic by writing to the ipl packet logging pseudo–device for every rule that has the log keyword.

options IPFILTER_DEFAULT_BLOCK changes the default behavior so any packet not matching a firewall pass rule gets blocked.

These settings will take effect only after you have built and installed a kernel with them set.


30.5.3 Available rc.conf Options

You need the following statements in /etc/rc.conf to activate IPF at boot time:

ipfilter_enable="YES"             # Start ipf firewall
ipfilter_rules="/etc/ipf.rules"   # loads rules definition text file
ipmon_enable="YES"                # Start IP monitor log
ipmon_flags="-Ds"                 # D = start as daemon
                                  # s = log to syslog
                                  # v = log tcp window, ack, seq
                                  # n = map IP & port to names

If you have a LAN behind this firewall that uses the reserved private IP address ranges, then you need to add the following to enable NAT functionality:

gateway_enable="YES"              # Enable as LAN gateway
ipnat_enable="YES"                # Start ipnat function
ipnat_rules="/etc/ipnat.rules"    # rules definition file for ipnat

30.5.4 IPF

The ipf command is used to load your rules file. Normally you create a file containing your custom rules and use this command to replace in mass the currently running firewall internal rules:

# ipf -Fa -f /etc/ipf.rules

-Fa means flush all internal rules tables.

-f means this is the file to read for the rules to load.

This gives you the ability to make changes to your custom rules file, run the above IPF command, and thus update the running firewall with a fresh copy of all the rules without having to reboot the system. This method is very convenient for testing new rules as the procedure can be executed as many times as needed.

See the ipf(8) manual page for details on the other flags available with this command.

The ipf(8) command expects the rules file to be a standard text file. It will not accept a rules file written as a script with symbolic substitution.

There is a way to build IPF rules that utilizes the power of script symbolic substitution. For more information, see Section 30.5.9.


30.5.5 IPFSTAT

The default behavior of ipfstat(8) is to retrieve and display the totals of the accumulated statistics gathered as a result of applying the user coded rules against packets going in and out of the firewall since it was last started, or since the last time the accumulators were reset to zero by the ipf -Z command.

See the ipfstat(8) manual page for details.

The default ipfstat(8) command output will look something like this:

input packets: blocked 99286 passed 1255609 nomatch 14686 counted 0
 output packets: blocked 4200 passed 1284345 nomatch 14687 counted 0
 input packets logged: blocked 99286 passed 0
 output packets logged: blocked 0 passed 0
 packets logged: input 0 output 0
 log failures: input 3898 output 0
 fragment state(in): kept 0 lost 0
 fragment state(out): kept 0 lost 0
 packet state(in): kept 169364 lost 0
 packet state(out): kept 431395 lost 0
 ICMP replies: 0 TCP RSTs sent: 0
 Result cache hits(in): 1215208 (out): 1098963
 IN Pullups succeeded: 2 failed: 0
 OUT Pullups succeeded: 0 failed: 0
 Fastroute successes: 0 failures: 0
 TCP cksum fails(in): 0 (out): 0
 Packet log flags set: (0)

When supplied with either -i for inbound or -o for outbound, it will retrieve and display the appropriate list of filter rules currently installed and in use by the kernel.

ipfstat -in displays the inbound internal rules table with rule number.

ipfstat -on displays the outbound internal rules table with the rule number.

The output will look something like this:

@1 pass out on xl0 from any to any
@2 block out on dc0 from any to any
@3 pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp/udp from any to any keep state

ipfstat -ih displays the inbound internal rules table, prefixing each rule with a count of how many times the rule was matched.

ipfstat -oh displays the outbound internal rules table, prefixing each rule with a count of how many times the rule was matched.

The output will look something like this:

2451423 pass out on xl0 from any to any
354727 block out on dc0 from any to any
430918 pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp/udp from any to any keep state

One of the most important functions of the ipfstat command is the -t flag which displays the state table in a way similar to the way top(1) shows the FreeBSD running process table. When your firewall is under attack this function gives you the ability to identify, drill down to, and see the attacking packets. The optional sub-flags give the ability to select the destination or source IP, port, or protocol that you want to monitor in real time. See the ipfstat(8) manual page for details.


30.5.6 IPMON

In order for ipmon to work properly, the kernel option IPFILTER_LOG must be turned on. This command has two different modes that it can be used in. Native mode is the default mode when you type the command on the command line without the -D flag.

Daemon mode is for when you want to have a continuous system log file available so that you can review logging of past events. This is how FreeBSD and IPFILTER are configured to work together. FreeBSD has a built in facility to automatically rotate system logs. That is why outputting the log information to syslogd is better than the default of outputting to a regular file. In the default rc.conf file you see the ipmon_flags statement uses the -Ds flags:

ipmon_flags="-Ds" # D = start as daemon
                  # s = log to syslog
                  # v = log tcp window, ack, seq
                  # n = map IP & port to names

The benefits of logging are obvious. It provides the ability to review, after the fact, information such as which packets had been dropped, what addresses they came from and where they were going. These all give you a significant edge in tracking down attackers.

Even with the logging facility enabled, IPF will not generate any rule logging on its own. The firewall administrator decides what rules in the rule set he wants to log and adds the log keyword to those rules. Normally only deny rules are logged.

It is very customary to include a default deny everything rule with the log keyword included as your last rule in the rule set. This way you get to see all the packets that did not match any of the rules in the rule set.


30.5.7 IPMON Logging

Syslogd uses its own special method for segregation of log data. It uses special groupings called “facility” and “level”. IPMON in -Ds mode uses security as the “facility” name. All IPMON logged data goes to security The following levels can be used to further segregate the logged data if desired:

LOG_INFO - packets logged using the "log" keyword as the action rather than pass or block.
LOG_NOTICE - packets logged which are also passed
LOG_WARNING - packets logged which are also blocked
LOG_ERR - packets which have been logged and which can be considered short

To setup IPFILTER to log all data to /var/log/ipfilter.log, you will need to create the file. The following command will do that:

# touch /var/log/ipfilter.log

The syslog function is controlled by definition statements in the /etc/syslog.conf file. The syslog.conf file offers considerable flexibility in how syslog will deal with system messages issued by software applications like IPF.

Add the following statement to /etc/syslog.conf:

security.* /var/log/ipfilter.log

The security.* means to write all the logged messages to the coded file location.

To activate the changes to /etc/syslog.conf you can reboot or bump the syslog task into re-reading /etc/syslog.conf by running /etc/rc.d/syslogd reload

Do not forget to change /etc/newsyslog.conf to rotate the new log you just created above.


30.5.8 The Format of Logged Messages

Messages generated by ipmon consist of data fields separated by white space. Fields common to all messages are:

  1. The date of packet receipt.

  2. The time of packet receipt. This is in the form HH:MM:SS.F, for hours, minutes, seconds, and fractions of a second (which can be several digits long).

  3. The name of the interface the packet was processed on, e.g. dc0.

  4. The group and rule number of the rule, e.g. @0:17.

These can be viewed with ipfstat -in.

  1. The action: p for passed, b for blocked, S for a short packet, n did not match any rules, L for a log rule. The order of precedence in showing flags is: S, p, b, n, L. A capital P or B means that the packet has been logged due to a global logging setting, not a particular rule.

  2. The addresses. This is actually three fields: the source address and port (separated by a comma), the -> symbol, and the destination address and port. 209.53.17.22,80 -> 198.73.220.17,1722.

  3. PR followed by the protocol name or number, e.g. PR tcp.

  4. len followed by the header length and total length of the packet, e.g. len 20 40.

If the packet is a TCP packet, there will be an additional field starting with a hyphen followed by letters corresponding to any flags that were set. See the ipmon(8) manual page for a list of letters and their flags.

If the packet is an ICMP packet, there will be two fields at the end, the first always being “ICMP”, and the next being the ICMP message and sub-message type, separated by a slash, e.g. ICMP 3/3 for a port unreachable message.


30.5.9 Building the Rule Script with Symbolic Substitution

Some experienced IPF users create a file containing the rules and code them in a manner compatible with running them as a script with symbolic substitution. The major benefit of doing this is that you only have to change the value associated with the symbolic name and when the script is run all the rules containing the symbolic name will have the value substituted in the rules. Being a script, you can use symbolic substitution to code frequently used values and substitute them in multiple rules. You will see this in the following example.

The script syntax used here is compatible with the sh, csh, and tcsh shells.

Symbolic substitution fields are prefixed with a dollar sign: $.

Symbolic fields do not have the $ prefix.

The value to populate the symbolic field must be enclosed with double quotes (").

Start your rule file with something like this:

############# Start of IPF rules script ########################

oif="dc0"            # name of the outbound interface
odns="192.0.2.11"    # ISP's DNS server IP address
myip="192.0.2.7"     # my static IP address from ISP
ks="keep state"
fks="flags S keep state"

# You can choose between building /etc/ipf.rules file
# from this script or running this script "as is".
#
# Uncomment only one line and comment out another.
#
# 1) This can be used for building /etc/ipf.rules:
#cat > /etc/ipf.rules << EOF
#
# 2) This can be used to run script "as is":
/sbin/ipf -Fa -f - << EOF

# Allow out access to my ISP's Domain name server.
pass out quick on $oif proto tcp from any to $odns port = 53 $fks
pass out quick on $oif proto udp from any to $odns port = 53 $ks

# Allow out non-secure standard www function
pass out quick on $oif proto tcp from $myip to any port = 80 $fks

# Allow out secure www function https over TLS SSL
pass out quick on $oif proto tcp from $myip to any port = 443 $fks
EOF
################## End of IPF rules script ########################

That is all there is to it. The rules are not important in this example; how the symbolic substitution fields are populated and used are. If the above example was in a file named /etc/ipf.rules.script, you could reload these rules by entering the following command:

# sh /etc/ipf.rules.script

There is one problem with using a rules file with embedded symbolics: IPF does not understand symbolic substitution, and cannot read such scripts directly.

This script can be used in one of two ways:

  • Uncomment the line that begins with cat, and comment out the line that begins with /sbin/ipf. Place ipfilter_enable="YES" into /etc/rc.conf as usual, and run script once after each modification to create or update /etc/ipf.rules.

  • Disable IPFILTER in system startup scripts by adding ipfilter_enable="NO" (this is default value) into /etc/rc.conf file.

    Add a script like the following to your /usr/local/etc/rc.d/ startup directory. The script should have an obvious name like ipf.loadrules.sh. The .sh extension is mandatory.

    #!/bin/sh
    sh /etc/ipf.rules.script

    The permissions on this script file must be read, write, execute for owner root.

    # chmod 700 /usr/local/etc/rc.d/ipf.loadrules.sh

Now, when your system boots, your IPF rules will be loaded.


30.5.10 IPF Rule Sets

A rule set is a group of ipf rules coded to pass or block packets based on the values contained in the packet. The bi-directional exchange of packets between hosts comprises a session conversation. The firewall rule set processes the packet two times, once on its arrival from the public Internet host and again as it leaves for its return trip back to the public Internet host. Each TCP/IP service (i.e. telnet, www, mail, etc.) is predefined by its protocol, source and destination IP address, or the source and destination port number. This is the basic selection criteria used to create rules which will pass or block services.

IPF was originally written using a rules processing logic of “the last matching rule wins” and used only stateless rules. Over time IPF has been enhanced to include a “quick” option and a stateful “keep state” option which drastically modernized the rule processing logic.

The instructions contained in this section are based on using rules that contain the “quick” option and the stateful “keep state” option. This is the basic framework for coding an inclusive firewall rule set.

An inclusive firewall only allows services matching the rules through. This way you can control what services can originate behind the firewall destined for the public Internet and also control the services which can originate from the public Internet accessing your private network. Everything else is blocked and logged by default design. Inclusive firewalls are much, much securer than exclusive firewall rule sets and is the only rule set type covered herein.

Warning: When working with the firewall rules, be very careful. Some configurations will lock you out of the server. To be on the safe side, you may wish to consider performing the initial firewall configuration from the local console rather than doing it remotely e.g. via ssh.


30.5.11 Rule Syntax

The rule syntax presented here has been simplified to only address the modern stateful rule context and “first matching rule wins” logic. For the complete legacy rule syntax description see the ipf(8) manual page.

A # character is used to mark the start of a comment and may appear at the end of a rule line or on its own line. Blank lines are ignored.

Rules contain keywords. These keywords have to be coded in a specific order from left to right on the line. Keywords are identified in bold type. Some keywords have sub-options which may be keywords themselves and also include more sub-options. Each of the headings in the below syntax has a bold section header which expands on the content.

ACTION IN-OUT OPTIONS SELECTION STATEFUL PROTO SRC_ADDR,DST_ADDR OBJECT PORT_NUM TCP_FLAG STATEFUL

ACTION = block | pass

IN-OUT = in | out

OPTIONS = log | quick | on interface-name

SELECTION = proto value | source/destination IP | port = number | flags flag-value

PROTO = tcp/udp | udp | tcp | icmp

SRC_ADD,DST_ADDR = all | from object to object

OBJECT = IP address | any

PORT_NUM = port number

TCP_FLAG = S

STATEFUL = keep state


30.5.11.1 ACTION

The action indicates what to do with the packet if it matches the rest of the filter rule. Each rule must have a action. The following actions are recognized:

block indicates that the packet should be dropped if the selection parameters match the packet.

pass indicates that the packet should exit the firewall if the selection parameters match the packet.


30.5.11.2 IN-OUT

A mandatory requirement is that each filter rule explicitly state which side of the I/O it is to be used on. The next keyword must be either in or out and one or the other has to be coded or the rule will not pass syntax checks.

in means this rule is being applied against an inbound packet which has just been received on the interface facing the public Internet.

out means this rule is being applied against an outbound packet destined for the interface facing the public Internet.


30.5.11.3 OPTIONS

Note: These options must be used in the order shown here.

log indicates that the packet header will be written to the ipl log (as described in the LOGGING section below) if the selection parameters match the packet.

quick indicates that if the selection parameters match the packet, this rule will be the last rule checked, allowing a “short-circuit” path to avoid processing any following rules for this packet. This option is a mandatory requirement for the modernized rules processing logic.

on indicates the interface name to be incorporated into the selection parameters. Interface names are as displayed by ifconfig(8). Using this option, the rule will only match if the packet is going through that interface in the specified direction (in/out). This option is a mandatory requirement for the modernized rules processing logic.

When a packet is logged, the headers of the packet are written to the IPL packet logging pseudo-device. Immediately following the log keyword, the following qualifiers may be used (in this order):

body indicates that the first 128 bytes of the packet contents will be logged after the headers.

first If the log keyword is being used in conjunction with a “keep state” option, it is recommended that this option is also applied so that only the triggering packet is logged and not every packet which thereafter matches the “keep state” information.


30.5.11.4 SELECTION

The keywords described in this section are used to describe attributes of the packet to be interrogated when determining whether rules match or not. There is a keyword subject, and it has sub-option keywords, one of which has to be selected. The following general-purpose attributes are provided for matching, and must be used in this order:


30.5.11.5 PROTO

proto is the subject keyword and must be coded along with one of its corresponding keyword sub-option values. The value allows a specific protocol to be matched against. This option is a mandatory requirement for the modernized rules processing logic.

tcp/udp | udp | tcp | icmp or any protocol names found in /etc/protocols are recognized and may be used. The special protocol keyword tcp/udp may be used to match either a TCP or a UDP packet, and has been added as a convenience to save duplication of otherwise identical rules.


30.5.11.6 SRC_ADDR/DST_ADDR

The all keyword is essentially a synonym for “from any to any” with no other match parameters.

from src to dst: the from and to keywords are used to match against IP addresses. Rules must specify BOTH source and destination parameters. any is a special keyword that matches any IP address. Examples of use: “from any to any” or “from 0.0.0.0/0 to any” or “from any to 0.0.0.0/0” or “from 0.0.0.0 to any” or “from any to 0.0.0.0”.

IP addresses may be specified as a dotted IP address numeric form/mask-length, or as single dotted IP address numeric form.

There is no way to match ranges of IP addresses which do not express themselves easily as mask-length. See this web page for help on writing mask-length: http://jodies.de/ipcalc.


30.5.11.7 PORT

If a port match is included, for either or both of source and destination, then it is only applied to TCP and UDP packets. When composing port comparisons, either the service name from /etc/services or an integer port number may be used. When the port appears as part of the from object, it matches the source port number; when it appears as part of the to object, it matches the destination port number. The use of the port option with the to object is a mandatory requirement for the modernized rules processing logic. Example of use: “from any to any port = 80”

Port comparisons may be done in a number of forms, with a number of comparison operators, or port ranges may be specified.

port "=" | "!=" | "<" | ">" | "<=" | ">=" | "eq" | "ne" | "lt" | "gt" | "le" | "ge".

To specify port ranges, port "<>" | "><"

Warning: Following the source and destination matching parameters, the following two parameters are mandatory requirements for the modernized rules processing logic.


30.5.11.8 TCP_FLAG

Flags are only effective for TCP filtering. The letters represents one of the possible flags that can be interrogated in the TCP packet header.

The modernized rules processing logic uses the flags S parameter to identify the tcp session start request.


30.5.11.9 STATEFUL

keep state indicates that on a pass rule, any packets that match the rules selection parameters should activate the stateful filtering facility.

Note: This option is a mandatory requirement for the modernized rules processing logic.


30.5.12 Stateful Filtering

Stateful filtering treats traffic as a bi-directional exchange of packets comprising a session conversation. When activated, keep-state dynamically generates internal rules for each anticipated packet being exchanged during the bi-directional session conversation. It has the interrogation abilities to determine if the session conversation between the originating sender and the destination are following the valid procedure of bi-directional packet exchange. Any packets that do not properly fit the session conversation template are automatically rejected as impostors.

Keep state will also allow ICMP packets related to a TCP or UDP session through. So if you get ICMP type 3 code 4 in response to some web surfing allowed out by a keep state rule, they will be automatically allowed in. Any packet that IPF can be certain is part of an active session, even if it is a different protocol, will be let in.

What happens is:

Packets destined to go out the interface connected to the public Internet are first checked against the dynamic state table, if the packet matches the next expected packet comprising in a active session conversation, then it exits the firewall and the state of the session conversation flow is updated in the dynamic state table, the remaining packets get checked against the outbound rule set.

Packets coming in to the interface connected to the public Internet are first checked against the dynamic state table, if the packet matches the next expected packet comprising a active session conversation, then it exits the firewall and the state of the session conversation flow is updated in the dynamic state table, the remaining packets get checked against the inbound rule set.

When the conversation completes it is removed from the dynamic state table.

Stateful filtering allows you to focus on blocking/passing new sessions. If the new session is passed, all its subsequent packets will be allowed through automatically and any impostors automatically rejected. If a new session is blocked, none of its subsequent packets will be allowed through. Stateful filtering has technically advanced interrogation abilities capable of defending against the flood of different attack methods currently employed by attackers.


30.5.13 Inclusive Rule Set Example

The following rule set is an example of how to code a very secure inclusive type of firewall. An inclusive firewall only allows services matching pass rules through and blocks all other by default. All firewalls have at the minimum two interfaces which have to have rules to allow the firewall to function.

All UNIX flavored systems including FreeBSD are designed to use interface lo0 and IP address 127.0.0.1 for internal communication within the operating system. The firewall rules must contain rules to allow free unmolested movement of these special internally used packets.

The interface which faces the public Internet is the one where you place your rules to authorize and control access out to the public Internet and access requests arriving from the public Internet. This can be your user PPP tun0 interface or your NIC that is connected to your DSL or cable modem.

In cases where one or more NICs are cabled to private LANs behind the firewall, those interfaces must have a rule coded to allow free unmolested movement of packets originating from those LAN interfaces.

The rules should be first organized into three major sections: all the free unmolested interfaces, the public interface outbound, and the public interface inbound.

The rules in each of the public interface sections should have the most frequently matched rules placed before less commonly matched rules, with the last rule in the section blocking and logging all packets on that interface and direction.

The Outbound section in the following rule set only contains ‘pass’ rules which contain selection values that uniquely identify the service that is authorized for public Internet access. All the rules have the ‘quick’, ‘on’, ‘proto’, ‘port’, and ‘keep state’ option coded. The ‘proto tcp’ rules have the ‘flag’ option included to identify the session start request as the triggering packet to activate the stateful facility.

The Inbound section has all the blocking of undesirable packets first, for two different reasons. The first is that these things being blocked may be part of an otherwise valid packet which may be allowed in by the later authorized service rules. The second reason is that by having a rule that explicitly blocks selected packets that I receive on an infrequent basis and that I do not want to see in the log, they will not be caught by the last rule in the section which blocks and logs all packets which have fallen through the rules. The last rule in the section which blocks and logs all packets is how you create the legal evidence needed to prosecute the people who are attacking your system.

Another thing you should take note of, is there is no response returned for any of the undesirable stuff, their packets just get dropped and vanish. This way the attacker has no knowledge if his packets have reached your system. The less the attackers can learn about your system, the more time they must invest before actually doing something bad. The inbound ‘nmap OS fingerprint’ attempts rule I log the first occurrence because this is something a attacker would do.

Any time you see log messages on a rule with ‘log first’. You should do an ipfstat -hio command to see the number of times the rule has been matched so you know if you are being flooded, i.e. under attack.

When you log packets with port numbers you do not recognize, look it up in /etc/services or go to http://www.securitystats.com/tools/portsearch.php and do a port number lookup to find what the purpose of that port number is.

Check out this link for port numbers used by Trojans http://www.simovits.com/trojans/trojans.html.

The following rule set is a complete very secure ‘inclusive’ type of firewall rule set that I have used on my system. You can not go wrong using this rule set for your own. Just comment out any pass rules for services that you do not want to authorize.

If you see messages in your log that you want to stop seeing just add a block rule in the inbound section.

You have to change the dc0 interface name in every rule to the interface name of the Nic card that connects your system to the public Internet. For user PPP it would be tun0.

Add the following statements to /etc/ipf.rules:

#################################################################
# No restrictions on Inside LAN Interface for private network
# Not needed unless you have LAN
#################################################################

#pass out quick on xl0 all
#pass in quick on xl0 all

#################################################################
# No restrictions on Loopback Interface
#################################################################
pass in quick on lo0 all
pass out quick on lo0 all

#################################################################
# Interface facing Public Internet (Outbound Section)
# Interrogate session start requests originating from behind the
# firewall on the private network
# or from this gateway server destine for the public Internet.
#################################################################

# Allow out access to my ISP's Domain name server.
# xxx must be the IP address of your ISP's DNS.
# Dup these lines if your ISP has more than one DNS server
# Get the IP addresses from /etc/resolv.conf file
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to xxx port = 53 flags S keep state
pass out quick on dc0 proto udp from any to xxx port = 53 keep state

# Allow out access to my ISP's DHCP server for cable or DSL networks.
# This rule is not needed for 'user ppp' type connection to the
# public Internet, so you can delete this whole group.
# Use the following rule and check log for IP address.
# Then put IP address in commented out rule & delete first rule
pass out log quick on dc0 proto udp from any to any port = 67 keep state
#pass out quick on dc0 proto udp from any to z.z.z.z port = 67 keep state

# Allow out non-secure standard www function
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 80 flags S keep state

# Allow out secure www function https over TLS SSL
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 443 flags S keep state

# Allow out send & get email function
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 110 flags S keep state
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 25 flags S keep state

# Allow out Time
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 37 flags S keep state

# Allow out nntp news
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 119 flags S keep state

# Allow out gateway & LAN users non-secure FTP ( both passive & active modes)
# This function uses the IPNAT built in FTP proxy function coded in
# the nat rules file to make this single rule function correctly.
# If you want to use the pkg_add command to install application packages
# on your gateway system you need this rule.
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 21 flags S keep state

# Allow out secure FTP, Telnet, and SCP
# This function is using SSH (secure shell)
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 22 flags S keep state

# Allow out non-secure Telnet
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 23 flags S keep state

# Allow out FBSD CVSUP function
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 5999 flags S keep state

# Allow out ping to public Internet
pass out quick on dc0 proto icmp from any to any icmp-type 8 keep state

# Allow out whois for LAN PC to public Internet
pass out quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 43 flags S keep state

# Block and log only the first occurrence of everything
# else that's trying to get out.
# This rule enforces the block all by default logic.
block out log first quick on dc0 all

#################################################################
# Interface facing Public Internet (Inbound Section)
# Interrogate packets originating from the public Internet
# destine for this gateway server or the private network.
#################################################################

# Block all inbound traffic from non-routable or reserved address spaces
block in quick on dc0 from 192.168.0.0/16 to any    #RFC 1918 private IP
block in quick on dc0 from 172.16.0.0/12 to any     #RFC 1918 private IP
block in quick on dc0 from 10.0.0.0/8 to any        #RFC 1918 private IP
block in quick on dc0 from 127.0.0.0/8 to any       #loopback
block in quick on dc0 from 0.0.0.0/8 to any         #loopback
block in quick on dc0 from 169.254.0.0/16 to any    #DHCP auto-config
block in quick on dc0 from 192.0.2.0/24 to any      #reserved for docs
block in quick on dc0 from 204.152.64.0/23 to any   #Sun cluster interconnect
block in quick on dc0 from 224.0.0.0/3 to any       #Class D & E multicast

##### Block a bunch of different nasty things. ############
# That I do not want to see in the log

# Block frags
block in quick on dc0 all with frags

# Block short tcp packets
block in quick on dc0 proto tcp all with short

# block source routed packets
block in quick on dc0 all with opt lsrr
block in quick on dc0 all with opt ssrr

# Block nmap OS fingerprint attempts
# Log first occurrence of these so I can get their IP address
block in log first quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any flags FUP

# Block anything with special options
block in quick on dc0 all with ipopts

# Block public pings
block in quick on dc0 proto icmp all icmp-type 8

# Block ident
block in quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 113

# Block all Netbios service. 137=name, 138=datagram, 139=session
# Netbios is MS/Windows sharing services.
# Block MS/Windows hosts2 name server requests 81
block in log first quick on dc0 proto tcp/udp from any to any port = 137
block in log first quick on dc0 proto tcp/udp from any to any port = 138
block in log first quick on dc0 proto tcp/udp from any to any port = 139
block in log first quick on dc0 proto tcp/udp from any to any port = 81

# Allow traffic in from ISP's DHCP server. This rule must contain
# the IP address of your ISP's DHCP server as it's the only
# authorized source to send this packet type. Only necessary for
# cable or DSL configurations. This rule is not needed for
# 'user ppp' type connection to the public Internet.
# This is the same IP address you captured and
# used in the outbound section.
pass in quick on dc0 proto udp from z.z.z.z to any port = 68 keep state

# Allow in standard www function because I have apache server
pass in quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 80 flags S keep state

# Allow in non-secure Telnet session from public Internet
# labeled non-secure because ID/PW passed over public Internet as clear text.
# Delete this sample group if you do not have telnet server enabled.
#pass in quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 23 flags S keep state

# Allow in secure FTP, Telnet, and SCP from public Internet
# This function is using SSH (secure shell)
pass in quick on dc0 proto tcp from any to any port = 22 flags S keep state

# Block and log only first occurrence of all remaining traffic
# coming into the firewall. The logging of only the first
# occurrence stops a .denial of service. attack targeted
# at filling up your log file space.
# This rule enforces the block all by default logic.
block in log first quick on dc0 all
################### End of rules file #####################################

30.5.14 NAT

NAT stands for Network Address Translation. To those familiar with Linux, this concept is called IP Masquerading; NAT and IP Masquerading are the same thing. One of the many things the IPF NAT function enables is the ability to have a private Local Area Network (LAN) behind the firewall sharing a single ISP assigned IP address on the public Internet.

You may ask why would someone want to do this. ISPs normally assign a dynamic IP address to their non-commercial users. Dynamic means that the IP address can be different each time you dial in and log on to your ISP, or for cable and DSL modem users when you power off and then power on your modems you can get assigned a different IP address. This IP address is how you are known to the public Internet.

Now lets say you have five PCs at home and each one needs Internet access. You would have to pay your ISP for an individual Internet account for each PC and have five phone lines.

With NAT you only need a single account with your ISP, then cable your other four PCs to a switch and the switch to the NIC in your FreeBSD system which is going to service your LAN as a gateway. NAT will automatically translate the private LAN IP address for each separate PC on the LAN to the single public IP address as it exits the firewall bound for the public Internet. It also does the reverse translation for returning packets.

NAT is most often accomplished without the approval, or knowledge, of your ISP and in most cases is grounds for your ISP terminating your account if found out. Commercial users pay a lot more for their Internet connection and usually get assigned a block of static IP address which never change. The ISP also expects and consents to their Commercial customers using NAT for their internal private LANs.

There is a special range of IP addresses reserved for NATed private LAN IP address. According to RFC 1918, you can use the following IP ranges for private nets which will never be routed directly to the public Internet:

Start IP 10.0.0.0

-

Ending IP 10.255.255.255

Start IP 172.16.0.0

-

Ending IP 172.31.255.255

Start IP 192.168.0.0

-

Ending IP 192.168.255.255


30.5.15 IPNAT

NAT rules are loaded by using the ipnat command. Typically the NAT rules are stored in /etc/ipnat.rules. See ipnat(1) for details.

When changing the NAT rules after NAT has been started, make your changes to the file containing the NAT rules, then run ipnat command with the -CF flags to delete the internal in use NAT rules and flush the contents of the translation table of all active entries.

To reload the NAT rules issue a command like this:

# ipnat -CF -f /etc/ipnat.rules

To display some statistics about your NAT, use this command:

# ipnat -s

To list the NAT table’s current mappings, use this command:

# ipnat -l

To turn verbose mode on, and display information relating to rule processing and active rules/table entries:

# ipnat -v

30.5.16 IPNAT Rules

NAT rules are very flexible and can accomplish many different things to fit the needs of commercial and home users.

The rule syntax presented here has been simplified to what is most commonly used in a non-commercial environment. For a complete rule syntax description see the ipnat(5) manual page.

The syntax for a NAT rule looks something like this:

map IF LAN_IP_RANGE -> PUBLIC_ADDRESS

The keyword map starts the rule.

Replace IF with the external interface.

The LAN_IP_RANGE is what your internal clients use for IP Addressing, usually this is something like 192.168.1.0/24.

The PUBLIC_ADDRESS can either be the external IP address or the special keyword 0/32, which means to use the IP address assigned to IF.


30.5.17 How NAT works

A packet arrives at the firewall from the LAN with a public destination. It passes through the outbound filter rules, NAT gets his turn at the packet and applies its rules top down, first matching rule wins. NAT tests each of its rules against the packets interface name and source IP address. When a packets interface name matches a NAT rule then the [source IP address, i.e. private LAN IP address] of the packet is checked to see if it falls within the IP address range specified to the left of the arrow symbol on the NAT rule. On a match the packet has its source IP address rewritten with the public IP address obtained by the 0/32 keyword. NAT posts a entry in its internal NAT table so when the packet returns from the public Internet it can be mapped back to its original private IP address and then passed to the filter rules for processing.


30.5.18 Enabling IPNAT

To enable IPNAT add these statements to /etc/rc.conf.

To enable your machine to route traffic between interfaces:

gateway_enable="YES"

To start IPNAT automatically each time:

ipnat_enable="YES"

To specify where to load the IPNAT rules from:

ipnat_rules="/etc/ipnat.rules"

30.5.19 NAT for a very large LAN

For networks that have large numbers of PC’s on the LAN or networks with more than a single LAN, the process of funneling all those private IP addresses into a single public IP address becomes a resource problem that may cause problems with the same port numbers being used many times across many NATed LAN PC’s, causing collisions. There are two ways to relieve this resource problem.


30.5.19.1 Assigning Ports to Use

A normal NAT rule would look like:

map dc0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 0/32

In the above rule the packet’s source port is unchanged as the packet passes through IPNAT. By adding the portmap keyword you can tell IPNAT to only use source ports in a range. For example the following rule will tell IPNAT to modify the source port to be within that range:

map dc0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 0/32 portmap tcp/udp 20000:60000

Additionally we can make things even easier by using the auto keyword to tell IPNAT to determine by itself which ports are available to use:

map dc0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 0/32 portmap tcp/udp auto

30.5.19.2 Using a pool of public addresses

In very large LANs there comes a point where there are just too many LAN addresses to fit into a single public address. If a block of public IP addresses is available, you can use these addresses as a “pool”, and let IPNAT pick one of the public IP addresses as packet-addresses are mapped on their way out.

For example, instead of mapping all packets through a single public IP address, as in:

map dc0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 204.134.75.1

A range of public IP addresses can be specified either with a netmask:

map dc0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 204.134.75.0/255.255.255.0

or using CIDR notation:

map dc0 192.168.1.0/24 -> 204.134.75.0/24

30.5.20 Port Redirection

A very common practice is to have a web server, email server, database server and DNS server each segregated to a different PC on the LAN. In this case the traffic from these servers still have to be NATed, but there has to be some way to direct the inbound traffic to the correct LAN PCs. IPNAT has the redirection facilities of NAT to solve this problem. Lets say you have your web server on LAN address 10.0.10.25 and your single public IP address is 20.20.20.5 you would code the rule like this:

rdr dc0 20.20.20.5/32 port 80 -> 10.0.10.25 port 80

or:

rdr dc0 0.0.0.0/0 port 80 -> 10.0.10.25 port 80

or for a LAN DNS Server on LAN address of 10.0.10.33 that needs to receive public DNS requests:

rdr dc0 20.20.20.5/32 port 53 -> 10.0.10.33 port 53 udp

30.5.21 FTP and NAT

FTP is a dinosaur left over from the time before the Internet as it is known today, when research universities were leased lined together and FTP was used to share files among research Scientists. This was a time when data security was not a consideration. Over the years the FTP protocol became buried into the backbone of the emerging Internet and its username and password being sent in clear text was never changed to address new security concerns. FTP has two flavors, it can run in active mode or passive mode. The difference is in how the data channel is acquired. Passive mode is more secure as the data channel is acquired be the ordinal ftp session requester. For a real good explanation of FTP and the different modes see http://www.slacksite.com/other/ftp.html.


30.5.21.1 IPNAT Rules

IPNAT has a special built in FTP proxy option which can be specified on the NAT map rule. It can monitor all outbound packet traffic for FTP active or passive start session requests and dynamically create temporary filter rules containing only the port number really in use for the data channel. This eliminates the security risk FTP normally exposes the firewall to from having large ranges of high order port numbers open.

This rule will handle all the traffic for the internal LAN:

map dc0 10.0.10.0/29 -> 0/32 proxy port 21 ftp/tcp

This rule handles the FTP traffic from the gateway:

map dc0 0.0.0.0/0 -> 0/32 proxy port 21 ftp/tcp

This rule handles all non-FTP traffic from the internal LAN:

map dc0 10.0.10.0/29 -> 0/32

The FTP map rule goes before our regular map rule. All packets are tested against the first rule from the top. Matches on interface name, then private LAN source IP address, and then is it a FTP packet. If all that matches then the special FTP proxy creates temp filter rules to let the FTP session packets pass in and out, in addition to also NATing the FTP packets. All LAN packets that are not FTP do not match the first rule and fall through to the third rule and are tested, matching on interface and source IP, then are NATed.


30.5.21.2 IPNAT FTP Filter Rules

Only one filter rule is needed for FTP if the NAT FTP proxy is used.

Without the FTP Proxy you will need the following three rules:

# Allow out LAN PC client FTP to public Internet
# Active and passive modes
pass out quick on rl0 proto tcp from any to any port = 21 flags S keep state

# Allow out passive mode data channel high order port numbers
pass out quick on rl0 proto tcp from any to any port > 1024 flags S keep state

# Active mode let data channel in from FTP server
pass in quick on rl0 proto tcp from any to any port = 20 flags S keep state

30.6 IPFW

The IPFIREWALL (IPFW) is a FreeBSD sponsored firewall software application authored and maintained by FreeBSD volunteer staff members. It uses the legacy stateless rules and a legacy rule coding technique to achieve what is referred to as Simple Stateful logic.

The IPFW sample rule set (found in /etc/rc.firewall and /etc/rc.firewall6) in the standard FreeBSD install is rather simple and it is not expected that it used directly without modifications. The example does not use stateful filtering, which is beneficial in most setups, so it will not be used as base for this section.

The IPFW stateless rule syntax is empowered with technically sophisticated selection capabilities which far surpasses the knowledge level of the customary firewall installer. IPFW is targeted at the professional user or the advanced technical computer hobbyist who have advanced packet selection requirements. A high degree of detailed knowledge into how different protocols use and create their unique packet header information is necessary before the power of the IPFW rules can be unleashed. Providing that level of explanation is out of the scope of this section of the handbook.

IPFW is composed of seven components, the primary component is the kernel firewall filter rule processor and its integrated packet accounting facility, the logging facility, the ‘divert’ rule which triggers the NAT facility, and the advanced special purpose facilities, the dummynet traffic shaper facilities, the ‘fwd rule’ forward facility, the bridge facility, and the ipstealth facility. IPFW supports both IPv4 and IPv6.


30.6.1 Enabling IPFW

IPFW is included in the basic FreeBSD install as a separate run time loadable module. The system will dynamically load the kernel module when the rc.conf statement firewall_enable="YES" is used. You do not need to compile IPFW into the FreeBSD kernel unless you want NAT function enabled.

After rebooting your system with firewall_enable="YES" in rc.conf the following white highlighted message is displayed on the screen as part of the boot process:

ipfw2 initialized, divert disabled, rule-based forwarding disabled, default to deny, logging disabled

The loadable module does have logging ability compiled in. To enable logging and set the verbose logging limit, there is a knob you can set in /etc/sysctl.conf by adding these statements, logging will be enabled on future reboots:

net.inet.ip.fw.verbose=1
net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit=5

30.6.2 Kernel Options

It is not a mandatory requirement that you enable IPFW by compiling the following options into the FreeBSD kernel unless you need NAT function. It is presented here as background information.

options    IPFIREWALL

This option enables IPFW as part of the kernel

options    IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE

Enables logging of packets that pass through IPFW and have the ‘log’ keyword specified in the rule set.

options    IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT=5

Limits the number of packets logged through syslogd(8) on a per entry basis. You may wish to use this option in hostile environments which you want to log firewall activity. This will close a possible denial of service attack via syslog flooding.

options    IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT

This option will allow everything to pass through the firewall by default, which is a good idea when you are first setting up your firewall.

options    IPDIVERT

This enables the use of NAT functionality.

Note: If you do not include IPFIREWALL_DEFAULT_TO_ACCEPT or set your rules to allow incoming packets you will block all packets going to and from this machine.


30.6.3 /etc/rc.conf Options

Enable the firewall:

firewall_enable="YES"

To select one of the default firewall types provided by FreeBSD, select one by reading the /etc/rc.firewall file and place it in the following:

firewall_type="open"

Available values for this setting are:

  • open — pass all traffic.

  • client — will protect only this machine.

  • simple — protect the whole network.

  • closed — entirely disables IP traffic except for the loopback interface.

  • UNKNOWN — disables the loading of firewall rules.

  • filename — absolute path of file containing firewall rules.

It is possible to use two different ways to load custom rules for ipfw firewall. One is by setting firewall_type variable to absolute path of file, which contains firewall rules without any command-line options for ipfw(8) itself. A simple example of ruleset file can be following:

add block in  all
add block out all

On the other hand, it is possible to set firewall_script variable to absolute path of executable script that includes ipfw commands being executed at system boot time. A valid ruleset script that would be equivalent to the ruleset file shown above would be following:

#!/bin/sh

ipfw -q flush

ipfw add block in  all
ipfw add block out all

Note: If firewall_type is set to either client or simple, the default rules found in /etc/rc.firewall should be reviewed to fit to the configuration of the given machine. Also note that the examples used in this chapter expect that the firewall_script is set to /etc/ipfw.rules.

Enable logging:

firewall_logging="YES"

Warning: The only thing that the firewall_logging variable will do is setting the net.inet.ip.fw.verbose sysctl variable to the value of 1 (see Section 30.6.1). There is no rc.conf variable to set log limitations, but it can be set via sysctl variable, manually or from the /etc/sysctl.conf file:

net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit=5

If your machine is acting as a gateway, i.e. providing Network Address Translation (NAT) via natd(8), please refer to Section 31.9 for information regarding the required /etc/rc.conf options.


30.6.4 The IPFW Command

The ipfw command is the normal vehicle for making manual single rule additions or deletions to the firewall active internal rules while it is running. The problem with using this method is once your system is shutdown or halted all the rules you added or changed or deleted are lost. Writing all your rules in a file and using that file to load the rules at boot time, or to replace in mass the currently running firewall rules with changes you made to the files content is the recommended method used here.

The ipfw command is still a very useful to display the running firewall rules to the console screen. The IPFW accounting facility dynamically creates a counter for each rule that counts each packet that matches the rule. During the process of testing a rule, listing the rule with its counter is the one of the ways of determining if the rule is functioning.

To list all the rules in sequence:

# ipfw list

To list all the rules with a time stamp of when the last time the rule was matched:

# ipfw -t list

To list the accounting information, packet count for matched rules along with the rules themselves. The first column is the rule number, followed by the number of outgoing matched packets, followed by the number of incoming matched packets, and then the rule itself.

# ipfw -a list

List the dynamic rules in addition to the static rules:

# ipfw -d list

Also show the expired dynamic rules:

# ipfw -d -e list

Zero the counters:

# ipfw zero

Zero the counters for just rule NUM:

# ipfw zero NUM

30.6.5 IPFW Rule Sets

A rule set is a group of ipfw rules coded to allow or deny packets based on the values contained in the packet. The bi-directional exchange of packets between hosts comprises a session conversation. The firewall rule set processes the packet twice: once on its arrival from the public Internet host and again as it leaves for its return trip back to the public Internet host. Each tcp/ip service (i.e. telnet, www, mail, etc.) is predefined by its protocol, and port number. This is the basic selection criteria used to create rules which will allow or deny services.

When a packet enters the firewall it is compared against the first rule in the rule set and progress one rule at a time moving from top to bottom of the set in ascending rule number sequence order. When the packet matches a rule selection parameters, the rules action field value is executed and the search of the rule set terminates for that packet. This is referred to as “the first match wins” search method. If the packet does not match any of the rules, it gets caught by the mandatory ipfw default rule, number 65535 which denies all packets and discards them without any reply back to the originating destination.

Note: The search continues after count, skipto and tee rules.

The instructions contained here are based on using rules that contain the stateful ‘keep state’, ‘limit’, ‘in’/'out’, and via options. This is the basic framework for coding an inclusive type firewall rule set.

An inclusive firewall only allows services matching the rules through. This way you can control what services can originate behind the firewall destine for the public Internet and also control the services which can originate from the public Internet accessing your private network. Everything else is denied by default design. Inclusive firewalls are much, much more secure than exclusive firewall rule sets and is the only rule set type covered here in.

Warning: When working with the firewall rules be careful, you can end up locking your self out.


30.6.5.1 Rule Syntax

The rule syntax presented here has been simplified to what is necessary to create a standard inclusive type firewall rule set. For a complete rule syntax description see the ipfw(8) manual page.

Rules contain keywords: these keywords have to be coded in a specific order from left to right on the line. Keywords are identified in bold type. Some keywords have sub-options which may be keywords them selves and also include more sub-options.

# is used to mark the start of a comment and may appear at the end of a rule line or on its own lines. Blank lines are ignored.

CMD RULE_NUMBER ACTION LOGGING SELECTION STATEFUL


30.6.5.1.1 CMD

Each new rule has to be prefixed with add to add the rule to the internal table.


30.6.5.1.2 RULE_NUMBER

Each rule has to have a rule number to go with it.


30.6.5.1.3 ACTION

A rule can be associated with one of the following actions, which will be executed when the packet matches the selection criterion of the rule.

allow | accept | pass | permit

These all mean the same thing which is to allow packets that match the rule to exit the firewall rule processing. The search terminates at this rule.

check-state

Checks the packet against the dynamic rules table. If a match is found, execute the action associated with the rule which generated this dynamic rule, otherwise move to the next rule. The check-state rule does not have selection criterion. If no check-state rule is present in the rule set, the dynamic rules table is checked at the first keep-state or limit rule.

deny | drop

Both words mean the same thing which is to discard packets that match this rule. The search terminates.


30.6.5.1.4 Logging

log or logamount

When a packet matches a rule with the log keyword, a message will be logged to syslogd with a facility name of SECURITY. The logging only occurs if the number of packets logged so far for that particular rule does not exceed the logamount parameter. If no logamount is specified, the limit is taken from the sysctl variable net.inet.ip.fw.verbose_limit. In both cases, a value of zero removes the logging limit. Once the limit is reached, logging can be re-enabled by clearing the logging counter or the packet counter for that rule, see the ipfw reset log command.

Note: Logging is done after all other packet matching conditions have been successfully verified, and before performing the final action (accept, deny) on the packet. It is up to you to decide which rules you want to enable logging on.


30.6.5.1.5 Selection

The keywords described in this section are used to describe attributes of the packet to be interrogated when determining whether rules match the packet or not. The following general-purpose attributes are provided for matching, and must be used in this order:

udp | tcp | icmp

or any protocol names found in /etc/protocols are recognized and may be used. The value specified is protocol to be matched against. This is a mandatory requirement.

from src to dst

The from and to keywords are used to match against IP addresses. Rules must specify BOTH source and destination parameters. any is a special keyword that matches any IP address. me is a special keyword that matches any IP address configured on an interface in your FreeBSD system to represent the PC the firewall is running on (i.e. this box) as in ‘from me to any’ or ‘from any to me’ or ‘from 0.0.0.0/0 to any’ or ‘from any to 0.0.0.0/0′ or ‘from 0.0.0.0 to any’ or ‘from any to 0.0.0.0′ or ‘from me to 0.0.0.0′. IP addresses are specified as a dotted IP address numeric form/mask-length, or as single dotted IP address numeric form. This is a mandatory requirement. See this link for help on writing mask-lengths. http://jodies.de/ipcalc

port number

For protocols which support port numbers (such as TCP and UDP). It is mandatory that you code the port number of the service you want to match on. Service names (from /etc/services) may be used instead of numeric port values.

in | out

Matches incoming or outgoing packets, respectively. The in and out are keywords and it is mandatory that you code one or the other as part of your rule matching criterion.

via IF

Matches packets going through the interface specified by exact name. The via keyword causes the interface to always be checked as part of the match process.

setup

This is a mandatory keyword that identifies the session start request for TCP packets.

keep-state

This is a mandatory keyword. Upon a match, the firewall will create a dynamic rule, whose default behavior is to match bidirectional traffic between source and destination IP/port using the same protocol.

limit {src-addr | src-port | dst-addr | dst-port}

The firewall will only allow N connections with the same set of parameters as specified in the rule. One or more of source and destination addresses and ports can be specified. The ‘limit’ and ‘keep-state’ can not be used on same rule. Limit provides the same stateful function as ‘keep-state’ plus its own functions.


30.6.5.2 Stateful Rule Option

Stateful filtering treats traffic as a bi-directional exchange of packets comprising a session conversation. It has the interrogation abilities to determine if the session conversation between the originating sender and the destination are following the valid procedure of bi-directional packet exchange. Any packets that do not properly fit the session conversation template are automatically rejected as impostors.

‘check-state’ is used to identify where in the IPFW rules set the packet is to be tested against the dynamic rules facility. On a match the packet exits the firewall to continue on its way and a new rule is dynamic created for the next anticipated packet being exchanged during this bi-directional session conversation. On a no match the packet advances to the next rule in the rule set for testing.

The dynamic rules facility is vulnerable to resource depletion from a SYN-flood attack which would open a huge number of dynamic rules. To counter this attack, FreeBSD added another new option named limit. This option is used to limit the number of simultaneous session conversations by interrogating the rules source or destinations fields as directed by the limit option and using the packet’s IP address found there, in a search of the open dynamic rules counting the number of times this rule and IP address combination occurred, if this count is greater that the value specified on the limit option, the packet is discarded.


30.6.5.3 Logging Firewall Messages

The benefits of logging are obvious: it provides the ability to review after the fact the rules you activated logging on which provides information like, what packets had been dropped, what addresses they came from, where they were going, giving you a significant edge in tracking down attackers.

Even with the logging facility enabled, IPFW will not generate any rule logging on it’s own. The firewall administrator decides what rules in the rule set he wants to log and adds the log verb to those rules. Normally only deny rules are logged, like the deny rule for incoming ICMP pings. It is very customary to duplicate the ipfw default deny everything rule with the log verb included as your last rule in the rule set. This way you get to see all the packets that did not match any of the rules in the rule set.

Logging is a two edged sword, if you are not careful, you can lose yourself in the over abundance of log data and fill your disk up with growing log files. DoS attacks that fill up disk drives is one of the oldest attacks around. These log message are not only written to syslogd, but also are displayed on the root console screen and soon become very annoying.

The IPFIREWALL_VERBOSE_LIMIT=5 kernel option limits the number of consecutive messages sent to the system logger syslogd, concerning the packet matching of a given rule. When this option is enabled in the kernel, the number of consecutive messages concerning a particular rule is capped at the number specified. There is nothing to be gained from 200 log messages saying the same identical thing. For instance, five consecutive messages concerning a particular rule would be logged to syslogd, the remainder identical consecutive messages would be counted and posted to the syslogd with a phrase like this:

last message repeated 45 times

All logged packets messages are written by default to /var/log/security file, which is defined in the /etc/syslog.conf file.


30.6.5.4 Building a Rule Script

Most experienced IPFW users create a file containing the rules and code them in a manner compatible with running them as a script. The major benefit of doing this is the firewall rules can be refreshed in mass without the need of rebooting the system to activate the new rules. This method is very convenient in testing new rules as the procedure can be executed as many times as needed. Being a script, you can use symbolic substitution to code frequent used values and substitution them in multiple rules. You will see this in the following example.

The script syntax used here is compatible with the ’sh’, ‘csh’, ‘tcsh’ shells. Symbolic substitution fields are prefixed with a dollar sign $. Symbolic fields do not have the $ prefix. The value to populate the Symbolic field must be enclosed to "double quotes".

Start your rules file like this:

############### start of example ipfw rules script #############
#
ipfw -q -f flush       # Delete all rules
# Set defaults
oif="tun0"             # out interface
odns="192.0.2.11"      # ISP's DNS server IP address
cmd="ipfw -q add "     # build rule prefix
ks="keep-state"        # just too lazy to key this each time
$cmd 00500 check-state
$cmd 00502 deny all from any to any frag
$cmd 00501 deny tcp from any to any established
$cmd 00600 allow tcp from any to any 80 out via $oif setup $ks
$cmd 00610 allow tcp from any to $odns 53 out via $oif setup $ks
$cmd 00611 allow udp from any to $odns 53 out via $oif $ks
################### End of example ipfw rules script ############

That is all there is to it. The rules are not important in this example, how the Symbolic substitution field are populated and used are.

If the above example was in /etc/ipfw.rules file, you could reload these rules by entering on the command line.

# sh /etc/ipfw.rules

The /etc/ipfw.rules file could be located anywhere you want and the file could be named any thing you would like.

The same thing could also be accomplished by running these commands by hand:

# ipfw -q -f flush
# ipfw -q add check-state
# ipfw -q add deny all from any to any frag
# ipfw -q add deny tcp from any to any established
# ipfw -q add allow tcp from any to any 80 out via tun0 setup keep-state
# ipfw -q add allow tcp from any to 192.0.2.11 53 out via tun0 setup keep-state
# ipfw -q add 00611 allow udp from any to 192.0.2.11 53 out via tun0 keep-state

30.6.5.5 Stateful Ruleset

The following non-NATed rule set is an example of how to code a very secure ‘inclusive’ type of firewall. An inclusive firewall only allows services matching pass rules through and blocks all other by default. All firewalls have at the minimum two interfaces which have to have rules to allow the firewall to function.

All UNIX flavored operating systems, FreeBSD included, are designed to use interface lo0 and IP address 127.0.0.1 for internal communication with in the operating system. The firewall rules must contain rules to allow free unmolested movement of these special internally used packets.

The interface which faces the public Internet, is the one which you code your rules to authorize and control access out to the public Internet and access requests arriving from the public Internet. This can be your ppp tun0 interface or your NIC that is connected to your DSL or cable modem.

In cases where one or more than one NIC are connected to a private LANs behind the firewall, those interfaces must have rules coded to allow free unmolested movement of packets originating from those LAN interfaces.

The rules should be first organized into three major sections, all the free unmolested interfaces, public interface outbound, and the public interface inbound.

The order of the rules in each of the public interface sections should be in order of the most used rules being placed before less often used rules with the last rule in the section being a block log all packets on that interface and direction.

The Outbound section in the following rule set only contains ‘allow’ rules which contain selection values that uniquely identify the service that is authorized for public Internet access. All the rules have the, proto, port, in/out, via and keep state option coded. The ‘proto tcp’ rules have the ’setup’ option included to identify the start session request as the trigger packet to be posted to the keep state stateful table.

The Inbound section has all the blocking of undesirable packets first for two different reasons. First is these things being blocked may be part of an otherwise valid packet which may be allowed in by the later authorized service rules. Second reason is that by having a rule that explicitly blocks selected packets that I receive on an infrequent bases and do not want to see in the log, this keeps them from being caught by the last rule in the section which blocks and logs all packets which have fallen through the rules. The last rule in the section which blocks and logs all packets is how you create the legal evidence needed to prosecute the people who are attacking your system.

Another thing you should take note of, is there is no response returned for any of the undesirable stuff, their packets just get dropped and vanish. This way the attackers has no knowledge if his packets have reached your system. The less the attackers can learn about your system the more secure it is. When you log packets with port numbers you do not recognize, look the numbers up in /etc/services/ or go to http://www.securitystats.com/tools/portsearch.php and do a port number lookup to find what the purpose of that port number is. Check out this link for port numbers used by Trojans: http://www.simovits.com/trojans/trojans.html.


30.6.5.6 An Example Inclusive Ruleset

The following non-NATed rule set is a complete inclusive type ruleset. You can not go wrong using this rule set for you own. Just comment out any pass rules for services you do not want. If you see messages in your log that you want to stop seeing just add a deny rule in the inbound section. You have to change the ‘dc0′ interface name in every rule to the interface name of the NIC that connects your system to the public Internet. For user ppp it would be ‘tun0′.

You will see a pattern in the usage of these rules.

  • All statements that are a request to start a session to the public Internet use keep-state.

  • All the authorized services that originate from the public Internet have the limit option to stop flooding.

  • All rules use in or out to clarify direction.

  • All rules use via interface name to specify the interface the packet is traveling over.

The following rules go into /etc/ipfw.rules.

################ Start of IPFW rules file ###############################
# Flush out the list before we begin.
ipfw -q -f flush

# Set rules command prefix
cmd="ipfw -q add"
pif="dc0"     # public interface name of NIC
              # facing the public Internet

#################################################################
# No restrictions on Inside LAN Interface for private network
# Not needed unless you have LAN.
# Change xl0 to your LAN NIC interface name
#################################################################
#$cmd 00005 allow all from any to any via xl0

#################################################################
# No restrictions on Loopback Interface
#################################################################
$cmd 00010 allow all from any to any via lo0

#################################################################
# Allow the packet through if it has previous been added to the
# the "dynamic" rules table by a allow keep-state statement.
#################################################################
$cmd 00015 check-state

#################################################################
# Interface facing Public Internet (Outbound Section)
# Interrogate session start requests originating from behind the
# firewall on the private network or from this gateway server
# destine for the public Internet.
#################################################################

# Allow out access to my ISP's Domain name server.
# x.x.x.x must be the IP address of your ISP.s DNS
# Dup these lines if your ISP has more than one DNS server
# Get the IP addresses from /etc/resolv.conf file
$cmd 00110 allow tcp from any to x.x.x.x 53 out via $pif setup keep-state
$cmd 00111 allow udp from any to x.x.x.x 53 out via $pif keep-state

# Allow out access to my ISP's DHCP server for cable/DSL configurations.
# This rule is not needed for .user ppp. connection to the public Internet.
# so you can delete this whole group.
# Use the following rule and check log for IP address.
# Then put IP address in commented out rule & delete first rule
$cmd 00120 allow log udp from any to any 67 out via $pif keep-state
#$cmd 00120 allow udp from any to x.x.x.x 67 out via $pif keep-state

# Allow out non-secure standard www function
$cmd 00200 allow tcp from any to any 80 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out secure www function https over TLS SSL
$cmd 00220 allow tcp from any to any 443 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out send & get email function
$cmd 00230 allow tcp from any to any 25 out via $pif setup keep-state
$cmd 00231 allow tcp from any to any 110 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out FBSD (make install & CVSUP) functions
# Basically give user root "GOD" privileges.
$cmd 00240 allow tcp from me to any out via $pif setup keep-state uid root

# Allow out ping
$cmd 00250 allow icmp from any to any out via $pif keep-state

# Allow out Time
$cmd 00260 allow tcp from any to any 37 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out nntp news (i.e. news groups)
$cmd 00270 allow tcp from any to any 119 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out secure FTP, Telnet, and SCP
# This function is using SSH (secure shell)
$cmd 00280 allow tcp from any to any 22 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out whois
$cmd 00290 allow tcp from any to any 43 out via $pif setup keep-state

# deny and log everything else that.s trying to get out.
# This rule enforces the block all by default logic.
$cmd 00299 deny log all from any to any out via $pif

#################################################################
# Interface facing Public Internet (Inbound Section)
# Interrogate packets originating from the public Internet
# destine for this gateway server or the private network.
#################################################################

# Deny all inbound traffic from non-routable reserved address spaces
$cmd 00300 deny all from 192.168.0.0/16 to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 00301 deny all from 172.16.0.0/12 to any in via $pif     #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 00302 deny all from 10.0.0.0/8 to any in via $pif          #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 00303 deny all from 127.0.0.0/8 to any in via $pif        #loopback
$cmd 00304 deny all from 0.0.0.0/8 to any in via $pif            #loopback
$cmd 00305 deny all from 169.254.0.0/16 to any in via $pif   #DHCP auto-config
$cmd 00306 deny all from 192.0.2.0/24 to any in via $pif       #reserved for docs
$cmd 00307 deny all from 204.152.64.0/23 to any in via $pif  #Sun cluster interconnect
$cmd 00308 deny all from 224.0.0.0/3 to any in via $pif         #Class D & E multicast

# Deny public pings
$cmd 00310 deny icmp from any to any in via $pif

# Deny ident
$cmd 00315 deny tcp from any to any 113 in via $pif

# Deny all Netbios service. 137=name, 138=datagram, 139=session
# Netbios is MS/Windows sharing services.
# Block MS/Windows hosts2 name server requests 81
$cmd 00320 deny tcp from any to any 137 in via $pif
$cmd 00321 deny tcp from any to any 138 in via $pif
$cmd 00322 deny tcp from any to any 139 in via $pif
$cmd 00323 deny tcp from any to any 81 in via $pif

# Deny any late arriving packets
$cmd 00330 deny all from any to any frag in via $pif

# Deny ACK packets that did not match the dynamic rule table
$cmd 00332 deny tcp from any to any established in via $pif

# Allow traffic in from ISP's DHCP server. This rule must contain
# the IP address of your ISP.s DHCP server as it.s the only
# authorized source to send this packet type.
# Only necessary for cable or DSL configurations.
# This rule is not needed for .user ppp. type connection to
# the public Internet. This is the same IP address you captured
# and used in the outbound section.
#$cmd 00360 allow udp from any to x.x.x.x 67 in via $pif keep-state

# Allow in standard www function because I have apache server
$cmd 00400 allow tcp from any to me 80 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 2

# Allow in secure FTP, Telnet, and SCP from public Internet
$cmd 00410 allow tcp from any to me 22 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 2

# Allow in non-secure Telnet session from public Internet
# labeled non-secure because ID & PW are passed over public
# Internet as clear text.
# Delete this sample group if you do not have telnet server enabled.
$cmd 00420 allow tcp from any to me 23 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 2

# Reject & Log all incoming connections from the outside
$cmd 00499 deny log all from any to any in via $pif

# Everything else is denied by default
# deny and log all packets that fell through to see what they are
$cmd 00999 deny log all from any to any
################ End of IPFW rules file ###############################

30.6.5.7 An Example NAT and Stateful Ruleset

There are some additional configuration statements that need to be enabled to activate the NAT function of IPFW. The kernel source needs ‘option IPDIVERT’ statement added to the other IPFIREWALL statements compiled into a custom kernel.

In addition to the normal IPFW options in /etc/rc.conf, the following are needed.

natd_enable="YES"                   # Enable NATD function
natd_interface="rl0"                # interface name of public Internet NIC
natd_flags="-dynamic -m"            # -m = preserve port numbers if possible

Utilizing stateful rules with divert natd rule (Network Address Translation) greatly complicates the rule set coding logic. The positioning of the check-state, and ‘divert natd’ rules in the rule set becomes very critical. This is no longer a simple fall-through logic flow. A new action type is used, called ’skipto’. To use the skipto command it is mandatory that you number each rule so you know exactly where the skipto rule number is you are really jumping to.

The following is an uncommented example of one coding method, selected here to explain the sequence of the packet flow through the rule sets.

The processing flow starts with the first rule from the top of the rule file and progress one rule at a time deeper into the file until the end is reach or the packet being tested to the selection criteria matches and the packet is released out of the firewall. It is important to take notice of the location of rule numbers 100 101, 450, 500, and 510. These rules control the translation of the outbound and inbound packets so their entries in the keep-state dynamic table always register the private LAN IP address. Next notice that all the allow and deny rules specified the direction the packet is going (IE outbound or inbound) and the interface. Also notice that all the start outbound session requests all skipto rule 500 for the network address translation.

Lets say a LAN user uses their web browser to get a web page. Web pages use port 80 to communicate over. So the packet enters the firewall, It does not match 100 because it is headed out not in. It passes rule 101 because this is the first packet so it has not been posted to the keep-state dynamic table yet. The packet finally comes to rule 125 a matches. It is outbound through the NIC facing the public Internet. The packet still has it’s source IP address as a private LAN IP address. On the match to this rule, two actions take place. The keep-state option will post this rule into the keep-state dynamic rules table and the specified action is executed. The action is part of the info posted to the dynamic table. In this case it is "skipto rule 500". Rule 500 NATs the packet IP address and out it goes. Remember this, this is very important. This packet makes its way to the destination and returns and enters the top of the rule set. This time it does match rule 100 and has it destination IP address mapped back to its corresponding LAN IP address. It then is processed by the check-state rule, it’s found in the table as an existing session conversation and released to the LAN. It goes to the LAN PC that sent it and a new packet is sent requesting another segment of the data from the remote server. This time it gets checked by the check-state rule and its outbound entry is found, the associated action, ’skipto 500′, is executed. The packet jumps to rule 500 gets NATed and released on it’s way out.

On the inbound side, everything coming in that is part of an existing session conversation is being automatically handled by the check-state rule and the properly placed divert natd rules. All we have to address is denying all the bad packets and only allowing in the authorized services. Lets say there is a apache server running on the firewall box and we want people on the public Internet to be able to access the local web site. The new inbound start request packet matches rule 100 and its IP address is mapped to LAN IP for the firewall box. The packet is them matched against all the nasty things we want to check for and finally matches against rule 425. On a match two things occur. The packet rule is posted to the keep-state dynamic table but this time any new session requests originating from that source IP address is limited to 2. This defends against DoS attacks of service running on the specified port number. The action is allow so the packet is released to the LAN. On return the check-state rule recognizes the packet as belonging to an existing session conversation sends it to rule 500 for NATing and released to outbound interface.

Example Ruleset #1:

#!/bin/sh
cmd="ipfw -q add"
skip="skipto 500"
pif=rl0
ks="keep-state"
good_tcpo="22,25,37,43,53,80,443,110,119"

ipfw -q -f flush

$cmd 002 allow all from any to any via xl0  # exclude LAN traffic
$cmd 003 allow all from any to any via lo0  # exclude loopback traffic

$cmd 100 divert natd ip from any to any in via $pif
$cmd 101 check-state

# Authorized outbound packets
$cmd 120 $skip udp from any to xx.168.240.2 53 out via $pif $ks
$cmd 121 $skip udp from any to xx.168.240.5 53 out via $pif $ks
$cmd 125 $skip tcp from any to any $good_tcpo out via $pif setup $ks
$cmd 130 $skip icmp from any to any out via $pif $ks
$cmd 135 $skip udp from any to any 123 out via $pif $ks

# Deny all inbound traffic from non-routable reserved address spaces
$cmd 300 deny all from 192.168.0.0/16  to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 301 deny all from 172.16.0.0/12   to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 302 deny all from 10.0.0.0/8      to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 303 deny all from 127.0.0.0/8     to any in via $pif  #loopback
$cmd 304 deny all from 0.0.0.0/8       to any in via $pif  #loopback
$cmd 305 deny all from 169.254.0.0/16  to any in via $pif  #DHCP auto-config
$cmd 306 deny all from 192.0.2.0/24    to any in via $pif  #reserved for docs
$cmd 307 deny all from 204.152.64.0/23 to any in via $pif  #Sun cluster
$cmd 308 deny all from 224.0.0.0/3     to any in via $pif  #Class D & E multicast

# Authorized inbound packets
$cmd 400 allow udp from xx.70.207.54 to any 68 in $ks
$cmd 420 allow tcp from any to me 80 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 1

$cmd 450 deny log ip from any to any

# This is skipto location for outbound stateful rules
$cmd 500 divert natd ip from any to any out via $pif
$cmd 510 allow ip from any to any

######################## end of rules  ##################

The following is pretty much the same as above, but uses a self documenting coding style full of description comments to help the inexperienced IPFW rule writer to better understand what the rules are doing.

Example Ruleset #2:

#!/bin/sh
################ Start of IPFW rules file ###############################
# Flush out the list before we begin.
ipfw -q -f flush

# Set rules command prefix
cmd="ipfw -q add"
skip="skipto 800"
pif="rl0"     # public interface name of NIC
              # facing the public Internet

#################################################################
# No restrictions on Inside LAN Interface for private network
# Change xl0 to your LAN NIC interface name
#################################################################
$cmd 005 allow all from any to any via xl0

#################################################################
# No restrictions on Loopback Interface
#################################################################
$cmd 010 allow all from any to any via lo0

#################################################################
# check if packet is inbound and nat address if it is
#################################################################
$cmd 014 divert natd ip from any to any in via $pif

#################################################################
# Allow the packet through if it has previous been added to the
# the "dynamic" rules table by a allow keep-state statement.
#################################################################
$cmd 015 check-state

#################################################################
# Interface facing Public Internet (Outbound Section)
# Interrogate session start requests originating from behind the
# firewall on the private network or from this gateway server
# destine for the public Internet.
#################################################################

# Allow out access to my ISP's Domain name server.
# x.x.x.x must be the IP address of your ISP's DNS
# Dup these lines if your ISP has more than one DNS server
# Get the IP addresses from /etc/resolv.conf file
$cmd 020 $skip tcp from any to x.x.x.x 53 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out access to my ISP's DHCP server for cable/DSL configurations.
$cmd 030 $skip udp from any to x.x.x.x 67 out via $pif keep-state

# Allow out non-secure standard www function
$cmd 040 $skip tcp from any to any 80 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out secure www function https over TLS SSL
$cmd 050 $skip tcp from any to any 443 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out send & get email function
$cmd 060 $skip tcp from any to any 25 out via $pif setup keep-state
$cmd 061 $skip tcp from any to any 110 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out FreeBSD (make install & CVSUP) functions
# Basically give user root "GOD" privileges.
$cmd 070 $skip tcp from me to any out via $pif setup keep-state uid root

# Allow out ping
$cmd 080 $skip icmp from any to any out via $pif keep-state

# Allow out Time
$cmd 090 $skip tcp from any to any 37 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out nntp news (i.e. news groups)
$cmd 100 $skip tcp from any to any 119 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out secure FTP, Telnet, and SCP
# This function is using SSH (secure shell)
$cmd 110 $skip tcp from any to any 22 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow out whois
$cmd 120 $skip tcp from any to any 43 out via $pif setup keep-state

# Allow ntp time server
$cmd 130 $skip udp from any to any 123 out via $pif keep-state

#################################################################
# Interface facing Public Internet (Inbound Section)
# Interrogate packets originating from the public Internet
# destine for this gateway server or the private network.
#################################################################

# Deny all inbound traffic from non-routable reserved address spaces
$cmd 300 deny all from 192.168.0.0/16  to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 301 deny all from 172.16.0.0/12   to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 302 deny all from 10.0.0.0/8      to any in via $pif  #RFC 1918 private IP
$cmd 303 deny all from 127.0.0.0/8     to any in via $pif  #loopback
$cmd 304 deny all from 0.0.0.0/8       to any in via $pif  #loopback
$cmd 305 deny all from 169.254.0.0/16  to any in via $pif  #DHCP auto-config
$cmd 306 deny all from 192.0.2.0/24    to any in via $pif  #reserved for docs
$cmd 307 deny all from 204.152.64.0/23 to any in via $pif  #Sun cluster
$cmd 308 deny all from 224.0.0.0/3     to any in via $pif  #Class D & E multicast

# Deny ident
$cmd 315 deny tcp from any to any 113 in via $pif

# Deny all Netbios service. 137=name, 138=datagram, 139=session
# Netbios is MS/Windows sharing services.
# Block MS/Windows hosts2 name server requests 81
$cmd 320 deny tcp from any to any 137 in via $pif
$cmd 321 deny tcp from any to any 138 in via $pif
$cmd 322 deny tcp from any to any 139 in via $pif
$cmd 323 deny tcp from any to any 81  in via $pif

# Deny any late arriving packets
$cmd 330 deny all from any to any frag in via $pif

# Deny ACK packets that did not match the dynamic rule table
$cmd 332 deny tcp from any to any established in via $pif

# Allow traffic in from ISP's DHCP server. This rule must contain
# the IP address of your ISP's DHCP server as it's the only
# authorized source to send this packet type.
# Only necessary for cable or DSL configurations.
# This rule is not needed for 'user ppp' type connection to
# the public Internet. This is the same IP address you captured
# and used in the outbound section.
$cmd 360 allow udp from x.x.x.x to any 68 in via $pif keep-state

# Allow in standard www function because I have Apache server
$cmd 370 allow tcp from any to me 80 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 2

# Allow in secure FTP, Telnet, and SCP from public Internet
$cmd 380 allow tcp from any to me 22 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 2

# Allow in non-secure Telnet session from public Internet
# labeled non-secure because ID & PW are passed over public
# Internet as clear text.
# Delete this sample group if you do not have telnet server enabled.
$cmd 390 allow tcp from any to me 23 in via $pif setup limit src-addr 2

# Reject & Log all unauthorized incoming connections from the public Internet
$cmd 400 deny log all from any to any in via $pif

# Reject & Log all unauthorized out going connections to the public Internet
$cmd 450 deny log all from any to any out via $pif

# This is skipto location for outbound stateful rules
$cmd 800 divert natd ip from any to any out via $pif
$cmd 801 allow ip from any to any

# Everything else is denied by default
# deny and log all packets that fell through to see what they are
$cmd 999 deny log all from any to any
################ End of IPFW rules file ###############################
Tags: account, Apache, archive, bsd, cron, database, domain, domain name, email, freebsd, FreeBSD Handbook, ftp, netbsd, openbsd, password, php, pop, software, ssh, ssl, telnet, trojan

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FreeBSD Handbook - Chapter 27 PPP and SLIP

January 6th, 2009

Restructured, reorganized, and updated by Jim Mock.

27.1 Synopsis

FreeBSD has a number of ways to link one computer to another. To establish a network or Internet connection through a dial-up modem, or to allow others to do so through you, requires the use of PPP or SLIP. This chapter describes setting up these modem-based communication services in detail.

After reading this chapter, you will know:

  • How to set up user PPP.

  • How to set up kernel PPP.

  • How to set up PPPoE (PPP over Ethernet).

  • How to set up PPPoA (PPP over ATM).

  • How to configure and set up a SLIP client and server.

Before reading this chapter, you should:

  • Be familiar with basic network terminology.

  • Understand the basics and purpose of a dialup connection and PPP and/or SLIP.

You may be wondering what the main difference is between user PPP and kernel PPP. The answer is simple: user PPP processes the inbound and outbound data in userland rather than in the kernel. This is expensive in terms of copying the data between the kernel and userland, but allows a far more feature-rich PPP implementation. User PPP uses the tun device to communicate with the outside world whereas kernel PPP uses the ppp device.

Note: Throughout in this chapter, user PPP will simply be referred to as ppp unless a distinction needs to be made between it and any other PPP software such as pppd. Unless otherwise stated, all of the commands explained in this chapter should be executed as root.


27.2 Using User PPP

Updated and enhanced by Tom Rhodes. Originally contributed by Brian Somers. With input from Nik Clayton, Dirk Frömberg, and Peter Childs.

27.2.1 User PPP
27.2.1.1 Assumptions

This document assumes you have the following:

  • An account with an Internet Service Provider (ISP) which you connect to using PPP.

  • You have a modem or other device connected to your system and configured correctly which allows you to connect to your ISP.

  • The dial-up number(s) of your ISP.

  • Your login name and password. (Either a regular UNIX style login and password pair, or a PAP or CHAP login and password pair).

  • The IP address of one or more name servers. Normally, you will be given two IP addresses by your ISP to use for this. If they have not given you at least one, then you can use the enable dns command in ppp.conf and ppp will set the name servers for you. This feature depends on your ISPs PPP implementation supporting DNS negotiation.

The following information may be supplied by your ISP, but is not completely necessary:

  • The IP address of your ISP’s gateway. The gateway is the machine to which you will connect and will be set up as your default route. If you do not have this information, we can make one up and your ISP’s PPP server will tell us the correct value when we connect.

    This IP number is referred to as HISADDR by ppp.

  • The netmask you should use. If your ISP has not provided you with one, you can safely use 255.255.255.255.

  • If your ISP provides you with a static IP address and hostname, you can enter it. Otherwise, we simply let the peer assign whatever IP address it sees fit.

If you do not have any of the required information, contact your ISP.

Note: Throughout this section, many of the examples showing the contents of configuration files are numbered by line. These numbers serve to aid in the presentation and discussion only and are not meant to be placed in the actual file. Proper indentation with tab and space characters is also important.


27.2.1.2 Automatic PPP Configuration

Both ppp and pppd (the kernel level implementation of PPP) use the configuration files located in the /etc/ppp directory. Examples for user ppp can be found in /usr/share/examples/ppp/.

Configuring ppp requires that you edit a number of files, depending on your requirements. What you put in them depends to some extent on whether your ISP allocates IP addresses statically (i.e., you get given one IP address, and always use that one) or dynamically (i.e., your IP address changes each time you connect to your ISP).


27.2.1.2.1 PPP and Static IP Addresses

You will need to edit the /etc/ppp/ppp.conf configuration file. It should look similar to the example below.

Note: Lines that end in a : start in the first column (beginning of the line)– all other lines should be indented as shown using spaces or tabs.

1     default:
2       set log Phase Chat LCP IPCP CCP tun command
3       ident user-ppp VERSION (built COMPILATIONDATE)
4       set device /dev/cuad0
5       set speed 115200
6       set dial "ABORT BUSY ABORT NO\\sCARRIER TIMEOUT 5 \
7                 \"\" AT OK-AT-OK ATE1Q0 OK \\dATDT\\T TIMEOUT 40 CONNECT"
8       set timeout 180
9       enable dns
10
11    provider:
12      set phone "(123) 456 7890"
13      set authname foo
14      set authkey bar
15      set login "TIMEOUT 10 \"\" \"\" gin:--gin: \\U word: \\P col: ppp"
16      set timeout 300
17      set ifaddr x.x.x.x y.y.y.y 255.255.255.255 0.0.0.0
18      add default HISADDR
Line 1:

Identifies the default entry. Commands in this entry are executed automatically when ppp is run.

Line 2:

Enables logging parameters. When the configuration is working satisfactorily, this line should be reduced to saying:

set log phase tun

in order to avoid excessive log file sizes.

Line 3:

Tells PPP how to identify itself to the peer. PPP identifies itself to the peer if it has any trouble negotiating and setting up the link, providing information that the peers administrator may find useful when investigating such problems.

Line 4:

Identifies the device to which the modem is connected. COM1 is /dev/cuad0 and COM2 is /dev/cuad1.

Line 5:

Sets the speed you want to connect at. If 115200 does not work (it should with any reasonably new modem), try 38400 instead.

Line 6 & 7:

The dial string. User PPP uses an expect-send syntax similar to the chat(8) program. Refer to the manual page for information on the features of this language.

Note that this command continues onto the next line for readability. Any command in ppp.conf may do this if the last character on the line is a \ character.

Line 8:

Sets the idle timeout for the link. 180 seconds is the default, so this line is purely cosmetic.

Line 9:

Tells PPP to ask the peer to confirm the local resolver settings. If you run a local name server, this line should be commented out or removed.

Line 10:

A blank line for readability. Blank lines are ignored by PPP.

Line 11:

Identifies an entry for a provider called “provider”. This could be changed to the name of your ISP so that later you can use the load ISP to start the connection.

Line 12:

Sets the phone number for this provider. Multiple phone numbers may be specified using the colon (:) or pipe character (|) as a separator. The difference between the two separators is described in ppp(8). To summarize, if you want to rotate through the numbers, use a colon. If you want to always attempt to dial the first number first and only use the other numbers if the first number fails, use the pipe character. Always quote the entire set of phone numbers as shown.

You must enclose the phone number in quotation marks (") if there is any intention on using spaces in the phone number. This can cause a simple, yet subtle error.

Line 13 & 14:

Identifies the user name and password. When connecting using a UNIX style login prompt, these values are referred to by the set login command using the \U and \P variables. When connecting using PAP or CHAP, these values are used at authentication time.

Line 15:

If you are using PAP or CHAP, there will be no login at this point, and this line should be commented out or removed. See PAP and CHAP authentication for further details.

The login string is of the same chat-like syntax as the dial string. In this example, the string works for a service whose login session looks like this:

J. Random Provider
login: foo
password: bar
protocol: ppp

You will need to alter this script to suit your own needs. When you write this script for the first time, you should ensure that you have enabled “chat” logging so you can determine if the conversation is going as expected.

Line 16:

Sets the default idle timeout (in seconds) for the connection. Here, the connection will be closed automatically after 300 seconds of inactivity. If you never want to timeout, set this value to zero or use the -ddial command line switch.

Line 17:

Sets the interface addresses. The string x.x.x.x should be replaced by the IP address that your provider has allocated to you. The string y.y.y.y should be replaced by the IP address that your ISP indicated for their gateway (the machine to which you connect). If your ISP has not given you a gateway address, use 10.0.0.2/0. If you need to use a “guessed” address, make sure that you create an entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.linkup as per the instructions for PPP and Dynamic IP addresses. If this line is omitted, ppp cannot run in -auto mode.

Line 18:

Adds a default route to your ISP’s gateway. The special word HISADDR is replaced with the gateway address specified on line 17. It is important that this line appears after line 17, otherwise HISADDR will not yet be initialized.

If you do not wish to run ppp in -auto, this line should be moved to the ppp.linkup file.

It is not necessary to add an entry to ppp.linkup when you have a static IP address and are running ppp in -auto mode as your routing table entries are already correct before you connect. You may however wish to create an entry to invoke programs after connection. This is explained later with the sendmail example.

Example configuration files can be found in the /usr/share/examples/ppp/ directory.


27.2.1.2.2 PPP and Dynamic IP Addresses

If your service provider does not assign static IP addresses, ppp can be configured to negotiate the local and remote addresses. This is done by “guessing” an IP address and allowing ppp to set it up correctly using the IP Configuration Protocol (IPCP) after connecting. The ppp.conf configuration is the same as PPP and Static IP Addresses, with the following change:

17      set ifaddr 10.0.0.1/0 10.0.0.2/0 255.255.255.255

Again, do not include the line number, it is just for reference. Indentation of at least one space is required.

Line 17:

The number after the / character is the number of bits of the address that ppp will insist on. You may wish to use IP numbers more appropriate to your circumstances, but the above example will always work.

The last argument (0.0.0.0) tells PPP to start negotiations using address 0.0.0.0 rather than 10.0.0.1 and is necessary for some ISPs. Do not use 0.0.0.0 as the first argument to set ifaddr as it prevents PPP from setting up an initial route in -auto mode.

If you are not running in -auto mode, you will need to create an entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.linkup. ppp.linkup is used after a connection has been established. At this point, ppp will have assigned the interface addresses and it will now be possible to add the routing table entries:

1     provider:
2      add default HISADDR
Line 1:

On establishing a connection, ppp will look for an entry in ppp.linkup according to the following rules: First, try to match the same label as we used in ppp.conf. If that fails, look for an entry for the IP address of our gateway. This entry is a four-octet IP style label. If we still have not found an entry, look for the MYADDR entry.

Line 2:

This line tells ppp to add a default route that points to HISADDR. HISADDR will be replaced with the IP number of the gateway as negotiated by the IPCP.

See the pmdemand entry in the files /usr/share/examples/ppp/ppp.conf.sample and /usr/share/examples/ppp/ppp.linkup.sample for a detailed example.


27.2.1.2.3 Receiving Incoming Calls

When you configure ppp to receive incoming calls on a machine connected to a LAN, you must decide if you wish to forward packets to the LAN. If you do, you should allocate the peer an IP number from your LAN’s subnet, and use the command enable proxy in your /etc/ppp/ppp.conf file. You should also confirm that the /etc/rc.conf file contains the following:

gateway_enable="YES"

27.2.1.2.4 Which getty?

Configuring FreeBSD for Dial-up Services provides a good description on enabling dial-up services using getty(8).

An alternative to getty is mgetty, a smarter version of getty designed with dial-up lines in mind.

The advantages of using mgetty is that it actively talks to modems, meaning if port is turned off in /etc/ttys then your modem will not answer the phone.

Later versions of mgetty (from 0.99beta onwards) also support the automatic detection of PPP streams, allowing your clients script-less access to your server.

Refer to Mgetty and AutoPPP for more information on mgetty.


27.2.1.2.5 PPP Permissions

The ppp command must normally be run as the root user. If however, you wish to allow ppp to run in server mode as a normal user by executing ppp as described below, that user must be given permission to run ppp by adding them to the network group in /etc/group.

You will also need to give them access to one or more sections of the configuration file using the allow command:

allow users fred mary

If this command is used in the default section, it gives the specified users access to everything.


27.2.1.2.6 PPP Shells for Dynamic-IP Users

Create a file called /etc/ppp/ppp-shell containing the following:

#!/bin/sh
IDENT=`echo $0 | sed -e 's/^.*-\(.*\)$/\1/'`
CALLEDAS="$IDENT"
TTY=`tty`

if [ x$IDENT = xdialup ]; then
        IDENT=`basename $TTY`
fi

echo "PPP for $CALLEDAS on $TTY"
echo "Starting PPP for $IDENT"

exec /usr/sbin/ppp -direct $IDENT

This script should be executable. Now make a symbolic link called ppp-dialup to this script using the following commands:

# ln -s ppp-shell /etc/ppp/ppp-dialup

You should use this script as the shell for all of your dialup users. This is an example from /etc/passwd for a dialup PPP user with username pchilds (remember do not directly edit the password file, use vipw(8)).

pchilds:*:1011:300:Peter Childs PPP:/home/ppp:/etc/ppp/ppp-dialup

Create a /home/ppp directory that is world readable containing the following 0 byte files:

-r--r--r--   1 root     wheel           0 May 27 02:23 .hushlogin
-r--r--r--   1 root     wheel           0 May 27 02:22 .rhosts

which prevents /etc/motd from being displayed.


27.2.1.2.7 PPP Shells for Static-IP Users

Create the ppp-shell file as above, and for each account with statically assigned IPs create a symbolic link to ppp-shell.

For example, if you have three dialup customers, fred, sam, and mary, that you route /24 CIDR networks for, you would type the following:

# ln -s /etc/ppp/ppp-shell /etc/ppp/ppp-fred
# ln -s /etc/ppp/ppp-shell /etc/ppp/ppp-sam
# ln -s /etc/ppp/ppp-shell /etc/ppp/ppp-mary

Each of these users dialup accounts should have their shell set to the symbolic link created above (for example, mary’s shell should be /etc/ppp/ppp-mary).


27.2.1.2.8 Setting Up ppp.conf for Dynamic-IP Users

The /etc/ppp/ppp.conf file should contain something along the lines of:

default:
  set debug phase lcp chat
  set timeout 0

ttyd0:
  set ifaddr 203.14.100.1 203.14.100.20 255.255.255.255
  enable proxy

ttyd1:
  set ifaddr 203.14.100.1 203.14.100.21 255.255.255.255
  enable proxy

Note: The indenting is important.

The default: section is loaded for each session. For each dialup line enabled in /etc/ttys create an entry similar to the one for ttyd0: above. Each line should get a unique IP address from your pool of IP addresses for dynamic users.


27.2.1.2.9 Setting Up ppp.conf for Static-IP Users

Along with the contents of the sample /usr/share/examples/ppp/ppp.conf above you should add a section for each of the statically assigned dialup users. We will continue with our fred, sam, and mary example.

fred:
  set ifaddr 203.14.100.1 203.14.101.1 255.255.255.255

sam:
  set ifaddr 203.14.100.1 203.14.102.1 255.255.255.255

mary:
  set ifaddr 203.14.100.1 203.14.103.1 255.255.255.255

The file /etc/ppp/ppp.linkup should also contain routing information for each static IP user if required. The line below would add a route for the 203.14.101.0/24 network via the client’s ppp link.

fred:
  add 203.14.101.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 HISADDR

sam:
  add 203.14.102.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 HISADDR

mary:
  add 203.14.103.0 netmask 255.255.255.0 HISADDR

27.2.1.2.10 mgetty and AutoPPP

Configuring and compiling mgetty with the AUTO_PPP option enabled allows mgetty to detect the LCP phase of PPP connections and automatically spawn off a ppp shell. However, since the default login/password sequence does not occur it is necessary to authenticate users using either PAP or CHAP.

This section assumes the user has successfully configured, compiled, and installed a version of mgetty with the AUTO_PPP option (v0.99beta or later).

Make sure your /usr/local/etc/mgetty+sendfax/login.config file has the following in it:

/AutoPPP/ -     -            /etc/ppp/ppp-pap-dialup

This will tell mgetty to run the ppp-pap-dialup script for detected PPP connections.

Create a file called /etc/ppp/ppp-pap-dialup containing the following (the file should be executable):

#!/bin/sh
exec /usr/sbin/ppp -direct pap$IDENT

For each dialup line enabled in /etc/ttys, create a corresponding entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.conf. This will happily co-exist with the definitions we created above.

pap:
  enable pap
  set ifaddr 203.14.100.1 203.14.100.20-203.14.100.40
  enable proxy

Each user logging in with this method will need to have a username/password in /etc/ppp/ppp.secret file, or alternatively add the following option to authenticate users via PAP from the /etc/passwd file.

enable passwdauth

If you wish to assign some users a static IP number, you can specify the number as the third argument in /etc/ppp/ppp.secret. See /usr/share/examples/ppp/ppp.secret.sample for examples.


27.2.1.2.11 MS Extensions

It is possible to configure PPP to supply DNS and NetBIOS nameserver addresses on demand.

To enable these extensions with PPP version 1.x, the following lines might be added to the relevant section of /etc/ppp/ppp.conf.

enable msext
set ns 203.14.100.1 203.14.100.2
set nbns 203.14.100.5

And for PPP version 2 and above:

accept dns
set dns 203.14.100.1 203.14.100.2
set nbns 203.14.100.5

This will tell the clients the primary and secondary name server addresses, and a NetBIOS nameserver host.

In version 2 and above, if the set dns line is omitted, PPP will use the values found in /etc/resolv.conf.


27.2.1.2.12 PAP and CHAP Authentication

Some ISPs set their system up so that the authentication part of your connection is done using either of the PAP or CHAP authentication mechanisms. If this is the case, your ISP will not give a login: prompt when you connect, but will start talking PPP immediately.

PAP is less secure than CHAP, but security is not normally an issue here as passwords, although being sent as plain text with PAP, are being transmitted down a serial line only. There is not much room for crackers to “eavesdrop”.

Referring back to the PPP and Static IP addresses or PPP and Dynamic IP addresses sections, the following alterations must be made:

13      set authname MyUserName
14      set authkey MyPassword
15      set login
Line 13:

This line specifies your PAP/CHAP user name. You will need to insert the correct value for MyUserName.

Line 14:

This line specifies your PAP/CHAP password. You will need to insert the correct value for MyPassword. You may want to add an additional line, such as:

16      accept PAP

or

16      accept CHAP

to make it obvious that this is the intention, but PAP and CHAP are both accepted by default.

Line 15:

Your ISP will not normally require that you log into the server if you are using PAP or CHAP. You must therefore disable your “set login” string.


27.2.1.2.13 Changing Your ppp Configuration on the Fly

It is possible to talk to the ppp program while it is running in the background, but only if a suitable diagnostic port has been set up. To do this, add the following line to your configuration:

set server /var/run/ppp-tun%d DiagnosticPassword 0177

This will tell PPP to listen to the specified UNIX domain socket, asking clients for the specified password before allowing access. The %d in the name is replaced with the tun device number that is in use.

Once a socket has been set up, the pppctl(8) program may be used in scripts that wish to manipulate the running program.


27.2.1.3 Using PPP Network Address Translation Capability

PPP has ability to use internal NAT without kernel diverting capabilities. This functionality may be enabled by the following line in /etc/ppp/ppp.conf:

nat enable yes

Alternatively, PPP NAT may be enabled by command-line option -nat. There is also /etc/rc.conf knob named ppp_nat, which is enabled by default.

If you use this feature, you may also find useful the following /etc/ppp/ppp.conf options to enable incoming connections forwarding:

nat port tcp 10.0.0.2:ftp ftp
nat port tcp 10.0.0.2:http http

or do not trust the outside at all

nat deny_incoming yes

27.2.1.4 Final System Configuration

You now have ppp configured, but there are a few more things to do before it is ready to work. They all involve editing the /etc/rc.conf file.

Working from the top down in this file, make sure the hostname= line is set, e.g.:

hostname="foo.example.com"

If your ISP has supplied you with a static IP address and name, it is probably best that you use this name as your host name.

Look for the network_interfaces variable. If you want to configure your system to dial your ISP on demand, make sure the tun0 device is added to the list, otherwise remove it.

network_interfaces="lo0 tun0"
ifconfig_tun0=

Note: The ifconfig_tun0 variable should be empty, and a file called /etc/start_if.tun0 should be created. This file should contain the line:

ppp -auto mysystem

This script is executed at network configuration time, starting your ppp daemon in automatic mode. If you have a LAN for which this machine is a gateway, you may also wish to use the -alias switch. Refer to the manual page for further details.

Make sure that the router program is set to NO with the following line in your /etc/rc.conf:

router_enable="NO"

It is important that the routed daemon is not started, as routed tends to delete the default routing table entries created by ppp.

It is probably a good idea to ensure that the sendmail_flags line does not include the -q option, otherwise sendmail will attempt to do a network lookup every now and then, possibly causing your machine to dial out. You may try:

sendmail_flags="-bd"

The downside of this is that you must force sendmail to re-examine the mail queue whenever the ppp link is up by typing:

# /usr/sbin/sendmail -q

You may wish to use the !bg command in ppp.linkup to do this automatically:

1     provider:
2       delete ALL
3       add 0 0 HISADDR
4       !bg sendmail -bd -q30m

If you do not like this, it is possible to set up a “dfilter” to block SMTP traffic. Refer to the sample files for further details.

All that is left is to reboot the machine. After rebooting, you can now either type:

# ppp

and then dial provider to start the PPP session, or, if you want ppp to establish sessions automatically when there is outbound traffic (and you have not created the start_if.tun0 script), type:

# ppp -auto provider

27.2.1.5 Summary

To recap, the following steps are necessary when setting up ppp for the first time:

Client side:

  1. Ensure that the tun device is built into your kernel.

  2. Ensure that the tunN device file is available in the /dev directory.

  3. Create an entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.conf. The pmdemand example should suffice for most ISPs.

  4. If you have a dynamic IP address, create an entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.linkup.

  5. Update your /etc/rc.conf file.

  6. Create a start_if.tun0 script if you require demand dialing.

Server side:

  1. Ensure that the tun device is built into your kernel.

  2. Ensure that the tunN device file is available in the /dev directory.

  3. Create an entry in /etc/passwd (using the vipw(8) program).

  4. Create a profile in this users home directory that runs ppp -direct direct-server or similar.

  5. Create an entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.conf. The direct-server example should suffice.

  6. Create an entry in /etc/ppp/ppp.linkup.

  7. Update your /etc/rc.conf file.


27.3 Using Kernel PPP

Parts originally contributed by Gennady B. Sorokopud and Robert Huff.

27.3.1 Setting Up Kernel PPP

Before you start setting up PPP on your machine, make sure that pppd is located in /usr/sbin and the directory /etc/ppp exists.

pppd can work in two modes:

  1. As a “client” — you want to connect your machine to the outside world via a PPP serial connection or modem line.

  2. As a “server” — your machine is located on the network, and is used to connect other computers using PPP.

In both cases you will need to set up an options file (/etc/ppp/options or ~/.ppprc if you have more than one user on your machine that uses PPP).

You will also need some modem/serial software (preferably comms/kermit), so you can dial and establish a connection with the remote host.


27.3.2 Using pppd as a Client

Based on information provided by Trev Roydhouse.

The following /etc/ppp/options might be used to connect to a Cisco terminal server PPP line.

crtscts         # enable hardware flow control
modem           # modem control line
noipdefault     # remote PPP server must supply your IP address
                # if the remote host does not send your IP during IPCP
                # negotiation, remove this option
passive         # wait for LCP packets
domain ppp.foo.com      # put your domain name here

:remote_ip    # put the IP of remote PPP host here
                # it will be used to route packets via PPP link
                # if you didn't specified the noipdefault option
                # change this line to local_ip:remote_ip

defaultroute    # put this if you want that PPP server will be your
                # default router

To connect:

  1. Dial to the remote host using Kermit (or some other modem program), and enter your user name and password (or whatever is needed to enable PPP on the remote host).

  2. Exit Kermit (without hanging up the line).

  3. Enter the following:

    # /usr/sbin/pppd /dev/tty01 19200

    Be sure to use the appropriate speed and device name.

Now your computer is connected with PPP. If the connection fails, you can add the debug option to the /etc/ppp/options file, and check console messages to track the problem.

Following /etc/ppp/pppup script will make all 3 stages automatic:

#!/bin/sh
pgrep -l pppd
pid=`pgrep pppd`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing pppd, PID=' ${pid}
        kill ${pid}
fi
pgrep -l kermit
pid=`pgrep kermit`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing kermit, PID=' ${pid}
        kill -9 ${pid}
fi

ifconfig ppp0 down
ifconfig ppp0 delete

kermit -y /etc/ppp/kermit.dial
pppd /dev/tty01 19200

/etc/ppp/kermit.dial is a Kermit script that dials and makes all necessary authorization on the remote host (an example of such a script is attached to the end of this document).

Use the following /etc/ppp/pppdown script to disconnect the PPP line:

#!/bin/sh
pid=`pgrep pppd`
if [ X${pid} != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing pppd, PID=' ${pid}
        kill -TERM ${pid}
fi

pgrep -l kermit
pid=`pgrep kermit`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing kermit, PID=' ${pid}
        kill -9 ${pid}
fi

/sbin/ifconfig ppp0 down
/sbin/ifconfig ppp0 delete
kermit -y /etc/ppp/kermit.hup
/etc/ppp/ppptest

Check to see if pppd is still running by executing /usr/etc/ppp/ppptest, which should look like this:

#!/bin/sh
pid=`pgrep pppd`
if [ X${pid} != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'pppd running: PID=' ${pid-NONE}
else
        echo 'No pppd running.'
fi
set -x
netstat -n -I ppp0
ifconfig ppp0

To hang up the modem, execute /etc/ppp/kermit.hup, which should contain:

set line /dev/tty01    ; put your modem device here
set speed 19200
set file type binary
set file names literal
set win 8
set rec pack 1024
set send pack 1024
set block 3
set term bytesize 8
set command bytesize 8
set flow none

pau 1
out +++
inp 5 OK
out ATH0\13
echo \13
exit

Here is an alternate method using chat instead of kermit:

The following two files are sufficient to accomplish a pppd connection.

/etc/ppp/options:

/dev/cuad1 115200

crtscts     # enable hardware flow control
modem       # modem control line
connect "/usr/bin/chat -f /etc/ppp/login.chat.script"
noipdefault # remote PPP serve must supply your IP address
            # if the remote host doesn't send your IP during
                # IPCP negotiation, remove this option
passive         # wait for LCP packets
domain your.domain   # put your domain name here

:       # put the IP of remote PPP host here
            # it will be used to route packets via PPP link
                # if you didn't specified the noipdefault option
                # change this line to local_ip:remote_ip

defaultroute    # put this if you want that PPP server will be
            # your default router

/etc/ppp/login.chat.script:

Note: The following should go on a single line.

ABORT BUSY ABORT 'NO CARRIER' "" AT OK ATDTphone.number
  CONNECT "" TIMEOUT 10 ogin:-\\r-ogin: login-id
  TIMEOUT 5 sword: password

Once these are installed and modified correctly, all you need to do is run pppd, like so:

# pppd

27.3.3 Using pppd as a Server

/etc/ppp/options should contain something similar to the following:

crtscts                         # Hardware flow control
netmask 255.255.255.0           # netmask (not required)
192.114.208.20:192.114.208.165  # IP's of local and remote hosts
                                # local ip must be different from one
                                # you assigned to the Ethernet (or other)
                                # interface on your machine.
                                # remote IP is IP address that will be
                                # assigned to the remote machine
domain ppp.foo.com              # your domain
passive                         # wait for LCP
modem                           # modem line

The following /etc/ppp/pppserv script will tell pppd to behave as a server:

#!/bin/sh
pgrep -l pppd
pid=`pgrep pppd`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing pppd, PID=' ${pid}
        kill ${pid}
fi
pgrep -l kermit
pid=`pgrep kermit`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing kermit, PID=' ${pid}
        kill -9 ${pid}
fi

# reset ppp interface
ifconfig ppp0 down
ifconfig ppp0 delete

# enable autoanswer mode
kermit -y /etc/ppp/kermit.ans

# run ppp
pppd /dev/tty01 19200

Use this /etc/ppp/pppservdown script to stop the server:

#!/bin/sh
pgrep -l pppd
pid=`pgrep pppd`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing pppd, PID=' ${pid}
        kill ${pid}
fi
pgrep -l kermit
pid=`pgrep kermit`
if [ "X${pid}" != "X" ] ; then
        echo 'killing kermit, PID=' ${pid}
        kill -9 ${pid}
fi
ifconfig ppp0 down
ifconfig ppp0 delete

kermit -y /etc/ppp/kermit.noans

The following Kermit script (/etc/ppp/kermit.ans) will enable/disable autoanswer mode on your modem. It should look like this:

set line /dev/tty01
set speed 19200
set file type binary
set file names literal
set win 8
set rec pack 1024
set send pack 1024
set block 3
set term bytesize 8
set command bytesize 8
set flow none

pau 1
out +++
inp 5 OK
out ATH0\13
inp 5 OK
echo \13
out ATS0=1\13   ; change this to out ATS0=0\13 if you want to disable
                ; autoanswer mode
inp 5 OK
echo \13
exit

A script named /etc/ppp/kermit.dial is used for dialing and authenticating on the remote host. You will need to customize it for your needs. Put your login and password in this script; you will also need to change the input statement depending on responses from your modem and remote host.

;
; put the com line attached to the modem here:
;
set line /dev/tty01
;
; put the modem speed here:
;
set speed 19200
set file type binary            ; full 8 bit file xfer
set file names literal
set win 8
set rec pack 1024
set send pack 1024
set block 3
set term bytesize 8
set command bytesize 8
set flow none
set modem hayes
set dial hangup off
set carrier auto                ; Then SET CARRIER if necessary,
set dial display on             ; Then SET DIAL if necessary,
set input echo on
set input timeout proceed
set input case ignore
def \%x 0                       ; login prompt counter
goto slhup

:slcmd                          ; put the modem in command mode
echo Put the modem in command mode.
clear                           ; Clear unread characters from input buffer
pause 1
output +++                      ; hayes escape sequence
input 1 OK\13\10                ; wait for OK
if success goto slhup
output \13
pause 1
output at\13
input 1 OK\13\10
if fail goto slcmd              ; if modem doesn't answer OK, try again

:slhup                          ; hang up the phone
clear                           ; Clear unread characters from input buffer
pause 1
echo Hanging up the phone.
output ath0\13                  ; hayes command for on hook
input 2 OK\13\10
if fail goto slcmd              ; if no OK answer, put modem in command mode

:sldial                         ; dial the number
pause 1
echo Dialing.
output atdt9,550311\13\10               ; put phone number here
assign \%x 0                    ; zero the time counter

:look
clear                           ; Clear unread characters from input buffer
increment \%x                   ; Count the seconds
input 1 {CONNECT }
if success goto sllogin
reinput 1 {NO CARRIER\13\10}
if success goto sldial
reinput 1 {NO DIALTONE\13\10}
if success goto slnodial
reinput 1 {\255}
if success goto slhup
reinput 1 {\127}
if success goto slhup
if < \%x 60 goto look
else goto slhup

:sllogin                        ; login
assign \%x 0                    ; zero the time counter
pause 1
echo Looking for login prompt.

:slloop
increment \%x                   ; Count the seconds
clear                           ; Clear unread characters from input buffer
output \13
;
; put your expected login prompt here:
;
input 1 {Username: }
if success goto sluid
reinput 1 {\255}
if success goto slhup
reinput 1 {\127}
if success goto slhup
if < \%x 10 goto slloop         ; try 10 times to get a login prompt
else goto slhup                 ; hang up and start again if 10 failures

:sluid
;
; put your userid here:
;
output ppp-login\13
input 1 {Password: }
;
; put your password here:
;
output ppp-password\13
input 1 {Entering SLIP mode.}
echo
quit

:slnodial
echo \7No dialtone.  Check the telephone line!\7
exit 1

; local variables:
; mode: csh
; comment-start: "; "
; comment-start-skip: "; "
; end:

27.4 Troubleshooting PPP Connections

Contributed by Tom Rhodes.

This section covers a few issues which may arise when using PPP over a modem connection. For instance, perhaps you need to know exactly what prompts the system you are dialing into will present. Some ISPs present the ssword prompt, and others will present password; if the ppp script is not written accordingly, the login attempt will fail. The most common way to debug ppp connections is by connecting manually. The following information will walk you through a manual connection step by step.


27.4.1 Check the Device Nodes

If you reconfigured your kernel then you recall the sio device. If you did not configure your kernel, there is no reason to worry. Just check the dmesg output for the modem device with:

# dmesg | grep sio

You should get some pertinent output about the sio devices. These are the COM ports we need. If your modem acts like a standard serial port then you should see it listed on sio1, or COM2. If so, you are not required to rebuild the kernel. When matching up sio modem is on sio1 or COM2 if you are in DOS, then your modem device would be /dev/cuad1.


27.4.2 Connecting Manually

Connecting to the Internet by manually controlling ppp is quick, easy, and a great way to debug a connection or just get information on how your ISP treats ppp client connections. Lets start PPP from the command line. Note that in all of our examples we will use example as the hostname of the machine running PPP. You start ppp by just typing ppp:

# ppp

We have now started ppp.

ppp ON example> set device /dev/cuad1

We set our modem device, in this case it is cuad1.

ppp ON example> set speed 115200

Set the connection speed, in this case we are using 115,200 kbps.

ppp ON example> enable dns

Tell ppp to configure our resolver and add the nameserver lines to /etc/resolv.conf. If ppp cannot determine our hostname, we can set one manually later.

ppp ON example> term

Switch to “terminal” mode so that we can manually control the modem.

deflink: Entering terminal mode on /dev/cuad1
type '~h' for help
at
OK
atdt123456789

Use at to initialize the modem, then use atdt and the number for your ISP to begin the dial in process.

CONNECT

Confirmation of the connection, if we are going to have any connection problems, unrelated to hardware, here is where we will attempt to resolve them.

ISP Login:myusername

Here you are prompted for a username, return the prompt with the username that was provided by the ISP.

ISP Pass:mypassword

This time we are prompted for a password, just reply with the password that was provided by the ISP. Just like logging into FreeBSD, the password will not echo.

Shell or PPP:ppp

Depending on your ISP this prompt may never appear. Here we are being asked if we wish to use a shell on the provider, or to start ppp. In this example, we have chosen to use ppp as we want an Internet connection.

Ppp ON example>

Notice that in this example the first p has been capitalized. This shows that we have successfully connected to the ISP.

PPp ON example>

We have successfully authenticated with our ISP and are waiting for the assigned IP address.

PPP ON example>

We have made an agreement on an IP address and successfully completed our connection.

PPP ON example>add default HISADDR

Here we add our default route, we need to do this before we can talk to the outside world as currently the only established connection is with the peer. If this fails due to existing routes you can put a bang character ! in front of the add. Alternatively, you can set this before making the actual connection and it will negotiate a new route accordingly.

If everything went good we should now have an active connection to the Internet, which could be thrown into the background using CTRL+z If you notice the PPP return to ppp then we have lost our connection. This is good to know because it shows our connection status. Capital P’s show that we have a connection to the ISP and lowercase p’s show that the connection has been lost for whatever reason. ppp only has these 2 states.


27.4.2.1 Debugging

If you have a direct line and cannot seem to make a connection, then turn hardware flow CTS/RTS to off with the set ctsrts off. This is mainly the case if you are connected to some PPP capable terminal servers, where PPP hangs when it tries to write data to your communication link, so it would be waiting for a CTS, or Clear To Send signal which may never come. If you use this option however, you should also use the set accmap option, which may be required to defeat hardware dependent on passing certain characters from end to end, most of the time XON/XOFF. See the ppp(8) manual page for more information on this option, and how it is used.

If you have an older modem, you may need to use the set parity even. Parity is set at none be default, but is used for error checking (with a large increase in traffic) on older modems and some ISPs. You may need this option for the Compuserve ISP.

PPP may not return to the command mode, which is usually a negotiation error where the ISP is waiting for your side to start negotiating. At this point, using the ~p command will force ppp to start sending the configuration information.

If you never obtain a login prompt, then most likely you need to use PAP or CHAP authentication instead of the UNIX style in the example above. To use PAP or CHAP just add the following options to PPP before going into terminal mode:

ppp ON example> set authname myusername

Where myusername should be replaced with the username that was assigned by the ISP.

ppp ON example> set authkey mypassword

Where mypassword should be replaced with the password that was assigned by the ISP.

If you connect fine, but cannot seem to find any domain name, try to use ping(8) with an IP address and see if you can get any return information. If you experience 100 percent (100%) packet loss, then it is most likely that you were not assigned a default route. Double check that the option add default HISADDR was set during the connection. If you can connect to a remote IP address then it is possible that a resolver address has not been added to the /etc/resolv.conf. This file should look like:

domain example.com
nameserver x.x.x.x
nameserver y.y.y.y

Where x.x.x.x and y.y.y.y should be replaced with the IP address of your ISP’s DNS servers. This information may or may not have been provided when you signed up, but a quick call to your ISP should remedy that.

You could also have syslog(3) provide a logging function for your PPP connection. Just add:

!ppp
*.*     /var/log/ppp.log

to /etc/syslog.conf. In most cases, this functionality already exists.


27.5 Using PPP over Ethernet (PPPoE)

Contributed (from http://node.to/freebsd/how-tos/how-to-freebsd-pppoe.html) by Jim Mock.

This section describes how to set up PPP over Ethernet (PPPoE).


27.5.1 Configuring the Kernel

No kernel configuration is necessary for PPPoE any longer. If the necessary netgraph support is not built into the kernel, it will be dynamically loaded by ppp.


27.5.2 Setting Up ppp.conf

Here is an example of a working ppp.conf:

default:
  set log Phase tun command # you can add more detailed logging if you wish
  set ifaddr 10.0.0.1/0 10.0.0.2/0

name_of_service_provider:
  set device PPPoE:xl1 # replace xl1 with your Ethernet device
  set authname YOURLOGINNAME
  set authkey YOURPASSWORD
  set dial
  set login
  add default HISADDR

27.5.3 Running ppp

As root, you can run:

# ppp -ddial name_of_service_provider

27.5.4 Starting ppp at Boot

Add the following to your /etc/rc.conf file:

ppp_enable="YES"
ppp_mode="ddial"
ppp_nat="YES"   # if you want to enable nat for your local network, otherwise NO
ppp_profile="name_of_service_provider"

27.5.5 Using a PPPoE Service Tag

Sometimes it will be necessary to use a service tag to establish your connection. Service tags are used to distinguish between different PPPoE servers attached to a given network.

You should have been given any required service tag information in the documentation provided by your ISP. If you cannot locate it there, ask your ISP’s tech support personnel.

As a last resort, you could try the method suggested by the Roaring Penguin PPPoE program which can be found in the Ports Collection. Bear in mind however, this may de-program your modem and render it useless, so think twice before doing it. Simply install the program shipped with the modem by your provider. Then, access the System menu from the program. The name of your profile should be listed there. It is usually ISP.

The profile name (service tag) will be used in the PPPoE configuration entry in ppp.conf as the provider part of the set device command (see the ppp(8) manual page for full details). It should look like this:

set device PPPoE:xl1:ISP

Do not forget to change xl1 to the proper device for your Ethernet card.

Do not forget to change ISP to the profile you have just found above.

For additional information, see:

  • Cheaper Broadband with FreeBSD on DSL by Renaud Waldura.

  • Nutzung von T-DSL und T-Online mit FreeBSD by Udo Erdelhoff (in German).


27.5.6 PPPoE with a 3Com® HomeConnect® ADSL Modem Dual Link

This modem does not follow RFC 2516 (A Method for transmitting PPP over Ethernet (PPPoE), written by L. Mamakos, K. Lidl, J. Evarts, D. Carrel, D. Simone, and R. Wheeler). Instead, different packet type codes have been used for the Ethernet frames. Please complain to 3Com if you think it should comply with the PPPoE specification.

In order to make FreeBSD capable of communicating with this device, a sysctl must be set. This can be done automatically at boot time by updating /etc/sysctl.conf:

net.graph.nonstandard_pppoe=1

or can be done immediately with the command:

# sysctl net.graph.nonstandard_pppoe=1

Unfortunately, because this is a system-wide setting, it is not possible to talk to a normal PPPoE client or server and a 3Com HomeConnect® ADSL Modem at the same time.


27.6 Using PPP over ATM (PPPoA)

The following describes how to set up PPP over ATM (PPPoA). PPPoA is a popular choice among European DSL providers.


27.6.1 Using PPPoA with the Alcatel SpeedTouch™ USB

PPPoA support for this device is supplied as a port in FreeBSD because the firmware is distributed under Alcatel’s license agreement and can not be redistributed freely with the base system of FreeBSD.

To install the software, simply use the Ports Collection. Install the net/pppoa port and follow the instructions provided with it.

Like many USB devices, the Alcatel SpeedTouch™ USB needs to download firmware from the host computer to operate properly. It is possible to automate this process in FreeBSD so that this transfer takes place whenever the device is plugged into a USB port. The following information can be added to the /etc/usbd.conf file to enable this automatic firmware transfer. This file must be edited as the root user.

device "Alcatel SpeedTouch USB"
    devname "ugen[0-9]+"
    vendor 0x06b9
    product 0x4061
    attach "/usr/local/sbin/modem_run -f /usr/local/libdata/mgmt.o"

To enable the USB daemon, usbd, put the following the line into /etc/rc.conf:

usbd_enable="YES"

It is also possible to set up ppp to dial up at startup. To do this add the following lines to /etc/rc.conf. Again, for this procedure you will need to be logged in as the root user.

ppp_enable="YES"
ppp_mode="ddial"
ppp_profile="adsl"

For this to work correctly you will need to have used the sample ppp.conf which is supplied with the net/pppoa port.


27.6.2 Using mpd

You can use mpd to connect to a variety of services, in particular PPTP services. You can find mpd in the Ports Collection, net/mpd. Many ADSL modems require that a PPTP tunnel is created between the modem and computer, one such modem is the Alcatel SpeedTouch Home.

First you must install the port, and then you can configure mpd to suit your requirements and provider settings. The port places a set of sample configuration files which are well documented in PREFIX/etc/mpd/. Note here that PREFIX means the directory into which your ports are installed, this defaults to /usr/local/. A complete guide to configure mpd is available in HTML format once the port has been installed. It is placed in PREFIX/share/doc/mpd/. Here is a sample configuration for connecting to an ADSL service with mpd. The configuration is spread over two files, first the mpd.conf:

default:
    load adsl

adsl:
    new -i ng0 adsl adsl
    set bundle authname username (1)
    set bundle password password (2)
    set bundle disable multilink

    set link no pap acfcomp protocomp
    set link disable chap
    set link accept chap
    set link keep-alive 30 10

    set ipcp no vjcomp
    set ipcp ranges 0.0.0.0/0 0.0.0.0/0

    set iface route default
    set iface disable on-demand
    set iface enable proxy-arp
    set iface idle 0

    open
(1)
The username used to authenticate with your ISP.
(2)
The password used to authenticate with your ISP.

The mpd.links file contains information about the link, or links, you wish to establish. An example mpd.links to accompany the above example is given beneath:

adsl:
    set link type pptp
    set pptp mode active
    set pptp enable originate outcall
    set pptp self 10.0.0.1 (1)
    set pptp peer 10.0.0.138 (2)
(1)
The IP address of your FreeBSD computer which you will be using mpd from.
(2)
The IP address of your ADSL modem. For the Alcatel SpeedTouch Home this address defaults to 10.0.0.138.

It is possible to initialize the connection easily by issuing the following command as root:

# mpd -b adsl

You can see the status of the connection with the following command:

% ifconfig ng0
ng0: flags=88d1<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,NOARP,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
     inet 216.136.204.117 --> 204.152.186.171 netmask 0xffffffff

Using mpd is the recommended way to connect to an ADSL service with FreeBSD.


27.6.3 Using pptpclient

It is also possible to use FreeBSD to connect to other PPPoA services using net/pptpclient.

To use net/pptpclient to connect to a DSL service, install the port or package and edit your /etc/ppp/ppp.conf. You will need to be root to perform both of these operations. An example section of ppp.conf is given below. For further information on ppp.conf options consult the ppp manual page, ppp(8).

adsl:
 set log phase chat lcp ipcp ccp tun command
 set timeout 0
 enable dns
 set authname username (1)
 set authkey password (2)
 set ifaddr 0 0
 add default HISADDR
(1)
The username of your account with the DSL provider.
(2)
The password for your account.

Warning: Because you must put your account’s password in the ppp.conf file in plain text form you should make sure than nobody can read the contents of this file. The following series of commands will make sure the file is only readable by the root account. Refer to the manual pages for chmod(1) and chown(8) for further information.

# chown root:wheel /etc/ppp/ppp.conf
# chmod 600 /etc/ppp/ppp.conf

This will open a tunnel for a PPP session to your DSL router. Ethernet DSL modems have a preconfigured LAN IP address which you connect to. In the case of the Alcatel SpeedTouch Home this address is 10.0.0.138. Your router documentation should tell you which address your device uses. To open the tunnel and start a PPP session execute the following command:

# pptp address adsl

Tip: You may wish to add an ampersand (“&”) to the end of the previous command because pptp will not return your prompt to you otherwise.

A tun virtual tunnel device will be created for interaction between the pptp and ppp processes. Once you have been returned to your prompt, or the pptp process has confirmed a connection you can examine the tunnel like so:

% ifconfig tun0
tun0: flags=8051<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
        inet 216.136.204.21 --> 204.152.186.171 netmask 0xffffff00
        Opened by PID 918

If you are unable to connect, check the configuration of your router, which is usually accessible via telnet or with a web browser. If you still cannot connect you should examine the output of the pptp command and the contents of the ppp log file, /var/log/ppp.log for clues.


27.7 Using SLIP

Originally contributed by Satoshi Asami. With input from Guy Helmer and Piero Serini.


27.7.1 Setting Up a SLIP Client

The following is one way to set up a FreeBSD machine for SLIP on a static host network. For dynamic hostname assignments (your address changes each time you dial up), you probably need to have a more complex setup.

First, determine which serial port your modem is connected to. Many people set up a symbolic link, such as /dev/modem, to point to the real device name, /dev/cuadN. This allows you to abstract the actual device name should you ever need to move the modem to a different port. It can become quite cumbersome when you need to fix a bunch of files in /etc and .kermrc files all over the system!

Note: /dev/cuad0 is COM1, cuad1 is COM2, etc.

Make sure you have the following in your kernel configuration file:

device   sl

It is included in the GENERIC kernel, so this should not be a problem unless you have deleted it.


27.7.1.1 Things You Have to Do Only Once
  1. Add your home machine, the gateway and nameservers to your /etc/hosts file. Ours looks like this:

    127.0.0.1               localhost loghost
    136.152.64.181          water.CS.Example.EDU water.CS water
    136.152.64.1            inr-3.CS.Example.EDU inr-3 slip-gateway
    128.32.136.9            ns1.Example.EDU ns1
    128.32.136.12           ns2.Example.EDU ns2
  2. Make sure you have files before dns in the hosts: section of your /etc/nsswitch.conf file. Without these parameters funny things may happen.

  3. Edit the /etc/rc.conf file.

    1. Set your hostname by editing the line that says:

      hostname="myname.my.domain"

      Your machine’s full Internet hostname should be placed here.

    2. Designate the default router by changing the line:

      defaultrouter="NO"

      to:

      defaultrouter="slip-gateway"
  4. Make a file /etc/resolv.conf which contains:

    domain CS.Example.EDU
    nameserver 128.32.136.9
    nameserver 128.32.136.12

    As you can see, these set up the nameserver hosts. Of course, the actual domain names and addresses depend on your environment.

  5. Set the password for root and toor (and any other accounts that do not have a password).

  6. Reboot your machine and make sure it comes up with the correct hostname.


27.7.1.2 Making a SLIP Connection
  1. Dial up, type slip at the prompt, enter your machine name and password. What is required to be entered depends on your environment. If you use Kermit, you can try a script like this:

    # kermit setup
    set modem hayes
    set line /dev/modem
    set speed 115200
    set parity none
    set flow rts/cts
    set terminal bytesize 8
    set file type binary
    # The next macro will dial up and login
    define slip dial 643-9600, input 10 =>, if failure stop, -
    output slip\x0d, input 10 Username:, if failure stop, -
    output silvia\x0d, input 10 Password:, if failure stop, -
    output ***\x0d, echo \x0aCONNECTED\x0a

    Of course, you have to change the username and password to fit yours. After doing so, you can just type slip from the Kermit prompt to connect.

    Note: Leaving your password in plain text anywhere in the filesystem is generally a bad idea. Do it at your own risk.

  2. Leave the Kermit there (you can suspend it by Ctrl-z) and as root, type:

    # slattach -h -c -s 115200 /dev/modem

    If you are able to ping hosts on the other side of the router, you are connected! If it does not work, you might want to try -a instead of -c as an argument to slattach.


27.7.1.3 How to Shutdown the Connection

Do the following:

# kill -INT `cat /var/run/slattach.modem.pid`

to kill slattach. Keep in mind you must be root to do the above. Then go back to kermit (by running fg if you suspended it) and exit from it (q).

The slattach(8) manual page says you have to use ifconfig sl0 down to mark the interface down, but this does not seem to make any difference. (ifconfig sl0 reports the same thing.)

Some times, your modem might refuse to drop the carrier. In that case, simply start kermit and quit it again. It usually goes out on the second try.


27.7.1.4 Troubleshooting

If it does not work, feel free to ask on freebsd-net mailing list. The things that people tripped over so far:

  • Not using -c or -a in slattach (This should not be fatal, but some users have reported that this solves their problems.)

  • Using s10 instead of sl0 (might be hard to see the difference on some fonts).

  • Try ifconfig sl0 to see your interface status. For example, you might get:

    # ifconfig sl0
    sl0: flags=10<POINTOPOINT>
            inet 136.152.64.181 --> 136.152.64.1 netmask ffffff00
  • If you get “no route to host” messages from ping(8), there may be a problem with your routing table. You can use the netstat -r command to display the current routes :

    # netstat -r
    Routing tables
    Destination      Gateway            Flags     Refs     Use  IfaceMTU    Rtt    Netmasks:
    
    (root node)
    (root node)
    
    Route Tree for Protocol Family inet:
    (root node) =>
    default          inr-3.Example.EDU  UG          8   224515  sl0 -      -
    localhost.Exampl localhost.Example. UH          5    42127  lo0 -       0.438
    inr-3.Example.ED water.CS.Example.E UH          1        0  sl0 -      -
    water.CS.Example localhost.Example. UGH        34 47641234  lo0 -       0.438
    (root node)

    The preceding examples are from a relatively busy system. The numbers on your system will vary depending on network activity.


27.7.2 Setting Up a SLIP Server

This document provides suggestions for setting up SLIP Server services on a FreeBSD system, which typically means configuring your system to automatically start up connections upon login for remote SLIP clients.


27.7.2.1 Prerequisites

This section is very technical in nature, so background knowledge is required. It is assumed that you are familiar with the TCP/IP network protocol, and in particular, network and node addressing, network address masks, subnetting, routing, and routing protocols, such as RIP. Configuring SLIP services on a dial-up server requires a knowledge of these concepts, and if you are not familiar with them, please read a copy of either Craig Hunt’s TCP/IP Network Administration published by O’Reilly & Associates, Inc. (ISBN Number 0-937175-82-X), or Douglas Comer’s books on the TCP/IP protocol.

It is further assumed that you have already set up your modem(s) and configured the appropriate system files to allow logins through your modems. If you have not prepared your system for this yet, please see Section 26.4 for details on dialup services configuration. You may also want to check the manual pages for sio(4) for information on the serial port device driver and ttys(5), gettytab(5), getty(8), & init(8) for information relevant to configuring the system to accept logins on modems, and perhaps stty(1) for information on setting serial port parameters (such as clocal for directly-connected serial interfaces).


27.7.2.2 Quick Overview

In its typical configuration, using FreeBSD as a SLIP server works as follows: a SLIP user dials up your FreeBSD SLIP Server system and logs in with a special SLIP login ID that uses /usr/sbin/sliplogin as the special user’s shell. The sliplogin program browses the file /etc/sliphome/slip.hosts to find a matching line for the special user, and if it finds a match, connects the serial line to an available SLIP interface and then runs the shell script /etc/sliphome/slip.login to configure the SLIP interface.


27.7.2.2.1 An Example of a SLIP Server Login

For example, if a SLIP user ID were Shelmerg, Shelmerg’s entry in /etc/master.passwd would look something like this:

Shelmerg:password:1964:89::0:0:Guy Helmer - SLIP:/usr/users/Shelmerg:/usr/sbin/sliplogin

When Shelmerg logs in, sliplogin will search /etc/sliphome/slip.hosts for a line that had a matching user ID; for example, there may be a line in /etc/sliphome/slip.hosts that reads:

Shelmerg        dc-slip sl-helmer       0xfffffc00       autocomp

sliplogin will find that matching line, hook the serial line into the next available SLIP interface, and then execute /etc/sliphome/slip.login like this:

/etc/sliphome/slip.login 0 19200 Shelmerg dc-slip sl-helmer 0xfffffc00 autocomp

If all goes well, /etc/sliphome/slip.login will issue an ifconfig for the SLIP interface to which sliplogin attached itself (SLIP interface 0, in the above example, which was the first parameter in the list given to slip.login) to set the local IP address (dc-slip), remote IP address (sl-helmer), network mask for the SLIP interface (0xfffffc00), and any additional flags (autocomp). If something goes wrong, sliplogin usually logs good informational messages via the syslogd daemon facility, which usually logs to /var/log/messages (see the manual pages for syslogd(8) and syslog.conf(5) and perhaps check /etc/syslog.conf to see to what syslogd is logging and where it is logging to).


27.7.2.3 Kernel Configuration

FreeBSD’s default kernel (GENERIC) comes with SLIP (sl(4)) support; in case of a custom kernel, you have to add the following line to your kernel configuration file:

device   sl

By default, your FreeBSD machine will not forward packets. If you want your FreeBSD SLIP Server to act as a router, you will have to edit the /etc/rc.conf file and change the setting of the gateway_enable variable to YES. This will make sure that setting the routing option will be persistent after a reboot.

To apply the settings immediately you can execute the following command as root:

# /etc/rc.d/routing start

Please refer to Chapter 8 on Configuring the FreeBSD Kernel for help in reconfiguring your kernel.


27.7.2.4 Sliplogin Configuration

As mentioned earlier, there are three files in the /etc/sliphome directory that are part of the configuration for /usr/sbin/sliplogin (see sliplogin(8) for the actual manual page for sliplogin): slip.hosts, which defines the SLIP users and their associated IP addresses; slip.login, which usually just configures the SLIP interface; and (optionally) slip.logout, which undoes slip.login’s effects when the serial connection is terminated.


27.7.2.4.1 slip.hosts Configuration

/etc/sliphome/slip.hosts contains lines which have at least four items separated by whitespace:

  • SLIP user’s login ID

  • Local address (local to the SLIP server) of the SLIP link

  • Remote address of the SLIP link

  • Network mask

The local and remote addresses may be host names (resolved to IP addresses by /etc/hosts or by the domain name service, depending on your specifications in the file /etc/nsswitch.conf), and the network mask may be a name that can be resolved by a lookup into /etc/networks. On a sample system, /etc/sliphome/slip.hosts looks like this:

#
# login local-addr      remote-addr     mask            opt1    opt2
#                                               (normal,compress,noicmp)
#
Shelmerg  dc-slip       sl-helmerg      0xfffffc00      autocomp

At the end of the line is one or more of the options:

  • normal — no header compression

  • compress — compress headers

  • autocomp — compress headers if the remote end allows it

  • noicmp — disable ICMP packets (so any “ping” packets will be dropped instead of using up your bandwidth)

Your choice of local and remote addresses for your SLIP links depends on whether you are going to dedicate a TCP/IP subnet or if you are going to use “proxy ARP” on your SLIP server (it is not “true” proxy ARP, but that is the terminology used in this section to describe it). If you are not sure which method to select or how to assign IP addresses, please refer to the TCP/IP books referenced in the SLIP Prerequisites (Section 27.7.2.1) and/or consult your IP network manager.

If you are going to use a separate subnet for your SLIP clients, you will need to allocate the subnet number out of your assigned IP network number and assign each of your SLIP client’s IP numbers out of that subnet. Then, you will probably need to configure a static route to the SLIP subnet via your SLIP server on your nearest IP router.

Otherwise, if you will use the “proxy ARP” method, you will need to assign your SLIP client’s IP addresses out of your SLIP server’s Ethernet subnet, and you will also need to adjust your /etc/sliphome/slip.login and /etc/sliphome/slip.logout scripts to use arp(8) to manage the “proxy ARP” entries in the SLIP server’s ARP table.


27.7.2.4.2 slip.login Configuration

The typical /etc/sliphome/slip.login file looks like this:

#!/bin/sh -
#
#       @(#)slip.login  5.1 (Berkeley) 7/1/90

#
# generic login file for a slip line.  sliplogin invokes this with
# the parameters:
#      1        2         3        4          5         6     7-n
#   slipunit ttyspeed loginname local-addr remote-addr mask opt-args
#
/sbin/ifconfig sl$1 inet $4 $5 netmask $6

This slip.login file merely runs ifconfig for the appropriate SLIP interface with the local and remote addresses and network mask of the SLIP interface.

If you have decided to use the “proxy ARP” method (instead of using a separate subnet for your SLIP clients), your /etc/sliphome/slip.login file will need to look something like this:

#!/bin/sh -
#
#       @(#)slip.login  5.1 (Berkeley) 7/1/90

#
# generic login file for a slip line.  sliplogin invokes this with
# the parameters:
#      1        2         3        4          5         6     7-n
#   slipunit ttyspeed loginname local-addr remote-addr mask opt-args
#
/sbin/ifconfig sl$1 inet $4 $5 netmask $6
# Answer ARP requests for the SLIP client with our Ethernet addr
/usr/sbin/arp -s $5 00:11:22:33:44:55 pub

The additional line in this slip.login, arp -s $5 00:11:22:33:44:55 pub, creates an ARP entry in the SLIP server’s ARP table. This ARP entry causes the SLIP server to respond with the SLIP server’s Ethernet MAC address whenever another IP node on the Ethernet asks to speak to the SLIP client’s IP address.

When using the example above, be sure to replace the Ethernet MAC address (00:11:22:33:44:55) with the MAC address of your system’s Ethernet card, or your “proxy ARP” will definitely not work! You can discover your SLIP server’s Ethernet MAC address by looking at the results of running netstat -i; the second line of the output should look something like:

ed0   1500  <Link>0.2.c1.28.5f.4a         191923 0   129457     0   116

This indicates that this particular system’s Ethernet MAC address is 00:02:c1:28:5f:4a — the periods in the Ethernet MAC address given by netstat -i must be changed to colons and leading zeros should be added to each single-digit hexadecimal number to convert the address into the form that arp(8) desires; see the manual page on arp(8) for complete information on usage.

Note: When you create /etc/sliphome/slip.login and /etc/sliphome/slip.logout, the “execute” bit (i.e., chmod 755 /etc/sliphome/slip.login /etc/sliphome/slip.logout) must be set, or sliplogin will be unable to execute it.


27.7.2.4.3 slip.logout Configuration

/etc/sliphome/slip.logout is not strictly needed (unless you are implementing “proxy ARP”), but if you decide to create it, this is an example of a basic slip.logout script:

#!/bin/sh -
#
#       slip.logout

#
# logout file for a slip line.  sliplogin invokes this with
# the parameters:
#      1        2         3        4          5         6     7-n
#   slipunit ttyspeed loginname local-addr remote-addr mask opt-args
#
/sbin/ifconfig sl$1 down

If you are using “proxy ARP”, you will want to have /etc/sliphome/slip.logout remove the ARP entry for the SLIP client:

#!/bin/sh -
#
#       @(#)slip.logout

#
# logout file for a slip line.  sliplogin invokes this with
# the parameters:
#      1        2         3        4          5         6     7-n
#   slipunit ttyspeed loginname local-addr remote-addr mask opt-args
#
/sbin/ifconfig sl$1 down
# Quit answering ARP requests for the SLIP client
/usr/sbin/arp -d $5

The arp -d $5 removes the ARP entry that the “proxy ARP” slip.login added when the SLIP client logged in.

It bears repeating: make sure /etc/sliphome/slip.logout has the execute bit set after you create it (i.e., chmod 755 /etc/sliphome/slip.logout).


27.7.2.5 Routing Considerations

If you are not using the “proxy ARP” method for routing packets between your SLIP clients and the rest of your network (and perhaps the Internet), you will probably have to add static routes to your closest default router(s) to route your SLIP clients subnet via your SLIP server.


27.7.2.5.1 Static Routes

Adding static routes to your nearest default routers can be troublesome (or impossible if you do not have authority to do so…). If you have a multiple-router network in your organization, some routers, such as those made by Cisco and Proteon, may not only need to be configured with the static route to the SLIP subnet, but also need to be told which static routes to tell other routers about, so some expertise and troubleshooting/tweaking may be necessary to get static-route-based routing to work.

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FreeBSD Handbook - Chapter 14 Security

January 6th, 2009

Much of this chapter has been taken from the security(7) manual page by Matthew Dillon.


14.1 Synopsis

This chapter will provide a basic introduction to system security concepts, some general good rules of thumb, and some advanced topics under FreeBSD. A lot of the topics covered here can be applied to system and Internet security in general as well. The Internet is no longer a “friendly” place in which everyone wants to be your kind neighbor. Securing your system is imperative to protect your data, intellectual property, time, and much more from the hands of hackers and the like.

FreeBSD provides an array of utilities and mechanisms to ensure the integrity and security of your system and network.

After reading this chapter, you will know:

  • Basic system security concepts, in respect to FreeBSD.

  • About the various crypt mechanisms available in FreeBSD, such as DES and MD5.

  • How to set up one-time password authentication.

  • How to configure TCP Wrappers for use with inetd.

  • How to set up KerberosIV on FreeBSD releases prior to 5.0.

  • How to set up Kerberos5 on FreeBSD.

  • How to configure IPsec and create a VPN between FreeBSD/Windows machines.

  • How to configure and use OpenSSH, FreeBSD’s SSH implementation.

  • What file system ACLs are and how to use them.

  • How to use the Portaudit utility to audit third party software packages installed from the Ports Collection.

  • How to utilize the FreeBSD security advisories publications.

  • Have an idea of what Process Accounting is and how to enable it on FreeBSD.

Before reading this chapter, you should:

  • Understand basic FreeBSD and Internet concepts.

Additional security topics are covered throughout this book. For example, Mandatory Access Control is discussed in Chapter 16 and Internet Firewalls are discussed in Chapter 30.


14.2 Introduction

Security is a function that begins and ends with the system administrator. While all BSD UNIX multi-user systems have some inherent security, the job of building and maintaining additional security mechanisms to keep those users “honest” is probably one of the single largest undertakings of the sysadmin. Machines are only as secure as you make them, and security concerns are ever competing with the human necessity for convenience. UNIX systems, in general, are capable of running a huge number of simultaneous processes and many of these processes operate as servers — meaning that external entities can connect and talk to them. As yesterday’s mini-computers and mainframes become today’s desktops, and as computers become networked and inter-networked, security becomes an even bigger issue.

System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of attack, including attacks that attempt to crash, or otherwise make a system unusable, but do not attempt to compromise the root account (“break root”). Security concerns can be split up into several categories:

  1. Denial of service attacks.

  2. User account compromises.

  3. Root compromise through accessible servers.

  4. Root compromise via user accounts.

  5. Backdoor creation.

A denial of service attack is an action that deprives the machine of needed resources. Typically, DoS attacks are brute-force mechanisms that attempt to crash or otherwise make a machine unusable by overwhelming its servers or network stack. Some DoS attacks try to take advantage of bugs in the networking stack to crash a machine with a single packet. The latter can only be fixed by applying a bug fix to the kernel. Attacks on servers can often be fixed by properly specifying options to limit the load the servers incur on the system under adverse conditions. Brute-force network attacks are harder to deal with. A spoofed-packet attack, for example, is nearly impossible to stop, short of cutting your system off from the Internet. It may not be able to take your machine down, but it can saturate your Internet connection.

A user account compromise is even more common than a DoS attack. Many sysadmins still run standard telnetd, rlogind, rshd, and ftpd servers on their machines. These servers, by default, do not operate over encrypted connections. The result is that if you have any moderate-sized user base, one or more of your users logging into your system from a remote location (which is the most common and convenient way to login to a system) will have his or her password sniffed. The attentive system admin will analyze his remote access logs looking for suspicious source addresses even for successful logins.

One must always assume that once an attacker has access to a user account, the attacker can break root. However, the reality is that in a well secured and maintained system, access to a user account does not necessarily give the attacker access to root. The distinction is important because without access to root the attacker cannot generally hide his tracks and may, at best, be able to do nothing more than mess with the user’s files, or crash the machine. User account compromises are very common because users tend not to take the precautions that sysadmins take.

System administrators must keep in mind that there are potentially many ways to break root on a machine. The attacker may know the root password, the attacker may find a bug in a root-run server and be able to break root over a network connection to that server, or the attacker may know of a bug in a suid-root program that allows the attacker to break root once he has broken into a user’s account. If an attacker has found a way to break root on a machine, the attacker may not have a need to install a backdoor. Many of the root holes found and closed to date involve a considerable amount of work by the attacker to cleanup after himself, so most attackers install backdoors. A backdoor provides the attacker with a way to easily regain root access to the system, but it also gives the smart system administrator a convenient way to detect the intrusion. Making it impossible for an attacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental to your security, because it will not close off the hole the attacker found to break in the first place.

Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered “onion peel” approach and can be categorized as follows:

  1. Securing root and staff accounts.

  2. Securing root-run servers and suid/sgid binaries.

  3. Securing user accounts.

  4. Securing the password file.

  5. Securing the kernel core, raw devices, and file systems.

  6. Quick detection of inappropriate changes made to the system.

  7. Paranoia.

The next section of this chapter will cover the above bullet items in greater depth.


14.3 Securing FreeBSD

Command vs. Protocol: Throughout this document, we will use bold text to refer to an application, and a monospaced font to refer to specific commands. Protocols will use a normal font. This typographical distinction is useful for instances such as ssh, since it is a protocol as well as command.

The sections that follow will cover the methods of securing your FreeBSD system that were mentioned in the last section of this chapter.


14.3.1 Securing the root Account and Staff Accounts

First off, do not bother securing staff accounts if you have not secured the root account. Most systems have a password assigned to the root account. The first thing you do is assume that the password is always compromised. This does not mean that you should remove the password. The password is almost always necessary for console access to the machine. What it does mean is that you should not make it possible to use the password outside of the console or possibly even with the su(1) command. For example, make sure that your ptys are specified as being insecure in the /etc/ttys file so that direct root logins via telnet or rlogin are disallowed. If using other login services such as sshd, make sure that direct root logins are disabled there as well. You can do this by editing your /etc/ssh/sshd_config file, and making sure that PermitRootLogin is set to NO. Consider every access method — services such as FTP often fall through the cracks. Direct root logins should only be allowed via the system console.

Of course, as a sysadmin you have to be able to get to root, so we open up a few holes. But we make sure these holes require additional password verification to operate. One way to make root accessible is to add appropriate staff accounts to the wheel group (in /etc/group). The staff members placed in the wheel group are allowed to su to root. You should never give staff members native wheel access by putting them in the wheel group in their password entry. Staff accounts should be placed in a staff group, and then added to the wheel group via the /etc/group file. Only those staff members who actually need to have root access should be placed in the wheel group. It is also possible, when using an authentication method such as Kerberos, to use Kerberos’ .k5login file in the root account to allow a ksu(1) to root without having to place anyone at all in the wheel group. This may be the better solution since the wheel mechanism still allows an intruder to break root if the intruder has gotten hold of your password file and can break into a staff account. While having the wheel mechanism is better than having nothing at all, it is not necessarily the safest option.

To lock an account completely, the pw(8) command should be used:

#pw lock staff

This will prevent the user from logging in using any mechanism, including ssh(1).

Another method of blocking access to accounts would be to replace the encrypted password with a single “*” character. This character would never match the encrypted password and thus block user access. For example, the following staff account:

foobar:R9DT/Fa1/LV9U:1000:1000::0:0:Foo Bar:/home/foobar:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

Should be changed to this:

foobar:*:1000:1000::0:0:Foo Bar:/home/foobar:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

This will prevent the foobar user from logging in using conventional methods. This method for access restriction is flawed on sites using Kerberos or in situations where the user has set up keys with ssh(1).

These security mechanisms also assume that you are logging in from a more restrictive server to a less restrictive server. For example, if your main box is running all sorts of servers, your workstation should not be running any. In order for your workstation to be reasonably secure you should run as few servers as possible, up to and including no servers at all, and you should run a password-protected screen blanker. Of course, given physical access to a workstation an attacker can break any sort of security you put on it. This is definitely a problem that you should consider, but you should also consider the fact that the vast majority of break-ins occur remotely, over a network, from people who do not have physical access to your workstation or servers.

Using something like Kerberos also gives you the ability to disable or change the password for a staff account in one place, and have it immediately affect all the machines on which the staff member may have an account. If a staff member’s account gets compromised, the ability to instantly change his password on all machines should not be underrated. With discrete passwords, changing a password on N machines can be a mess. You can also impose re-passwording restrictions with Kerberos: not only can a Kerberos ticket be made to timeout after a while, but the Kerberos system can require that the user choose a new password after a certain period of time (say, once a month).


14.3.2 Securing Root-run Servers and SUID/SGID Binaries

The prudent sysadmin only runs the servers he needs to, no more, no less. Be aware that third party servers are often the most bug-prone. For example, running an old version of imapd or popper is like giving a universal root ticket out to the entire world. Never run a server that you have not checked out carefully. Many servers do not need to be run as root. For example, the ntalk, comsat, and finger daemons can be run in special user sandboxes. A sandbox is not perfect, unless you go through a large amount of trouble, but the onion approach to security still stands: If someone is able to break in through a server running in a sandbox, they still have to break out of the sandbox. The more layers the attacker must break through, the lower the likelihood of his success. Root holes have historically been found in virtually every server ever run as root, including basic system servers. If you are running a machine through which people only login via sshd and never login via telnetd or rshd or rlogind, then turn off those services!

FreeBSD now defaults to running ntalkd, comsat, and finger in a sandbox. Another program which may be a candidate for running in a sandbox is named(8). /etc/defaults/rc.conf includes the arguments necessary to run named in a sandbox in a commented-out form. Depending on whether you are installing a new system or upgrading an existing system, the special user accounts used by these sandboxes may not be installed. The prudent sysadmin would research and implement sandboxes for servers whenever possible.

There are a number of other servers that typically do not run in sandboxes: sendmail, popper, imapd, ftpd, and others. There are alternatives to some of these, but installing them may require more work than you are willing to perform (the convenience factor strikes again). You may have to run these servers as root and rely on other mechanisms to detect break-ins that might occur through them.

The other big potential root holes in a system are the suid-root and sgid binaries installed on the system. Most of these binaries, such as rlogin, reside in /bin, /sbin, /usr/bin, or /usr/sbin. While nothing is 100% safe, the system-default suid and sgid binaries can be considered reasonably safe. Still, root holes are occasionally found in these binaries. A root hole was found in Xlib in 1998 that made xterm (which is typically suid) vulnerable. It is better to be safe than sorry and the prudent sysadmin will restrict suid binaries, that only staff should run, to a special group that only staff can access, and get rid of (chmod 000) any suid binaries that nobody uses. A server with no display generally does not need an xterm binary. Sgid binaries can be almost as dangerous. If an intruder can break an sgid-kmem binary, the intruder might be able to read /dev/kmem and thus read the encrypted password file, potentially compromising any passworded account. Alternatively an intruder who breaks group kmem can monitor keystrokes sent through ptys, including ptys used by users who login through secure methods. An intruder that breaks the tty group can write to almost any user’s tty. If a user is running a terminal program or emulator with a keyboard-simulation feature, the intruder can potentially generate a data stream that causes the user’s terminal to echo a command, which is then run as that user.


14.3.3 Securing User Accounts

User accounts are usually the most difficult to secure. While you can impose draconian access restrictions on your staff and “star” out their passwords, you may not be able to do so with any general user accounts you might have. If you do have sufficient control, then you may win out and be able to secure the user accounts properly. If not, you simply have to be more vigilant in your monitoring of those accounts. Use of ssh and Kerberos for user accounts is more problematic, due to the extra administration and technical support required, but still a very good solution compared to a encrypted password file.


14.3.4 Securing the Password File

The only sure fire way is to star out as many passwords as you can and use ssh or Kerberos for access to those accounts. Even though the encrypted password file (/etc/spwd.db) can only be read by root, it may be possible for an intruder to obtain read access to that file even if the attacker cannot obtain root-write access.

Your security scripts should always check for and report changes to the password file (see the Checking file integrity section below).


14.3.5 Securing the Kernel Core, Raw Devices, and File systems

If an attacker breaks root he can do just about anything, but there are certain conveniences. For example, most modern kernels have a packet sniffing device driver built in. Under FreeBSD it is called the bpf device. An intruder will commonly attempt to run a packet sniffer on a compromised machine. You do not need to give the intruder the capability and most systems do not have the need for the bpf device compiled in.

But even if you turn off the bpf device, you still have /dev/mem and /dev/kmem to worry about. For that matter, the intruder can still write to raw disk devices. Also, there is another kernel feature called the module loader, kldload(8). An enterprising intruder can use a KLD module to install his own bpf device, or other sniffing device, on a running kernel. To avoid these problems you have to run the kernel at a higher secure level, at least securelevel 1. The securelevel can be set with a sysctl on the kern.securelevel variable. Once you have set the securelevel to 1, write access to raw devices will be denied and special chflags flags, such as schg, will be enforced. You must also ensure that the schg flag is set on critical startup binaries, directories, and script files — everything that gets run up to the point where the securelevel is set. This might be overdoing it, and upgrading the system is much more difficult when you operate at a higher secure level. You may compromise and run the system at a higher secure level but not set the schg flag for every system file and directory under the sun. Another possibility is to simply mount / and /usr read-only. It should be noted that being too draconian in what you attempt to protect may prevent the all-important detection of an intrusion.


14.3.6 Checking File Integrity: Binaries, Configuration Files, Etc.

When it comes right down to it, you can only protect your core system configuration and control files so much before the convenience factor rears its ugly head. For example, using chflags to set the schg bit on most of the files in / and /usr is probably counterproductive, because while it may protect the files, it also closes a detection window. The last layer of your security onion is perhaps the most important — detection. The rest of your security is pretty much useless (or, worse, presents you with a false sense of security) if you cannot detect potential intrusions. Half the job of the onion is to slow down the attacker, rather than stop him, in order to be able to catch him in the act.

The best way to detect an intrusion is to look for modified, missing, or unexpected files. The best way to look for modified files is from another (often centralized) limited-access system. Writing your security scripts on the extra-secure limited-access system makes them mostly invisible to potential attackers, and this is important. In order to take maximum advantage you generally have to give the limited-access box significant access to the other machines in the business, usually either by doing a read-only NFS export of the other machines to the limited-access box, or by setting up ssh key-pairs to allow the limited-access box to ssh to the other machines. Except for its network traffic, NFS is the least visible method — allowing you to monitor the file systems on each client box virtually undetected. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a switch, the NFS method is often the better choice. If your limited-access server is connected to the client boxes through a hub, or through several layers of routing, the NFS method may be too insecure (network-wise) and using ssh may be the better choice even with the audit-trail tracks that ssh lays.

Once you have given a limited-access box at least read access to the client systems it is supposed to monitor, you must write scripts to do the actual monitoring. Given an NFS mount, you can write scripts out of simple system utilities such as find(1) and md5(1). It is best to physically md5 the client-box files at least once a day, and to test control files such as those found in /etc and /usr/local/etc even more often. When mismatches are found, relative to the base md5 information the limited-access machine knows is valid, it should scream at a sysadmin to go check it out. A good security script will also check for inappropriate suid binaries and for new or deleted files on system partitions such as / and /usr.

When using ssh rather than NFS, writing the security script is much more difficult. You essentially have to scp the scripts to the client box in order to run them, making them visible, and for safety you also need to scp the binaries (such as find) that those scripts use. The ssh client on the client box may already be compromised. All in all, using ssh may be necessary when running over insecure links, but it is also a lot harder to deal with.

A good security script will also check for changes to user and staff members access configuration files: .rhosts, .shosts, .ssh/authorized_keys and so forth, files that might fall outside the purview of the MD5 check.

If you have a huge amount of user disk space, it may take too long to run through every file on those partitions. In this case, setting mount flags to disallow suid binaries is a good idea. The nosuid option (see mount(8)) is what you want to look into. You should probably scan them anyway, at least once a week, since the object of this layer is to detect a break-in attempt, whether or not the attempt succeeds.

Process accounting (see accton(8)) is a relatively low-overhead feature of the operating system which might help as a post-break-in evaluation mechanism. It is especially useful in tracking down how an intruder has actually broken into a system, assuming the file is still intact after the break-in has occured.

Finally, security scripts should process the log files, and the logs themselves should be generated in as secure a manner as possible — remote syslog can be very useful. An intruder will try to cover his tracks, and log files are critical to the sysadmin trying to track down the time and method of the initial break-in. One way to keep a permanent record of the log files is to run the system console to a serial port and collect the information to a secure machine monitoring the consoles.


14.3.7 Paranoia

A little paranoia never hurts. As a rule, a sysadmin can add any number of security features, as long as they do not affect convenience, and can add security features that do affect convenience with some added thought. Even more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up a bit — if you use recommendations such as those given by this document verbatim, you give away your methodologies to the prospective attacker who also has access to this document.


14.3.8 Denial of Service Attacks

This section covers Denial of Service attacks. A DoS attack is typically a packet attack. While there is not much you can do about modern spoofed packet attacks that saturate your network, you can generally limit the damage by ensuring that the attacks cannot take down your servers by:

  1. Limiting server forks.

  2. Limiting springboard attacks (ICMP response attacks, ping broadcast, etc.).

  3. Overloading the Kernel Route Cache.

A common DoS attack scenario is attacking a forking server and making it spawning so many child processes that the host system eventually runs out of memory, file descriptors, etc. and then grinds to a halt. inetd (see inetd(8)) has several options to limit this sort of attack. It should be noted that while it is possible to prevent a machine from going down, it is not generally possible to prevent a service from being disrupted by the attack. Read the inetd manual page carefully and pay specific attention to the -c, -C, and -R options. Note that spoofed-IP attacks will circumvent the -C option to inetd, so typically a combination of options must be used. Some standalone servers have self-fork-limitation parameters.

Sendmail has its -OMaxDaemonChildren option, which tends to work much better than trying to use Sendmail’s load limiting options due to the load lag. You should specify a MaxDaemonChildren parameter, when you start sendmail; high enough to handle your expected load, but not so high that the computer cannot handle that number of Sendmail instances without falling on its face. It is also prudent to run Sendmail in queued mode (-ODeliveryMode=queued) and to run the daemon (sendmail -bd) separate from the queue-runs (sendmail -q15m). If you still want real-time delivery you can run the queue at a much lower interval, such as -q1m, but be sure to specify a reasonable MaxDaemonChildren option for that Sendmail to prevent cascade failures.

Syslogd can be attacked directly and it is strongly recommended that you use the -s option whenever possible, and the -a option otherwise.

You should also be fairly careful with connect-back services such as TCP Wrapper’s reverse-identd, which can be attacked directly. You generally do not want to use the reverse-ident feature of TCP Wrapper for this reason.

It is a very good idea to protect internal services from external access by firewalling them off at your border routers. The idea here is to prevent saturation attacks from outside your LAN, not so much to protect internal services from network-based root compromise. Always configure an exclusive firewall, i.e., “firewall everything except ports A, B, C, D, and M-Z”. This way you can firewall off all of your low ports except for certain specific services such as named (if you are primary for a zone), ntalkd, sendmail, and other Internet-accessible services. If you try to configure the firewall the other way — as an inclusive or permissive firewall, there is a good chance that you will forget to “close” a couple of services, or that you will add a new internal service and forget to update the firewall. You can still open up the high-numbered port range on the firewall, to allow permissive-like operation, without compromising your low ports. Also take note that FreeBSD allows you to control the range of port numbers used for dynamic binding, via the various net.inet.ip.portrange sysctl’s (sysctl -a | fgrep portrange), which can also ease the complexity of your firewall’s configuration. For example, you might use a normal first/last range of 4000 to 5000, and a hiport range of 49152 to 65535, then block off everything under 4000 in your firewall (except for certain specific Internet-accessible ports, of course).

Another common DoS attack is called a springboard attack — to attack a server in a manner that causes the server to generate responses which overloads the server, the local network, or some other machine. The most common attack of this nature is the ICMP ping broadcast attack. The attacker spoofs ping packets sent to your LAN’s broadcast address with the source IP address set to the actual machine they wish to attack. If your border routers are not configured to stomp on ping packets to broadcast addresses, your LAN winds up generating sufficient responses to the spoofed source address to saturate the victim, especially when the attacker uses the same trick on several dozen broadcast addresses over several dozen different networks at once. Broadcast attacks of over a hundred and twenty megabits have been measured. A second common springboard attack is against the ICMP error reporting system. By constructing packets that generate ICMP error responses, an attacker can saturate a server’s incoming network and cause the server to saturate its outgoing network with ICMP responses. This type of attack can also crash the server by running it out of memory, especially if the server cannot drain the ICMP responses it generates fast enough. Use the sysctl variable net.inet.icmp.icmplim to limit these attacks. The last major class of springboard attacks is related to certain internal inetd services such as the udp echo service. An attacker simply spoofs a UDP packet with the source address being server A’s echo port, and the destination address being server B’s echo port, where server A and B are both on your LAN. The two servers then bounce this one packet back and forth between each other. The attacker can overload both servers and their LANs simply by injecting a few packets in this manner. Similar problems exist with the internal chargen port. A competent sysadmin will turn off all of these inetd-internal test services.

Spoofed packet attacks may also be used to overload the kernel route cache. Refer to the net.inet.ip.rtexpire, rtminexpire, and rtmaxcache sysctl parameters. A spoofed packet attack that uses a random source IP will cause the kernel to generate a temporary cached route in the route table, viewable with netstat -rna | fgrep W3. These routes typically timeout in 1600 seconds or so. If the kernel detects that the cached route table has gotten too big it will dynamically reduce the rtexpire but will never decrease it to less than rtminexpire. There are two problems:

  1. The kernel does not react quickly enough when a lightly loaded server is suddenly attacked.

  2. The rtminexpire is not low enough for the kernel to survive a sustained attack.

If your servers are connected to the Internet via a T3 or better, it may be prudent to manually override both rtexpire and rtminexpire via sysctl(8). Never set either parameter to zero (unless you want to crash the machine). Setting both parameters to 2 seconds should be sufficient to protect the route table from attack.


14.3.9 Access Issues with Kerberos and SSH

There are a few issues with both Kerberos and ssh that need to be addressed if you intend to use them. Kerberos 5 is an excellent authentication protocol, but there are bugs in the kerberized telnet and rlogin applications that make them unsuitable for dealing with binary streams. Also, by default Kerberos does not encrypt a session unless you use the -x option. ssh encrypts everything by default.

Ssh works quite well in every respect except that it forwards encryption keys by default. What this means is that if you have a secure workstation holding keys that give you access to the rest of the system, and you ssh to an insecure machine, your keys are usable. The actual keys themselves are not exposed, but ssh installs a forwarding port for the duration of your login, and if an attacker has broken root on the insecure machine he can utilize that port to use your keys to gain access to any other machine that your keys unlock.

We recommend that you use ssh in combination with Kerberos whenever possible for staff logins. Ssh can be compiled with Kerberos support. This reduces your reliance on potentially exposed ssh keys while at the same time protecting passwords via Kerberos. Ssh keys should only be used for automated tasks from secure machines (something that Kerberos is unsuited to do). We also recommend that you either turn off key-forwarding in the ssh configuration, or that you make use of the from=IP/DOMAIN option that ssh allows in its authorized_keys file to make the key only usable to entities logging in from specific machines.


14.4 DES, Blowfish, MD5, and Crypt

Parts rewritten and updated by Bill Swingle.

Every user on a UNIX system has a password associated with their account. It seems obvious that these passwords need to be known only to the user and the actual operating system. In order to keep these passwords secret, they are encrypted with what is known as a “one-way hash”, that is, they can only be easily encrypted but not decrypted. In other words, what we told you a moment ago was obvious is not even true: the operating system itself does not really know the password. It only knows the encrypted form of the password. The only way to get the “plain-text” password is by a brute force search of the space of possible passwords.

Unfortunately the only secure way to encrypt passwords when UNIX came into being was based on DES, the Data Encryption Standard. This was not such a problem for users resident in the US, but since the source code for DES could not be exported outside the US, FreeBSD had to find a way to both comply with US law and retain compatibility with all the other UNIX variants that still used DES.

The solution was to divide up the encryption libraries so that US users could install the DES libraries and use DES but international users still had an encryption method that could be exported abroad. This is how FreeBSD came to use MD5 as its default encryption method. MD5 is believed to be more secure than DES, so installing DES is offered primarily for compatibility reasons.


14.4.1 Recognizing Your Crypt Mechanism

Currently the library supports DES, MD5 and Blowfish hash functions. By default FreeBSD uses MD5 to encrypt passwords.

It is pretty easy to identify which encryption method FreeBSD is set up to use. Examining the encrypted passwords in the /etc/master.passwd file is one way. Passwords encrypted with the MD5 hash are longer than those encrypted with the DES hash and also begin with the characters $1$. Passwords starting with $2a$ are encrypted with the Blowfish hash function. DES password strings do not have any particular identifying characteristics, but they are shorter than MD5 passwords, and are coded in a 64-character alphabet which does not include the $ character, so a relatively short string which does not begin with a dollar sign is very likely a DES password.

The password format used for new passwords is controlled by the passwd_format login capability in /etc/login.conf, which takes values of des, md5 or blf. See the login.conf(5) manual page for more information about login capabilities.


14.5 One-time Passwords

By default, FreeBSD includes support for OPIE (One-time Passwords In Everything), which uses the MD5 hash by default.

There are three different sorts of passwords which we will discuss below. The first is your usual UNIX style or Kerberos password; we will call this a “UNIX password”. The second sort is the one-time password which is generated by the OPIE opiekey(1) program and accepted by the opiepasswd(1) program and the login prompt; we will call this a “one-time password”. The final sort of password is the secret password which you give to the opiekey program (and sometimes the opiepasswd programs) which it uses to generate one-time passwords; we will call it a “secret password” or just unqualified “password”.

The secret password does not have anything to do with your UNIX password; they can be the same but this is not recommended. OPIE secret passwords are not limited to 8 characters like old UNIX passwords[8], they can be as long as you like. Passwords of six or seven word long phrases are fairly common. For the most part, the OPIE system operates completely independently of the UNIX password system.

Besides the password, there are two other pieces of data that are important to OPIE. One is what is known as the “seed” or “key”, consisting of two letters and five digits. The other is what is called the “iteration count”, a number between 1 and 100. OPIE creates the one-time password by concatenating the seed and the secret password, then applying the MD5 hash as many times as specified by the iteration count and turning the result into six short English words. These six English words are your one-time password. The authentication system (primarily PAM) keeps track of the last one-time password used, and the user is authenticated if the hash of the user-provided password is equal to the previous password. Because a one-way hash is used it is impossible to generate future one-time passwords if a successfully used password is captured; the iteration count is decremented after each successful login to keep the user and the login program in sync. When the iteration count gets down to 1, OPIE must be reinitialized.

There are a few programs involved in each system which we will discuss below. The opiekey program accepts an iteration count, a seed, and a secret password, and generates a one-time password or a consecutive list of one-time passwords. The opiepasswd program is used to initialize OPIE, and to change passwords, iteration counts, or seeds; it takes either a secret passphrase, or an iteration count, seed, and a one-time password. The opieinfo program will examine the relevant credentials files (/etc/opiekeys) and print out the invoking user’s current iteration count and seed.

There are four different sorts of operations we will cover. The first is using opiepasswd over a secure connection to set up one-time-passwords for the first time, or to change your password or seed. The second operation is using opiepasswd over an insecure connection, in conjunction with opiekey over a secure connection, to do the same. The third is using opiekey to log in over an insecure connection. The fourth is using opiekey to generate a number of keys which can be written down or printed out to carry with you when going to some location without secure connections to anywhere.


14.5.1 Secure Connection Initialization

To initialize OPIE for the first time, execute the opiepasswd command:

% opiepasswd -c
[grimreaper] ~ $ opiepasswd -f -c
Adding unfurl:
Only use this method from the console; NEVER from remote. If you are using
telnet, xterm, or a dial-in, type ^C now or exit with no password.
Then run opiepasswd without the -c parameter.
Using MD5 to compute responses.
Enter new secret pass phrase:
Again new secret pass phrase:
ID unfurl OTP key is 499 to4268
MOS MALL GOAT ARM AVID COED

At the Enter new secret pass phrase: or Enter secret password: prompts, you should enter a password or phrase. Remember, this is not the password that you will use to login with, this is used to generate your one-time login keys. The “ID” line gives the parameters of your particular instance: your login name, the iteration count, and seed. When logging in the system will remember these parameters and present them back to you so you do not have to remember them. The last line gives the particular one-time password which corresponds to those parameters and your secret password; if you were to re-login immediately, this one-time password is the one you would use.


14.5.2 Insecure Connection Initialization

To initialize or change your secret password over an insecure connection, you will need to already have a secure connection to some place where you can run opiekey; this might be in the form of a shell prompt on a machine you trust. You will also need to make up an iteration count (100 is probably a good value), and you may make up your own seed or use a randomly-generated one. Over on the insecure connection (to the machine you are initializing), use opiepasswd:

% opiepasswd

Updating unfurl:
You need the response from an OTP generator.
Old secret pass phrase:
        otp-md5 498 to4268 ext
        Response: GAME GAG WELT OUT DOWN CHAT
New secret pass phrase:
        otp-md5 499 to4269
        Response: LINE PAP MILK NELL BUOY TROY

ID mark OTP key is 499 gr4269
LINE PAP MILK NELL BUOY TROY

To accept the default seed press Return. Then before entering an access password, move over to your secure connection and give it the same parameters:

% opiekey 498 to4268
Using the MD5 algorithm to compute response.
Reminder: Don't use opiekey from telnet or dial-in sessions.
Enter secret pass phrase:
GAME GAG WELT OUT DOWN CHAT

Now switch back over to the insecure connection, and copy the one-time password generated over to the relevant program.


14.5.3 Generating a Single One-time Password

Once you have initialized OPIE and login, you will be presented with a prompt like this:

% telnet example.com
Trying 10.0.0.1...
Connected to example.com
Escape character is '^]'.

FreeBSD/i386 (example.com) (ttypa)

login: <username>
otp-md5 498 gr4269 ext
Password:

As a side note, the OPIE prompts have a useful feature (not shown here): if you press Return at the password prompt, the prompter will turn echo on, so you can see what you are typing. This can be extremely useful if you are attempting to type in a password by hand, such as from a printout.

At this point you need to generate your one-time password to answer this login prompt. This must be done on a trusted system that you can run opiekey on. (There are versions of these for DOS, Windows and Mac OS as well.) They need the iteration count and the seed as command line options. You can cut-and-paste these right from the login prompt on the machine that you are logging in to.

On the trusted system:

% opiekey 498 to4268
Using the MD5 algorithm to compute response.
Reminder: Don't use opiekey from telnet or dial-in sessions.
Enter secret pass phrase:
GAME GAG WELT OUT DOWN CHAT

Now that you have your one-time password you can continue logging in.


14.5.4 Generating Multiple One-time Passwords

Sometimes you have to go places where you do not have access to a trusted machine or secure connection. In this case, it is possible to use the opiekey command to generate a number of one-time passwords beforehand to be printed out and taken with you. For example:

% opiekey -n 5 30 zz99999
Using the MD5 algorithm to compute response.
Reminder: Don't use opiekey from telnet or dial-in sessions.
Enter secret pass phrase: <secret password>
26: JOAN BORE FOSS DES NAY QUIT
27: LATE BIAS SLAY FOLK MUCH TRIG
28: SALT TIN ANTI LOON NEAL USE
29: RIO ODIN GO BYE FURY TIC
30: GREW JIVE SAN GIRD BOIL PHI

The -n 5 requests five keys in sequence, the 30 specifies what the last iteration number should be. Note that these are printed out in reverse order of eventual use. If you are really paranoid, you might want to write the results down by hand; otherwise you can cut-and-paste into lpr. Note that each line shows both the iteration count and the one-time password; you may still find it handy to scratch off passwords as you use them.


14.5.5 Restricting Use of UNIX® Passwords

OPIE can restrict the use of UNIX passwords based on the IP address of a login session. The relevant file is /etc/opieaccess, which is present by default. Please check opieaccess(5) for more information on this file and which security considerations you should be aware of when using it.

Here is a sample opieaccess file:

permit 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0

This line allows users whose IP source address (which is vulnerable to spoofing) matches the specified value and mask, to use UNIX passwords at any time.

If no rules in opieaccess are matched, the default is to deny non-OPIE logins.


14.6 TCP Wrappers

Written by Tom Rhodes.

Anyone familiar with inetd(8) has probably heard of TCP Wrappers at some point. But few individuals seem to fully comprehend its usefulness in a network environment. It seems that everyone wants to install a firewall to handle network connections. While a firewall has a wide variety of uses, there are some things that a firewall will not handle, such as sending text back to the connection originator. The TCP Wrappers software does this and much more. In the next few sections many of the TCP Wrappers features will be discussed, and, when applicable, example configuration lines will be provided.

The TCP Wrappers software extends the abilities of inetd to provide support for every server daemon under its control. Using this method it is possible to provide logging support, return messages to connections, permit a daemon to only accept internal connections, etc. While some of these features can be provided by implementing a firewall, this will add not only an extra layer of protection but go beyond the amount of control a firewall can provide.

The added functionality of TCP Wrappers should not be considered a replacement for a good firewall. TCP Wrappers can be used in conjunction with a firewall or other security enhancements though and it can serve nicely as an extra layer of protection for the system.

Since this is an extension to the configuration of inetd, the reader is expected have read the inetd configuration section.

Note: While programs run by inetd(8) are not exactly “daemons”, they have traditionally been called daemons. This is the term we will use in this section too.


14.6.1 Initial Configuration

The only requirement of using TCP Wrappers in FreeBSD is to ensure the inetd server is started from rc.conf with the -Ww option; this is the default setting. Of course, proper configuration of /etc/hosts.allow is also expected, but syslogd(8) will throw messages in the system logs in these cases.

Note: Unlike other implementations of TCP Wrappers, the use of hosts.deny has been deprecated. All configuration options should be placed in /etc/hosts.allow.

In the simplest configuration, daemon connection policies are set to either be permitted or blocked depending on the options in /etc/hosts.allow. The default configuration in FreeBSD is to allow a connection to every daemon started with inetd. Changing this will be discussed only after the basic configuration is covered.

Basic configuration usually takes the form of daemon : address : action. Where daemon is the daemon name which inetd started. The address can be a valid hostname, an IP address or an IPv6 address enclosed in brackets ([ ]). The action field can be either allow or deny to grant or deny access appropriately. Keep in mind that configuration works off a first rule match semantic, meaning that the configuration file is scanned in ascending order for a matching rule. When a match is found the rule is applied and the search process will halt.

Several other options exist but they will be explained in a later section. A simple configuration line may easily be constructed from that information alone. For example, to allow POP3 connections via the mail/qpopper daemon, the following lines should be appended to hosts.allow:

# This line is required for POP3 connections:
qpopper : ALL : allow

After adding this line, inetd will need to be restarted. This can be accomplished by use of the kill(1) command, or with the restart parameter with /etc/rc.d/inetd.


14.6.2 Advanced Configuration

TCP Wrappers has advanced options too; they will allow for more control over the way connections are handled. In some cases it may be a good idea to return a comment to certain hosts or daemon connections. In other cases, perhaps a log file should be recorded or an email sent to the administrator. Other situations may require the use of a service for local connections only. This is all possible through the use of configuration options known as wildcards, expansion characters and external command execution. The next two sections are written to cover these situations.


14.6.2.1 External Commands

Suppose that a situation occurs where a connection should be denied yet a reason should be sent to the individual who attempted to establish that connection. How could it be done? That action can be made possible by using the twist option. When a connection attempt is made, twist will be called to execute a shell command or script. An example already exists in the hosts.allow file:

# The rest of the daemons are protected.
ALL : ALL \
        : severity auth.info \
        : twist /bin/echo "You are not welcome to use %d from %h."

This example shows that the message, “You are not allowed to use daemon from hostname.” will be returned for any daemon not previously configured in the access file. This is extremely useful for sending a reply back to the connection initiator right after the established connection is dropped. Note that any message returned must be wrapped in quote " characters; there are no exceptions to this rule.

Warning: It may be possible to launch a denial of service attack on the server if an attacker, or group of attackers could flood these daemons with connection requests.

Another possibility is to use the spawn option in these cases. Like twist, the spawn option implicitly denies the connection and may be used to run external shell commands or scripts. Unlike twist, spawn will not send a reply back to the individual who established the connection. For an example, consider the following configuration line:

# We do not allow connections from example.com:
ALL : .example.com \
    : spawn (/bin/echo %a from %h attempted to access %d >> \
      /var/log/connections.log) \
    : deny

This will deny all connection attempts from the *.example.com domain; simultaneously logging the hostname, IP address and the daemon which they attempted to access in the /var/log/connections.log file.

Aside from the already explained substitution characters above, e.g. %a, a few others exist. See the hosts_access(5) manual page for the complete list.


14.6.2.2 Wildcard Options

Thus far the ALL option has been used continuously throughout the examples. Other options exist which could extend the functionality a bit further. For instance, ALL may be used to match every instance of either a daemon, domain or an IP address. Another wildcard available is PARANOID which may be used to match any host which provides an IP address that may be forged. In other words, PARANOID may be used to define an action to be taken whenever a connection is made from an IP address that differs from its hostname. The following example may shed some more light on this discussion:

# Block possibly spoofed requests to sendmail:
sendmail : PARANOID : deny

In that example all connection requests to sendmail which have an IP address that varies from its hostname will be denied.

Caution: Using the PARANOID wildcard may severely cripple servers if the client or server has a broken DNS setup. Administrator discretion is advised.

To learn more about wildcards and their associated functionality, see the hosts_access(5) manual page.

Before any of the specific configuration lines above will work, the first configuration line should be commented out in hosts.allow. This was noted at the beginning of this section.


14.7 KerberosIV

Contributed by Mark Murray. Based on a contribution by Mark Dapoz.

Kerberos is a network add-on system/protocol that allows users to authenticate themselves through the services of a secure server. Services such as remote login, remote copy, secure inter-system file copying and other high-risk tasks are made considerably safer and more controllable.

The following instructions can be used as a guide on how to set up Kerberos as distributed for FreeBSD. However, you should refer to the relevant manual pages for a complete description.


14.7.1 Installing KerberosIV

Kerberos is an optional component of FreeBSD. The easiest way to install this software is by selecting the krb4 or krb5 distribution in sysinstall during the initial installation of FreeBSD. This will install the “eBones” (KerberosIV) or “Heimdal” (Kerberos5) implementation of Kerberos. These implementations are included because they are developed outside the USA/Canada and were thus available to system owners outside those countries during the era of restrictive export controls on cryptographic code from the USA.

Alternatively, the MIT implementation of Kerberos is available from the Ports Collection as security/krb5.


14.7.2 Creating the Initial Database

This is done on the Kerberos server only. First make sure that you do not have any old Kerberos databases around. You should change to the directory /etc/kerberosIV and check that only the following files are present:

# cd /etc/kerberosIV
# ls
README      krb.conf        krb.realms

If any additional files (such as principal.* or master_key) exist, then use the kdb_destroy command to destroy the old Kerberos database, or if Kerberos is not running, simply delete the extra files.

You should now edit the krb.conf and krb.realms files to define your Kerberos realm. In this case the realm will be EXAMPLE.COM and the server is grunt.example.com. We edit or create the krb.conf file:

# cat krb.conf
EXAMPLE.COM
EXAMPLE.COM grunt.example.com admin server
CS.BERKELEY.EDU okeeffe.berkeley.edu
ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos.mit.edu
ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos-1.mit.edu
ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos-2.mit.edu
ATHENA.MIT.EDU kerberos-3.mit.edu
LCS.MIT.EDU kerberos.lcs.mit.edu
TELECOM.MIT.EDU bitsy.mit.edu
ARC.NASA.GOV trident.arc.nasa.gov

In this case, the other realms do not need to be there. They are here as an example of how a machine may be made aware of multiple realms. You may wish to not include them for simplicity.

The first line names the realm in which this system works. The other lines contain realm/host entries. The first item on a line is a realm, and the second is a host in that realm that is acting as a “key distribution center”. The words admin server following a host’s name means that host also provides an administrative database server. For further explanation of these terms, please consult the Kerberos manual pages.

Now we have to add grunt.example.com to the EXAMPLE.COM realm and also add an entry to put all hosts in the .example.com domain in the EXAMPLE.COM realm. The krb.realms file would be updated as follows:

# cat krb.realms
grunt.example.com EXAMPLE.COM
.example.com EXAMPLE.COM
.berkeley.edu CS.BERKELEY.EDU
.MIT.EDU ATHENA.MIT.EDU
.mit.edu ATHENA.MIT.EDU

Again, the other realms do not need to be there. They are here as an example of how a machine may be made aware of multiple realms. You may wish to remove them to simplify things.

The first line puts the specific system into the named realm. The rest of the lines show how to default systems of a particular subdomain to a named realm.

Now we are ready to create the database. This only needs to run on the Kerberos server (or Key Distribution Center). Issue the kdb_init command to do this:

# kdb_init
Realm name [default  ATHENA.MIT.EDU ]: EXAMPLE.COM
You will be prompted for the database Master Password.
It is important that you NOT FORGET this password.

Enter Kerberos master key:

Now we have to save the key so that servers on the local machine can pick it up. Use the kstash command to do this:

# kstash

Enter Kerberos master key:

Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered. BEWARE!

This saves the encrypted master password in /etc/kerberosIV/master_key.


14.7.3 Making It All Run

Two principals need to be added to the database for each system that will be secured with Kerberos. Their names are kpasswd and rcmd. These two principals are made for each system, with the instance being the name of the individual system.

These daemons, kpasswd and rcmd allow other systems to change Kerberos passwords and run commands like rcp(1), rlogin(1) and rsh(1).

Now let us add these entries:

# kdb_edit
Opening database...

Enter Kerberos master key:

Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered.  BEWARE!
Previous or default values are in [brackets] ,
enter return to leave the same, or new value.

Principal name: passwd
Instance: grunt

<Not found>, Create [y] ? y

Principal: passwd, Instance: grunt, kdc_key_ver: 1
New Password:                    <---- enter RANDOM here
Verifying password

New Password: <---- enter RANDOM here

Random password [y] ? y

Principal's new key version = 1
Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ?
Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ?
Attributes [ 0 ] ?
Edit O.K.
Principal name: rcmd
Instance: grunt

<Not found>, Create [y] ?

Principal: rcmd, Instance: grunt, kdc_key_ver: 1
New Password:       <---- enter RANDOM here
Verifying password

New Password:           <---- enter RANDOM here

Random password [y] ?

Principal's new key version = 1
Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ?
Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ?
Attributes [ 0 ] ?
Edit O.K.
Principal name:         <---- null entry here will cause an exit

14.7.4 Creating the Server File

We now have to extract all the instances which define the services on each machine. For this we use the ext_srvtab command. This will create a file which must be copied or moved by secure means to each Kerberos client’s /etc directory. This file must be present on each server and client, and is crucial to the operation of Kerberos.

# ext_srvtab grunt
Enter Kerberos master key:

Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered. BEWARE!
Generating 'grunt-new-srvtab'....

Now, this command only generates a temporary file which must be renamed to srvtab so that all the servers can pick it up. Use the mv(1) command to move it into place on the original system:

# mv grunt-new-srvtab srvtab

If the file is for a client system, and the network is not deemed safe, then copy the client-new-srvtab to removable media and transport it by secure physical means. Be sure to rename it to srvtab in the client’s /etc directory, and make sure it is mode 600:

# mv grumble-new-srvtab srvtab
# chmod 600 srvtab

14.7.5 Populating the Database

We now have to add some user entries into the database. First let us create an entry for the user jane. Use the kdb_edit command to do this:

# kdb_edit
Opening database...

Enter Kerberos master key:

Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered.  BEWARE!
Previous or default values are in [brackets] ,
enter return to leave the same, or new value.

Principal name: jane
Instance:

<Not found>, Create [y] ? y

Principal: jane, Instance: , kdc_key_ver: 1
New Password:                <---- enter a secure password here
Verifying password

New Password:                <---- re-enter the password here
Principal's new key version = 1
Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ?
Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ?
Attributes [ 0 ] ?
Edit O.K.
Principal name:          <---- null entry here will cause an exit

14.7.6 Testing It All Out

First we have to start the Kerberos daemons. Note that if you have correctly edited your /etc/rc.conf then this will happen automatically when you reboot. This is only necessary on the Kerberos server. Kerberos clients will automatically get what they need from the /etc/kerberosIV directory.

# kerberos &
Kerberos server starting
Sleep forever on error
Log file is /var/log/kerberos.log
Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered. BEWARE!

Current Kerberos master key version is 1
Local realm: EXAMPLE.COM
# kadmind -n &
KADM Server KADM0.0A initializing
Please do not use 'kill -9' to kill this job, use a
regular kill instead

Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered.  BEWARE!

Now we can try using the kinit command to get a ticket for the ID jane that we created above:

% kinit jane
MIT Project Athena (grunt.example.com)
Kerberos Initialization for "jane"
Password:

Try listing the tokens using klist to see if we really have them:

% klist
Ticket file:    /tmp/tkt245
Principal:      jane@EXAMPLE.COM

  Issued           Expires          Principal
Apr 30 11:23:22  Apr 30 19:23:22  krbtgt.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM

Now try changing the password using passwd(1) to check if the kpasswd daemon can get authorization to the Kerberos database:

% passwd
realm EXAMPLE.COM
Old password for jane:
New Password for jane:
Verifying password
New Password for jane:
Password changed.

14.7.7 Adding su Privileges

Kerberos allows us to give each user who needs root privileges their own separate su(1) password. We could now add an ID which is authorized to su(1) to root. This is controlled by having an instance of root associated with a principal. Using kdb_edit we can create the entry jane.root in the Kerberos database:

# kdb_edit
Opening database...

Enter Kerberos master key:

Current Kerberos master key version is 1.

Master key entered.  BEWARE!
Previous or default values are in [brackets] ,
enter return to leave the same, or new value.

Principal name: jane
Instance: root

<Not found>, Create [y] ? y

Principal: jane, Instance: root, kdc_key_ver: 1
New Password:                    <---- enter a SECURE password here
Verifying password

New Password:            <---- re-enter the password here

Principal's new key version = 1
Expiration date (enter yyyy-mm-dd) [ 2000-01-01 ] ?
Max ticket lifetime (*5 minutes) [ 255 ] ? 12 <--- Keep this short!
Attributes [ 0 ] ?
Edit O.K.
Principal name:                <---- null entry here will cause an exit

Now try getting tokens for it to make sure it works:

# kinit jane.root
MIT Project Athena (grunt.example.com)
Kerberos Initialization for "jane.root"
Password:

Now we need to add the user to root’s .klogin file:

# cat /root/.klogin
jane.root@EXAMPLE.COM

Now try doing the su(1):

% su
Password:

and take a look at what tokens we have:

# klist
Ticket file:    /tmp/tkt_root_245
Principal:      jane.root@EXAMPLE.COM

  Issued           Expires          Principal
May  2 20:43:12  May  3 04:43:12  krbtgt.EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM

14.7.8 Using Other Commands

In an earlier example, we created a principal called jane with an instance root. This was based on a user with the same name as the principal, and this is a Kerberos default; that a <principal>.<instance> of the form <username>.root will allow that <username> to su(1) to root if the necessary entries are in the .klogin file in root’s home directory:

# cat /root/.klogin
jane.root@EXAMPLE.COM

Likewise, if a user has in their own home directory lines of the form:

% cat ~/.klogin
jane@EXAMPLE.COM
jack@EXAMPLE.COM

This allows anyone in the EXAMPLE.COM realm who has authenticated themselves as jane or jack (via kinit, see above) to access to jane’s account or files on this system (grunt) via rlogin(1), rsh(1) or rcp(1).

For example, jane now logs into another system using Kerberos:

% kinit
MIT Project Athena (grunt.example.com)
Password:
% rlogin grunt
Last login: Mon May  1 21:14:47 from grumble
Copyright (c) 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994
        The Regents of the University of California.   All rights reserved.

FreeBSD BUILT-19950429 (GR386) #0: Sat Apr 29 17:50:09 SAT 1995

Or jack logs into jane’s account on the same machine (jane having set up the .klogin file as above, and the person in charge of Kerberos having set up principal jack with a null instance):

% kinit
% rlogin grunt -l jane
MIT Project Athena (grunt.example.com)
Password:
Last login: Mon May  1 21:16:55 from grumble
Copyright (c) 1980, 1983, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994
        The Regents of the University of California.   All rights reserved.
FreeBSD BUILT-19950429 (GR386) #0: Sat Apr 29 17:50:09 SAT 1995

14.8 Kerberos5

Contributed by Tillman Hodgson. Based on a contribution by Mark Murray.

Every FreeBSD release beyond FreeBSD-5.1 includes support only for Kerberos5. Hence Kerberos5 is the only version included, and its configuration is similar in many aspects to that of KerberosIV. The following information only applies to Kerberos5 in post FreeBSD-5.0 releases. Users who wish to use the KerberosIV package may install the security/krb4 port.

Kerberos is a network add-on system/protocol that allows users to authenticate themselves through the services of a secure server. Services such as remote login, remote copy, secure inter-system file copying and other high-risk tasks are made considerably safer and more controllable.

Kerberos can be described as an identity-verifying proxy system. It can also be described as a trusted third-party authentication system. Kerberos provides only one function — the secure authentication of users on the network. It does not provide authorization functions (what users are allowed to do) or auditing functions (what those users did). After a client and server have used Kerberos to prove their identity, they can also encrypt all of their communications to assure privacy and data integrity as they go about their business.

Therefore it is highly recommended that Kerberos be used with other security methods which provide authorization and audit services.

The following instructions can be used as a guide on how to set up Kerberos as distributed for FreeBSD. However, you should refer to the relevant manual pages for a complete description.

For purposes of demonstrating a Kerberos installation, the various name spaces will be handled as follows:

  • The DNS domain (“zone”) will be example.org.

  • The Kerberos realm will be EXAMPLE.ORG.

Note: Please use real domain names when setting up Kerberos even if you intend to run it internally. This avoids DNS problems and assures inter-operation with other Kerberos realms.


14.8.1 History

Kerberos was created by MIT as a solution to network security problems. The Kerberos protocol uses strong cryptography so that a client can prove its identity to a server (and vice versa) across an insecure network connection.

Kerberos is both the name of a network authentication protocol and an adjective to describe programs that implement the program (Kerberos telnet, for example). The current version of the protocol is version 5, described in RFC 1510.

Several free implementations of this protocol are available, covering a wide range of operating systems. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where Kerberos was originally developed, continues to develop their Kerberos package. It is commonly used in the US as a cryptography product, as such it has historically been affected by US export regulations. The MIT Kerberos is available as a port (security/krb5). Heimdal Kerberos is another version 5 implementation, and was explicitly developed outside of the US to avoid export regulations (and is thus often included in non-commercial UNIX variants). The Heimdal Kerberos distribution is available as a port (security/heimdal), and a minimal installation of it is included in the base FreeBSD install.

In order to reach the widest audience, these instructions assume the use of the Heimdal distribution included in FreeBSD.


14.8.2 Setting up a Heimdal KDC

The Key Distribution Center (KDC) is the centralized authentication service that Kerberos provides — it is the computer that issues Kerberos tickets. The KDC is considered “trusted” by all other computers in the Kerberos realm, and thus has heightened security concerns.

Note that while running the Kerberos server requires very few computing resources, a dedicated machine acting only as a KDC is recommended for security reasons.

To begin setting up a KDC, ensure that your /etc/rc.conf file contains the correct settings to act as a KDC (you may need to adjust paths to reflect your own system):

kerberos5_server_enable="YES"
kadmind5_server_enable="YES"

Next we will set up your Kerberos config file, /etc/krb5.conf:

[libdefaults]
    default_realm = EXAMPLE.ORG
[realms]
    EXAMPLE.ORG = {
        kdc = kerberos.example.org
        admin_server = kerberos.example.org
    }
[domain_realm]
    .example.org = EXAMPLE.ORG

Note that this /etc/krb5.conf file implies that your KDC will have the fully-qualified hostname of kerberos.example.org. You will need to add a CNAME (alias) entry to your zone file to accomplish this if your KDC has a different hostname.

Note: For large networks with a properly configured BIND DNS server, the above example could be trimmed to:

[libdefaults]
      default_realm = EXAMPLE.ORG

With the following lines being appended to the example.org zonefile:

_kerberos._udp      IN  SRV     01 00 88 kerberos.example.org.
_kerberos._tcp      IN  SRV     01 00 88 kerberos.example.org.
_kpasswd._udp       IN  SRV     01 00 464 kerberos.example.org.
_kerberos-adm._tcp  IN  SRV     01 00 749 kerberos.example.org.
_kerberos           IN  TXT     EXAMPLE.ORG

Note: For clients to be able to find the Kerberos services, you must have either a fully configured /etc/krb5.conf or a minimally configured /etc/krb5.conf and a properly configured DNS server.

Next we will create the Kerberos database. This database contains the keys of all principals encrypted with a master password. You are not required to remember this password, it will be stored in a file (/var/heimdal/m-key). To create the master key, run kstash and enter a password.

Once the master key has been created, you can initialize the database using the kadmin program with the -l option (standing for “local”). This option instructs kadmin to modify the database files directly rather than going through the kadmind network service. This handles the chicken-and-egg problem of trying to connect to the database before it is created. Once you have the kadmin prompt, use the init command to create your realms initial database.

Lastly, while still in kadmin, create your first principal using the add command. Stick to the defaults options for the principal for now, you can always change them later with the modify command. Note that you can use the ? command at any prompt to see the available options.

A sample database creation session is shown below:

# kstash
Master key: xxxxxxxx
Verifying password - Master key: xxxxxxxx

# kadmin -l
kadmin> init EXAMPLE.ORG
Realm max ticket life [unlimited]:
kadmin> add tillman
Max ticket life [unlimited]:
Max renewable life [unlimited]:
Attributes []:
Password: xxxxxxxx
Verifying password - Password: xxxxxxxx

Now it is time to start up the KDC services. Run /etc/rc.d/kerberos start and /etc/rc.d/kadmind start to bring up the services. Note that you will not have any kerberized daemons running at this point but you should be able to confirm the that the KDC is functioning by obtaining and listing a ticket for the principal (user) that you just created from the command-line of the KDC itself:

% kinit tillman
tillman@EXAMPLE.ORG's Password:

% klist
Credentials cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_500
    Principal: tillman@EXAMPLE.ORG

  Issued           Expires          Principal
Aug 27 15:37:58  Aug 28 01:37:58  krbtgt/EXAMPLE.ORG@EXAMPLE.ORG

The ticket can then be revoked when you have finished:

% kdestroy

14.8.3 Kerberos enabling a server with Heimdal services

First, we need a copy of the Kerberos configuration file, /etc/krb5.conf. To do so, simply copy it over to the client computer from the KDC in a secure fashion (using network utilities, such as scp(1), or physically via a floppy disk).

Next you need a /etc/krb5.keytab file. This is the major difference between a server providing Kerberos enabled daemons and a workstation — the server must have a keytab file. This file contains the server’s host key, which allows it and the KDC to verify each others identity. It must be transmitted to the server in a secure fashion, as the security of the server can be broken if the key is made public. This explicitly means that transferring it via a clear text channel, such as FTP, is a very bad idea.

Typically, you transfer to the keytab to the server using the kadmin program. This is handy because you also need to create the host principal (the KDC end of the krb5.keytab) using kadmin.

Note that you must have already obtained a ticket and that this ticket must be allowed to use the kadmin interface in the kadmind.acl. See the section titled “Remote administration” in the Heimdal info pages (info heimdal) for details on designing access control lists. If you do not want to enable remote kadmin access, you can simply securely connect to the KDC (via local console, ssh(1) or Kerberos telnet(1)) and perform administration locally using kadmin -l.

After installing the /etc/krb5.conf file, you can use kadmin from the Kerberos server. The add –random-key command will let you add the server’s host principal, and the ext command will allow you to extract the server’s host principal to its own keytab. For example:

# kadmin
kadmin> add --random-key host/myserver.example.org
Max ticket life [unlimited]:
Max renewable life [unlimited]:
Attributes []:
kadmin> ext host/myserver.example.org
kadmin> exit

Note that the ext command (short for “extract”) stores the extracted key in /etc/krb5.keytab by default.

If you do not have kadmind running on the KDC (possibly for security reasons) and thus do not have access to kadmin remotely, you can add the host principal (host/myserver.EXAMPLE.ORG) directly on the KDC and then extract it to a temporary file (to avoid over-writing the /etc/krb5.keytab on the KDC) using something like this:

# kadmin
kadmin> ext --keytab=/tmp/example.keytab host/myserver.example.org
kadmin> exit

You can then securely copy the keytab to the server computer (using scp or a floppy, for example). Be sure to specify a non-default keytab name to avoid over-writing the keytab on the KDC.

At this point your server can communicate with the KDC (due to its krb5.conf file) and it can prove its own identity (due to the krb5.keytab file). It is now ready for you to enable some Kerberos services. For this example we will enable the telnet service by putting a line like this into your /etc/inetd.conf and then restarting the inetd(8) service with /etc/rc.d/inetd restart:

telnet    stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/libexec/telnetd  telnetd -a user

The critical bit is that the -a (for authentication) type is set to user. Consult the telnetd(8) manual page for more details.


14.8.4 Kerberos enabling a client with Heimdal

Setting up a client computer is almost trivially easy. As far as Kerberos configuration goes, you only need the Kerberos configuration file, located at /etc/krb5.conf. Simply securely copy it over to the client computer from the KDC.

Test your client computer by attempting to use kinit, klist, and kdestroy from the client to obtain, show, and then delete a ticket for the principal you created above. You should also be able to use Kerberos applications to connect to Kerberos enabled servers, though if that does not work and obtaining a ticket does the problem is likely with the server and not with the client or the KDC.

When testing an application like telnet, try using a packet sniffer (such as tcpdump(1)) to confirm that your password is not sent in the clear. Try using telnet with the -x option, which encrypts the entire data stream (similar to ssh).

Various non-core Kerberos client applications are also installed by default. This is where the “minimal” nature of the base Heimdal installation is felt: telnet is the only Kerberos enabled service.

The Heimdal port adds some of the missing client applications: Kerberos enabled versions of ftp, rsh, rcp, rlogin, and a few other less common programs. The MIT port also contains a full suite of Kerberos client applications.


14.8.5 User configuration files: .k5login and .k5users

Users within a realm typically have their Kerberos principal (such as tillman@EXAMPLE.ORG) mapped to a local user account (such as a local account named tillman). Client applications such as telnet usually do not require a user name or a principal.

Occasionally, however, you want to grant access to a local user account to someone who does not have a matching Kerberos principal. For example, tillman@EXAMPLE.ORG may need access to the local user account webdevelopers. Other principals may also need access to that local account.

The .k5login and .k5users files, placed in a users home directory, can be used similar to a powerful combination of .hosts and .rhosts, solving this problem. For example, if a .k5login with the following contents:

tillman@example.org
jdoe@example.org

Were to be placed into the home directory of the local user webdevelopers then both principals listed would have access to that account without requiring a shared password.

Reading the manual pages for these commands is recommended. Note that the ksu manual page covers .k5users.


14.8.6 Kerberos Tips, Tricks, and Troubleshooting
  • When using either the Heimdal or MIT Kerberos ports ensure that your PATH environment variable lists the Kerberos versions of the client applications before the system versions.

  • Do all the computers in your realm have synchronized time settings? If not, authentication may fail. Section 29.10 describes how to synchronize clocks using NTP.

  • MIT and Heimdal inter-operate nicely. Except for kadmin, the protocol for which is not standardized.

  • If you change your hostname, you also need to change your host/ principal and update your keytab. This also applies to special keytab entries like the www/ principal used for Apache’s www/mod_auth_kerb.

  • All hosts in your realm must be resolvable (both forwards and reverse) in DNS (or /etc/hosts as a minimum). CNAMEs will work, but the A and PTR records must be correct and in place. The error message is not very intuitive: “Kerberos5 refuses authentication because Read req failed: Key table entry not found”.

  • Some operating systems that may being acting as clients to your KDC do not set the permissions for ksu to be setuid root. This means that ksu does not work, which is a good security idea but annoying. This is not a KDC error.

  • With MIT Kerberos, if you want to allow a principal to have a ticket life longer than the default ten hours, you must use modify_principal in kadmin to change the maxlife of both the principal in question and the krbtgt principal. Then the principal can use the -l option with kinit to request a ticket with a longer lifetime.

  • Note: If you run a packet sniffer on your KDC to add in troubleshooting and then run kinit from a workstation, you will notice that your TGT is sent immediately upon running kinit — even before you type your password! The explanation is that the Kerberos server freely transmits a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) to any unauthorized request; however, every TGT is encrypted in a key derived from the user’s password. Therefore, when a user types their password it is not being sent to the KDC, it is being used to decrypt the TGT that kinit already obtained. If the decryption process results in a valid ticket with a valid time stamp, the user has valid Kerberos credentials. These credentials include a session key for establishing secure communications with the Kerberos server in the future, as well as the actual ticket-granting ticket, which is actually encrypted with the Kerberos server’s own key. This second layer of encryption is unknown to the user, but it is what allows the Kerberos server to verify the authenticity of each TGT.

  • If you want to use long ticket lifetimes (a week, for example) and you are using OpenSSH to connect to the machine where your ticket is stored, make sure that Kerberos TicketCleanup is set to no in your sshd_config or else your tickets will be deleted when you log out.

  • Remember that host principals can have a longer ticket lifetime as well. If your user principal has a lifetime of a week but the host you are connecting to has a lifetime of nine hours, you will have an expired host principal in your cache and the ticket cache will not work as expected.

  • When setting up a krb5.dict file to prevent specific bad passwords from being used (the manual page for kadmind covers this briefly), remember that it only applies to principals that have a password policy assigned to them. The krb5.dict files format is simple: one string per line. Creating a symbolic link to /usr/share/dict/words might be useful.


14.8.7 Differences with the MIT port

The major difference between the MIT and Heimdal installs relates to the kadmin program which has a different (but equivalent) set of commands and uses a different protocol. This has a large implications if your KDC is MIT as you will not be able to use the Heimdal kadmin program to administer your KDC remotely (or vice versa, for that matter).

The client applications may also take slightly different command line options to accomplish the same tasks. Following the instructions on the MIT Kerberos web site (http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/www/) is recommended. Be careful of path issues: the MIT port installs into /usr/local/ by default, and the “normal” system applications may be run instead of MIT if your PATH environment variable lists the system directories first.

Note: With the MIT security/krb5 port that is provided by FreeBSD, be sure to read the /usr/local/share/doc/krb5/README.FreeBSD file installed by the port if you want to understand why logins via telnetd and klogind behave somewhat oddly. Most importantly, correcting the “incorrect permissions on cache file” behavior requires that the login.krb5 binary be used for authentication so that it can properly change ownership for the forwarded credentials.

The rc.conf must also be modified to contain the following configuration:

kerberos5_server="/usr/local/sbin/krb5kdc"
kadmind5_server="/usr/local/sbin/kadmind"
kerberos5_server_enable="YES"
kadmind5_server_enable="YES"

This is done because the applications for MIT kerberos installs binaries in the /usr/local hierarchy.


14.8.8 Mitigating limitations found in Kerberos

14.8.8.1 Kerberos is an all-or-nothing approach

Every service enabled on the network must be modified to work with Kerberos (or be otherwise secured against network attacks) or else the users credentials could be stolen and re-used. An example of this would be Kerberos enabling all remote shells (via rsh and telnet, for example) but not converting the POP3 mail server which sends passwords in plain text.


14.8.8.2 Kerberos is intended for single-user workstations

In a multi-user environment, Kerberos is less secure. This is because it stores the tickets in the /tmp directory, which is readable by all users. If a user is sharing a computer with several other people simultaneously (i.e. multi-user), it is possible that the user’s tickets can be stolen (copied) by another user.

This can be overcome with the -c filename command-line option or (preferably) the KRB5CCNAME environment variable, but this is rarely done. In principal, storing the ticket in the users home directory and using simple file permissions can mitigate this problem.


14.8.8.3 The KDC is a single point of failure

By design, the KDC must be as secure as the master password database is contained on it. The KDC should have absolutely no other services running on it and should be physically secured. The danger is high because Kerberos stores all passwords encrypted with the same key (the “master” key), which in turn is stored as a file on the KDC.

As a side note, a compromised master key is not quite as bad as one might normally fear. The master key is only used to encrypt the Kerberos database and as a seed for the random number generator. As long as access to your KDC is secure, an attacker cannot do much with the master key.

Additionally, if the KDC is unavailable (perhaps due to a denial of service attack or network problems) the network services are unusable as authentication can not be performed, a recipe for a denial-of-service attack. This can alleviated with multiple KDCs (a single master and one or more slaves) and with careful implementation of secondary or fall-back authentication (PAM is excellent for this).


14.8.8.4 Kerberos Shortcomings

Kerberos allows users, hosts and services to authenticate between themselves. It does not have a mechanism to authenticate the KDC to the users, hosts or services. This means that a trojanned kinit (for example) could record all user names and passwords. Something like security/tripwire or other file system integrity checking tools can alleviate this.


14.8.9 Resources and further information
  • The Kerberos FAQ

  • Designing an Authentication System: a Dialog in Four Scenes

  • RFC 1510, The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)

  • MIT Kerberos home page

  • Heimdal Kerberos home page


14.9 OpenSSL

Written by Tom Rhodes.

One feature that many users overlook is the OpenSSL toolkit included in FreeBSD. OpenSSL provides an encryption transport layer on top of the normal communications layer; thus allowing it to be intertwined with many network applications and services.

Some uses of OpenSSL may include encrypted authentication of mail clients, web based transactions such as credit card payments and more. Many ports such as www/apache13-ssl, and mail/sylpheed-claws will offer compilation support for building with OpenSSL.

Note: In most cases the Ports Collection will attempt to build the security/openssl port unless the WITH_OPENSSL_BASE make variable is explicitly set to “yes”.

The version of OpenSSL included in FreeBSD supports Secure Sockets Layer v2/v3 (SSLv2/SSLv3), Transport Layer Security v1 (TLSv1) network security protocols and can be used as a general cryptographic library.

Note: While OpenSSL supports the IDEA algorithm, it is disabled by default due to United States patents. To use it, the license should be reviewed and, if the restrictions are acceptable, the MAKE_IDEA variable must be set in make.conf.

One of the most common uses of OpenSSL is to provide certificates for use with software applications. These certificates ensure that the credentials of the company or individual are valid and not fraudulent. If the certificate in question has not been verified by one of the several “Certificate Authorities”, or CAs, a warning is usually produced. A Certificate Authority is a company, such as VeriSign, which will sign certificates in order to validate credentials of individuals or companies. This process has a cost associated with it and is definitely not a requirement for using certificates; however, it can put some of the more paranoid users at ease.


14.9.1 Generating Certificates

To generate a certificate, the following command is available:

# openssl req -new -nodes -out req.pem -keyout cert.pem
Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key
................++++++
.......................................++++++
writing new private key to 'cert.pem'
-----
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:US
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:PA
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Pittsburgh
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:My Company
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:Systems Administrator
Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:localhost.example.org
Email Address []:trhodes@FreeBSD.org

Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
to be sent with your certificate request
A challenge password []:SOME PASSWORD
An optional company name []:Another Name

Notice the response directly after the “Common Name” prompt shows a domain name. This prompt requires a server name to be entered for verification purposes; placing anything but a domain name would yield a useless certificate. Other options, for instance expire time, alternate encryption algorithms, etc. are available. A complete list may be obtained by viewing the openssl(1) manual page.

Two files should now exist in the directory in which the aforementioned command was issued. The certificate request, req.pem, may be sent to a certificate authority who will validate the credentials that you entered, sign the request and return the certificate to you. The second file created will be named cert.pem and is the private key for the certificate and should be protected at all costs; if this falls in the hands of others it can be used to impersonate you (or your server).

In cases where a signature from a CA is not required, a self signed certificate can be created. First, generate the RSA key:

# openssl dsaparam -rand -genkey -out myRSA.key 1024

Next, generate the CA key:

# openssl gendsa -des3 -out myca.key myRSA.key

Use this key to create the certificate:

# openssl req -new -x509 -days 365 -key myca.key -out new.crt

Two new files should appear in the directory: a certificate authority signature file, myca.key and the certificate itself, new.crt. These should be placed in a directory, preferably under /etc, which is readable only by root. Permissions of 0700 should be fine for this and they can be set with the chmod utility.


14.9.2 Using Certificates, an Example

So what can these files do? A good use would be to encrypt connections to the Sendmail MTA. This would dissolve the use of clear text authentication for users who send mail via the local MTA.

Note: This is not the best use in the world as some MUAs will present the user with an error if they have not installed the certificate locally. Refer to the documentation included with the software for more information on certificate installation.

The following lines should be placed inside the local .mc file:

dnl SSL Options
define(`confCACERT_PATH',`/etc/certs')dnl
define(`confCACERT',`/etc/certs/new.crt')dnl
define(`confSERVER_CERT',`/etc/certs/new.crt')dnl
define(`confSERVER_KEY',`/etc/certs/myca.key')dnl
define(`confTLS_SRV_OPTIONS', `V')dnl

Where /etc/certs/ is the directory to be used for storing the certificate and key files locally. The last few requirements are a rebuild of the local .cf file. This is easily achieved by typing make install within the /etc/mail directory. Follow that up with make restart which should start the Sendmail daemon.

If all went well there will be no error messages in the /var/log/maillog file and Sendmail will show up in the process list.

For a simple test, simply connect to the mail server using the telnet(1) utility:

# telnet example.com 25
Trying 192.0.34.166...
Connected to example.com.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 example.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.10/8.12.10; Tue, 31 Aug 2004 03:41:22 -0400 (EDT)
ehlo example.com
250-example.com Hello example.com [192.0.34.166], pleased to meet you
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
250-PIPELINING
250-8BITMIME
250-SIZE
250-DSN
250-ETRN
250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN
250-STARTTLS
250-DELIVERBY
250 HELP
quit
221 2.0.0 example.com closing connection
Connection closed by foreign host.

If the “STARTTLS” line appears in the output then everything is working correctly.


14.10 VPN over IPsec

Written by Nik Clayton.

Creating a VPN between two networks, separated by the Internet, using FreeBSD gateways.


14.10.1 Understanding IPsec

Written by Hiten M. Pandya.

This section will guide you through the process of setting up IPsec. In order to set up IPsec, it is necessary that you are familiar with the concepts of building a custom kernel (see Chapter 8).

IPsec is a protocol which sits on top of the Internet Protocol (IP) layer. It allows two or more hosts to communicate in a secure manner (hence the name). The FreeBSD IPsec “network stack” is based on the KAME implementation, which has support for both protocol families, IPv4 and IPv6.

IPsec consists of two sub-protocols:

  • Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP), protects the IP packet data from third party interference, by encrypting the contents using symmetric cryptography algorithms (like Blowfish, 3DES).

  • Authentication Header (AH), protects the IP packet header from third party interference and spoofing, by computing a cryptographic checksum and hashing the IP packet header fields with a secure hashing function. This is then followed by an additional header that contains the hash, to allow the information in the packet to be authenticated.

ESP and AH can either be used together or separately, depending on the environment.

IPsec can either be used to directly encrypt the traffic between two hosts (known as Transport Mode); or to build “virtual tunnels” between two subnets, which could be used for secure communication between two corporate networks (known as Tunnel Mode). The latter is more commonly known as a Virtual Private Network (VPN). The ipsec(4) manual page should be consulted for detailed information on the IPsec subsystem in FreeBSD.

To add IPsec support to your kernel, add the following options to your kernel configuration file:

options   IPSEC        #IP security
device    crypto
     

If IPsec debugging support is desired, the following kernel option should also be added:

options   IPSEC_DEBUG  #debug for IP security
     

14.10.2 The Problem

There is no standard for what constitutes a VPN. VPNs can be implemented using a number of different technologies, each of which have their own strengths and weaknesses. This section presents a scenario, and the strategies used for implementing a VPN for this scenario.


14.10.3 The Scenario: Two networks, one home based and one corporate based. Both are connected to the Internet, and expected, via this VPN to behave as one.

The premise is as follows:

  • You have at least two sites

  • Both sites are using IP internally

  • Both sites are connected to the Internet, through a gateway that is running FreeBSD.

  • The gateway on each network has at least one public IP address.

  • The internal addresses of the two networks can be public or private IP addresses, it does not matter. They just may not collide; e.g.: may not both use 192.168.1.x.


14.10.4 Configuring IPsec on FreeBSD

Written by Tom Rhodes.

To begin, the security/ipsec-tools must be installed from the Ports Collection. This third party software package provides a number of applications which will help support the configuration.

The next requirement is to create two gif(4) pseudo-devices which will be used to tunnel packets and allow both networks to communicate properly. As root, run the following commands, replacing the internal and external items with the real internal and external gateways:

# ifconfig gif0 create
# ifconfig gif0 internal1 internal2
# ifconfig gif0 tunnel external1 external2

For example, the corporate LAN’s public IP is 172.16.5.4 having a private IP of 10.246.38.1. The home LAN’s public IP is 192.168.1.12 with an internal private IP of 10.0.0.5.

This may seem confusing, so review the following example output from the ifconfig(8) command:

Gateway 1:

gif0: flags=8051 mtu 1280
tunnel inet 172.16.5.4 --> 192.168.1.12
inet6 fe80::2e0:81ff:fe02:5881%gif0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x6
inet 10.246.38.1 --> 10.0.0.5 netmask 0xffffff00

Gateway 2:

gif0: flags=8051 mtu 1280
tunnel inet 192.168.1.12 --> 172.16.5.4
inet 10.0.0.5 --> 10.246.38.1 netmask 0xffffff00
inet6 fe80::250:bfff:fe3a:c1f%gif0 prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x4

Once complete, both private IPs should be reachable using the ping(8) command like the following output suggests:

priv-net# ping 10.0.0.5
PING 10.0.0.5 (10.0.0.5): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 10.0.0.5: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=42.786 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.5: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=19.255 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.5: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=20.440 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.5: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=21.036 ms
--- 10.0.0.5 ping statistics ---
4 packets transmitted, 4 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 19.255/25.879/42.786/9.782 ms

corp-net# ping 10.246.38.1
PING 10.246.38.1 (10.246.38.1): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 10.246.38.1: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=28.106 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.1: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=42.917 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.1: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=127.525 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.1: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=119.896 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.1: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=154.524 ms
--- 10.246.38.1 ping statistics ---
5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 28.106/94.594/154.524/49.814 ms

As expected, both sides have the ability to send and receive ICMP packets from the privately configured addresses. Next, both gateways must be told how to route packets in order to correctly send traffic from either network. The following command will achieve this goal:

# corp-net# route add 10.0.0.0 10.0.0.5 255.255.255.0
# corp-net# route add net 10.0.0.0: gateway 10.0.0.5
# priv-net# route add 10.246.38.0 10.246.38.1 255.255.255.0
# priv-net# route add host 10.246.38.0: gateway 10.246.38.1

At this point, internal machines should be reachable from each gateway as well as from machines behind the gateways. This is easily determined from the following example:

corp-net# ping 10.0.0.8
PING 10.0.0.8 (10.0.0.8): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 10.0.0.8: icmp_seq=0 ttl=63 time=92.391 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.8: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=21.870 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.8: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=198.022 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.8: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=22.241 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.8: icmp_seq=4 ttl=63 time=174.705 ms
--- 10.0.0.8 ping statistics ---
5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 21.870/101.846/198.022/74.001 ms

priv-net# ping 10.246.38.107
PING 10.246.38.1 (10.246.38.107): 56 data bytes
64 bytes from 10.246.38.107: icmp_seq=0 ttl=64 time=53.491 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.107: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=23.395 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.107: icmp_seq=2 ttl=64 time=23.865 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.107: icmp_seq=3 ttl=64 time=21.145 ms
64 bytes from 10.246.38.107: icmp_seq=4 ttl=64 time=36.708 ms
--- 10.246.38.107 ping statistics ---
5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0% packet loss
round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 21.145/31.721/53.491/12.179 ms

Setting up the tunnels is the easy part. Configuring a secure link is a much more in depth process. The following configuration uses pre-shared (PSK) RSA keys. Aside from the IP addresses, both /usr/local/etc/racoon/racoon.conf files will be identical and look similar to

path    pre_shared_key  "/usr/local/etc/racoon/psk.txt"; #location of pre-shared key file
log     debug;  #log verbosity setting: set to 'notify' when testing and debugging is complete

padding # options are not to be changed
{
        maximum_length  20;
        randomize       off;
        strict_check    off;
        exclusive_tail  off;
}

timer   # timing options. change as needed
{
        counter         5;
        interval        20 sec;
        persend         1;
#       natt_keepalive  15 sec;
        phase1          30 sec;
        phase2          15 sec;
}

listen  # address [port] that racoon will listening on
{
        isakmp          172.16.5.4 [500];
        isakmp_natt     172.16.5.4 [4500];
}

remote  192.168.1.12 [500]
{
        exchange_mode   main,aggressive;
        doi             ipsec_doi;
        situation       identity_only;
        my_identifier   address 172.16.5.4;
        peers_identifier        address 192.168.1.12;
        lifetime        time 8 hour;
        passive         off;
        proposal_check  obey;
#       nat_traversal   off;
        generate_policy off;

                        proposal {
                                encryption_algorithm    blowfish;
                                hash_algorithm          md5;
                                authentication_method   pre_shared_key;
                                lifetime time           30 sec;
                                dh_group                1;
                        }
}

sainfo  (address 10.246.38.0/24 any address 10.0.0.0/24 any)    # address $network/$netmask $type address $network/$netmask $type ( $type being any or esp)
{                               # $network must be the two internal networks you are joining.
        pfs_group       1;
        lifetime        time    36000 sec;
        encryption_algorithm    blowfish,3des,des;
        authentication_algorithm        hmac_md5,hmac_sha1;
        compression_algorithm   deflate;
}

Explaining every available option, along with those listed in these examples is beyond the scope of this document. There is plenty of relevant information in the racoon configuration manual page.

The SPD policies need to be configured so FreeBSD and racoon is able to encrypt and decrypt network traffic between hosts.

This task may be undertaken with a simple shell script similar to the following which is on the corporate gateway. This file will be used during system initialization and should be saved as /usr/local/etc/racoon/setkey.conf.

flush;
spdflush;
# To the home network
spdadd 10.246.38.0/24 10.0.0.0/24 any -P out ipsec esp/tunnel/172.16.5.4-192.168.1.12/use;
spdadd 10.0.0.0/24 10.246.38.0/24 any -P in ipsec esp/tunnel/192.168.1.12-172.16.5.4/use;

Once in place, racoon may be started on both gateways using the following command:

# /usr/local/sbin/racoon -F -f /usr/local/etc/racoon/racoon.conf -l /var/log/racoon.log

The output should be similar to the following:

corp-net# /usr/local/sbin/racoon -F -f /usr/local/etc/racoon/racoon.conf
Foreground mode.
2006-01-30 01:35:47: INFO: begin Identity Protection mode.
2006-01-30 01:35:48: INFO: received Vendor ID: KAME/racoon
2006-01-30 01:35:55: INFO: received Vendor ID: KAME/racoon
2006-01-30 01:36:04: INFO: ISAKMP-SA established 172.16.5.4[500]-192.168.1.12[500] spi:623b9b3bd2492452:7deab82d54ff704a
2006-01-30 01:36:05: INFO: initiate new phase 2 negotiation: 172.16.5.4[0]192.168.1.12[0]
2006-01-30 01:36:09: INFO: IPsec-SA established: ESP/Tunnel 192.168.1.12[0]->172.16.5.4[0] spi=28496098(0x1b2d0e2)
2006-01-30 01:36:09: INFO: IPsec-SA established: ESP/Tunnel 172.16.5.4[0]->192.168.1.12[0] spi=47784998(0x2d92426)
2006-01-30 01:36:13: INFO: respond new phase 2 negotiation: 172.16.5.4[0]192.168.1.12[0]
2006-01-30 01:36:18: INFO: IPsec-SA established: ESP/Tunnel 192.168.1.12[0]->172.16.5.4[0] spi=124397467(0x76a279b)
2006-01-30 01:36:18: INFO: IPsec-SA established: ESP/Tunnel 172.16.5.4[0]->192.168.1.12[0] spi=175852902(0xa7b4d66)

To ensure the tunnel is working properly, switch to another console and use tcpdump(1) to view network traffic using the following command. Replace em0 with the network interface card as required.

# tcpdump -i em0 host 172.16.5.4 and dst 192.168.1.12

Data similar to the following should appear on the console. If not, there is an issue, and debugging the returned data will be required.

01:47:32.021683 IP corporatenetwork.com > 192.168.1.12.privatenetwork.com: ESP(spi=0x02acbf9f,seq=0xa)
01:47:33.022442 IP corporatenetwork.com > 192.168.1.12.privatenetwork.com: ESP(spi=0x02acbf9f,seq=0xb)
01:47:34.024218 IP corporatenetwork.com > 192.168.1.12.privatenetwork.com: ESP(spi=0x02acbf9f,seq=0xc)

At this point, both networks should be available and seem to be part of the same network. Most likely both networks are protected by a firewall, as they should be. To allow traffic to flow between them, rules need to be added to pass packets back and forth. For the ipfw(8) firewall, add the following lines to the firewall configuration file:

ipfw add 00201 allow log esp from any to any
ipfw add 00202 allow log ah from any to any
ipfw add 00203 allow log ipencap from any to any
ipfw add 00204 allow log udp from any 500 to any

Note: The rule numbers may need to be altered depending on the current host configuration.

For users of pf(4) or ipf(8), the following rules should do the trick:

pass in quick proto esp from any to any
pass in quick proto ah from any to any
pass in quick proto ipencap from any to any
pass in quick proto udp from any port = 500 to any port = 500
pass in quick on gif0 from any to any
pass out quick proto esp from any to any
pass out quick proto ah from any to any
pass out quick proto ipencap from any to any
pass out quick proto udp from any port = 500 to any port = 500
pass out quick on gif0 from any to any

Finally, to allow the machine to start support for the VPN during system initialization, add the following lines to /etc/rc.conf:

ipsec_enable="YES"
ipsec_program="/usr/local/sbin/setkey"
ipsec_file="/usr/local/etc/racoon/setkey.conf" # allows setting up spd policies on boot
racoon_enable="yes"

14.11 OpenSSH

Contributed by Chern Lee.

OpenSSH is a set of network connectivity tools used to access remote machines securely. It can be used as a direct replacement for rlogin, rsh, rcp, and telnet. Additionally, TCP/IP connections can be tunneled/forwarded securely through SSH. OpenSSH encrypts all traffic to effectively eliminate eavesdropping, connection hijacking, and other network-level attacks.

OpenSSH is maintained by the OpenBSD project, and is based upon SSH v1.2.12 with all the recent bug fixes and updates. It is compatible with both SSH protocols 1 and 2.


14.11.1 Advantages of Using OpenSSH

Normally, when using telnet(1) or rlogin(1), data is sent over the network in a clear, un-encrypted form. Network sniffers anywhere in between the client and server can steal your user/password information or data transferred in your session. OpenSSH offers a variety of authentication and encryption methods to prevent this from happening.


14.11.2 Enabling sshd

The sshd is an option presented during a Standard install of FreeBSD. To see if sshd is enabled, check the rc.conf file for:

sshd_enable="YES"

This will load sshd(8), the daemon program for OpenSSH, the next time your system initializes. Alternatively, it is possible to use /etc/rc.d/sshd rc(8) script to start OpenSSH:

/etc/rc.d/sshd start

14.11.3 SSH Client

The ssh(1) utility works similarly to rlogin(1).

# ssh user@example.com
Host key not found from the list of known hosts.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Host 'example.com' added to the list of known hosts.
user@example.com's password: *******

The login will continue just as it would have if a session was created using rlogin or telnet. SSH utilizes a key fingerprint system for verifying the authenticity of the server when the client connects. The user is prompted to enter yes only when connecting for the first time. Future attempts to login are all verified against the saved fingerprint key. The SSH client will alert you if the saved fingerprint differs from the received fingerprint on future login attempts. The fingerprints are saved in ~/.ssh/known_hosts, or ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 for SSH v2 fingerprints.

By default, recent versions of the OpenSSH servers only accept SSH v2 connections. The client will use version 2 if possible and will fall back to version 1. The client can also be forced to use one or the other by passing it the -1 or -2 for version 1 or version 2, respectively. The version 1 compatibility is maintained in the client for backwards compatibility with older versions.


14.11.4 Secure Copy

The scp(1) command works similarly to rcp(1); it copies a file to or from a remote machine, except in a secure fashion.

# scp user@example.com:/COPYRIGHT COPYRIGHT
user@example.com's password: *******
COPYRIGHT            100% |*****************************|  4735
00:00
#

Since the fingerprint was already saved for this host in the previous example, it is verified when using scp(1) here.

The arguments passed to scp(1) are similar to cp(1), with the file or files in the first argument, and the destination in the second. Since the file is fetched over the network, through SSH, one or more of the file arguments takes on the form user@host:<path_to_remote_file>.


14.11.5 Configuration

The system-wide configuration files for both the OpenSSH daemon and client reside within the /etc/ssh directory.

ssh_config configures the client settings, while sshd_config configures the daemon.

Additionally, the sshd_program (/usr/sbin/sshd by default), and sshd_flags rc.conf options can provide more levels of configuration.


14.11.6 ssh-keygen

Instead of using passwords, ssh-keygen(1) can be used to generate DSA or RSA keys to authenticate a user:

% ssh-keygen -t dsa
Generating public/private dsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/user/.ssh/id_dsa):
Created directory '/home/user/.ssh'.
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_dsa.
Your public key has been saved in /home/user/.ssh/id_dsa.pub.
The key fingerprint is:
bb:48:db:f2:93:57:80:b6:aa:bc:f5:d5:ba:8f:79:17 user@host.example.com

ssh-keygen(1) will create a public and private key pair for use in authentication. The private key is stored in ~/.ssh/id_dsa or ~/.ssh/id_rsa, whereas the public key is stored in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub, respectively for DSA and RSA key types. The public key must be placed in the ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file of the remote machine for both RSA or DSA keys in order for the setup to work.

This will allow connection to the remote machine based upon SSH keys instead of passwords.

If a passphrase is used in ssh-keygen(1), the user will be prompted for a password each time in order to use the private key. ssh-agent(1) can alleviate the strain of repeatedly entering long passphrases, and is explored in the Section 14.11.7 section below.

Warning: The various options and files can be different according to the OpenSSH version you have on your system; to avoid problems you should consult the ssh-keygen(1) manual page.


14.11.7 ssh-agent and ssh-add

The ssh-agent(1) and ssh-add(1) utilities provide methods for SSH keys to be loaded into memory for use, without needing to type the passphrase each time.

The ssh-agent(1) utility will handle the authentication using the private key(s) that are loaded into it. ssh-agent(1) should be used to launch another application. At the most basic level, it could spawn a shell or at a more advanced level, a window manager.

To use ssh-agent(1) in a shell, first it will need to be spawned with a shell as an argument. Secondly, the identity needs to be added by running ssh-add(1) and providing it the passphrase for the private key. Once these steps have been completed the user will be able to ssh(1) to any host that has the corresponding public key installed. For example:

% ssh-agent csh
% ssh-add
Enter passphrase for /home/user/.ssh/id_dsa:
Identity added: /home/user/.ssh/id_dsa (/home/user/.ssh/id_dsa)
%

To use ssh-agent(1) in X11, a call to ssh-agent(1) will need to be placed in ~/.xinitrc. This will provide the ssh-agent(1) services to all programs launched in X11. An example ~/.xinitrc file might look like this:

exec ssh-agent startxfce4

This would launch ssh-agent(1), which would in turn launch XFCE, every time X11 starts. Then once that is done and X11 has been restarted so that the changes can take effect, simply run ssh-add(1) to load all of your SSH keys.


14.11.8 SSH Tunneling

OpenSSH has the ability to create a tunnel to encapsulate another protocol in an encrypted session.

The following command tells ssh(1) to create a tunnel for telnet:

% ssh -2 -N -f -L 5023:localhost:23 user@foo.example.com
%

The ssh command is used with the following options:

-2

Forces ssh to use version 2 of the protocol. (Do not use if you are working with older SSH servers)

-N

Indicates no command, or tunnel only. If omitted, ssh would initiate a normal session.

-f

Forces ssh to run in the background.

-L

Indicates a local tunnel in localport:remotehost:remoteport fashion.

user@foo.example.com

The remote SSH server.

An SSH tunnel works by creating a listen socket on localhost on the specified port. It then forwards any connection received on the local host/port via the SSH connection to the specified remote host and port.

In the example, port 5023 on localhost is being forwarded to port 23 on localhost of the remote machine. Since 23 is telnet, this would create a secure telnet session through an SSH tunnel.

This can be used to wrap any number of insecure TCP protocols such as SMTP, POP3, FTP, etc.

Example 14-1. Using SSH to Create a Secure Tunnel for SMTP

% ssh -2 -N -f -L 5025:localhost:25 user@mailserver.example.com
user@mailserver.example.com's password: *****
% telnet localhost 5025
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
220 mailserver.example.com ESMTP

This can be used in conjunction with an ssh-keygen(1) and additional user accounts to create a more seamless/hassle-free SSH tunneling environment. Keys can be used in place of typing a password, and the tunnels can be run as a separate user.


14.11.8.1 Practical SSH Tunneling Examples
14.11.8.1.1 Secure Access of a POP3 Server

At work, there is an SSH server that accepts connections from the outside. On the same office network resides a mail server running a POP3 server. The network, or network path between your home and office may or may not be completely trustable. Because of this, you need to check your e-mail in a secure manner. The solution is to create an SSH connection to your office’s SSH server, and tunnel through to the mail server.

% ssh -2 -N -f -L 2110:mail.example.com:110 user@ssh-server.example.com
user@ssh-server.example.com's password: ******

When the tunnel is up and running, you can point your mail client to send POP3 requests to localhost port 2110. A connection here will be forwarded securely across the tunnel to mail.example.com.


14.11.8.1.2 Bypassing a Draconian Firewall

Some network administrators impose extremely draconian firewall rules, filtering not only incoming connections, but outgoing connections. You may be only given access to contact remote machines on ports 22 and 80 for SSH and web surfing.

You may wish to access another (perhaps non-work related) service, such as an Ogg Vorbis server to stream music. If this Ogg Vorbis server is streaming on some other port than 22 or 80, you will not be able to access it.

The solution is to create an SSH connection to a machine outside of your network’s firewall, and use it to tunnel to the Ogg Vorbis server.

% ssh -2 -N -f -L 8888:music.example.com:8000 user@unfirewalled-system.example.org
user@unfirewalled-system.example.org's password: *******

Your streaming client can now be pointed to localhost port 8888, which will be forwarded over to music.example.com port 8000, successfully evading the firewall.


14.11.9 The AllowUsers Users Option

It is often a good idea to limit which users can log in and from where. The AllowUsers option is a good way to accomplish this. For example, to only allow the root user to log in from 192.168.1.32, something like this would be appropriate in the /etc/ssh/sshd_config file:

AllowUsers root@192.168.1.32

To allow the user admin to log in from anywhere, just list the username by itself:

AllowUsers admin

Multiple users should be listed on the same line, like so:

AllowUsers root@192.168.1.32 admin

Note: It is important that you list each user that needs to log in to this machine; otherwise they will be locked out.

After making changes to /etc/ssh/sshd_config you must tell sshd(8) to reload its config files, by running:

# /etc/rc.d/sshd reload

14.11.10 Further Reading

OpenSSH

ssh(1) scp(1) ssh-keygen(1) ssh-agent(1) ssh-add(1) ssh_config(5)

sshd(8) sftp-server(8) sshd_config(5)


14.12 File System Access Control Lists

Contributed by Tom Rhodes.

In conjunction with file system enhancements like snapshots, FreeBSD 5.0 and later offers the security of File System Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Access Control Lists extend the standard UNIX permission model in a highly compatible (POSIX.1e) way. This feature permits an administrator to make use of and take advantage of a more sophisticated security model.

To enable ACL support for UFS file systems, the following:

options UFS_ACL

must be compiled into the kernel. If this option has not been compiled in, a warning message will be displayed when attempting to mount a file system supporting ACLs. This option is included in the GENERIC kernel. ACLs rely on extended attributes being enabled on the file system. Extended attributes are natively supported in the next generation UNIX file system, UFS2.

Note: A higher level of administrative overhead is required to configure extended attributes on UFS1 than on UFS2. The performance of extended attributes on UFS2 is also substantially higher. As a result, UFS2 is generally recommended in preference to UFS1 for use with access control lists.

ACLs are enabled by the mount-time administrative flag, acls, which may be added to /etc/fstab. The mount-time flag can also be automatically set in a persistent manner using tunefs(8) to modify a superblock ACLs flag in the file system header. In general, it is preferred to use the superblock flag for several reasons:

  • The mount-time ACLs flag cannot be changed by a remount (mount(8) -u), only by means of a complete umount(8) and fresh mount(8). This means that ACLs cannot be enabled on the root file system after boot. It also means that you cannot change the disposition of a file system once it is in use.

  • Setting the superblock flag will cause the file system to always be mounted with ACLs enabled even if there is not an fstab entry or if the devices re-order. This prevents accidental mounting of the file system without ACLs enabled, which can result in ACLs being improperly enforced, and hence security problems.

Note: We may change the ACLs behavior to allow the flag to be enabled without a complete fresh mount(8), but we consider it desirable to discourage accidental mounting without ACLs enabled, because you can shoot your feet quite nastily if you enable ACLs, then disable them, then re-enable them without flushing the extended attributes. In general, once you have enabled ACLs on a file system, they should not be disabled, as the resulting file protections may not be compatible with those intended by the users of the system, and re-enabling ACLs may re-attach the previous ACLs to files that have since had their permissions changed, resulting in other unpredictable behavior.

File systems with ACLs enabled will show a + (plus) sign in their permission settings when viewed. For example:

drwx------  2 robert  robert  512 Dec 27 11:54 private
drwxrwx---+ 2 robert  robert  512 Dec 23 10:57 directory1
drwxrwx---+ 2 robert  robert  512 Dec 22 10:20 directory2
drwxrwx---+ 2 robert  robert  512 Dec 27 11:57 directory3
drwxr-xr-x  2 robert  robert  512 Nov 10 11:54 public_html

Here we see that the directory1, directory2, and directory3 directories are all taking advantage of ACLs. The public_html directory is not.


14.12.1 Making Use of ACLs

The file system ACLs can be viewed by the getfacl(1) utility. For instance, to view the ACL settings on the test file, one would use the command:

% getfacl test
    #file:test
    #owner:1001
    #group:1001
    user::rw-
    group::r--
    other::r--

To change the ACL settings on this file, invoke the setfacl(1) utility. Observe:

% setfacl -k test

The -k flag will remove all of the currently defined ACLs from a file or file system. The more preferable method would be to use -b as it leaves the basic fields required for ACLs to work.

% setfacl -m u:trhodes:rwx,group:web:r--,o::--- test

In the aforementioned command, the -m option was used to modify the default ACL entries. Since there were no pre-defined entries, as they were removed by the previous command, this will restore the default options and assign the options listed. Take care to notice that if you add a user or group which does not exist on the system, an “Invalid argument” error will be printed to stdout.


14.13 Monitoring Third Party Security Issues

Contributed by Tom Rhodes.

In recent years, the security world has made many improvements to how vulnerability assessment is handled. The threat of system intrusion increases as third party utilities are installed and configured for virtually any operating system available today.

Vulnerability assessment is a key factor in security, and while FreeBSD releases advisories for the base system, doing so for every third party utility is beyond the FreeBSD Project’s capability. There is a way to mitigate third party vulnerabilities and warn administrators of known security issues. A FreeBSD add on utility known as Portaudit exists solely for this purpose.

The ports-mgmt/portaudit port polls a database, updated and maintained by the FreeBSD Security Team and ports developers, for known security issues.

To begin using Portaudit, one must install it from the Ports Collection:

# cd /usr/ports/ports-mgmt/portaudit && make install clean

During the install process, the configuration files for periodic(8) will be updated, permitting Portaudit output in the daily security runs. Ensure the daily security run emails, which are sent to root’s email account, are being read. No more configuration will be required here.

After installation, an administrator can update the database and view known vulnerabilities in installed packages by invoking the following command:

# portaudit -Fda

Note: The database will automatically be updated during the periodic(8) run; thus, the previous command is completely optional. It is only required for the following examples.

To audit the third party utilities installed as part of the Ports Collection at anytime, an administrator need only run the following command:

# portaudit -a

Portaudit will produce something like this for vulnerable packages:

Affected package: cups-base-1.1.22.0_1
Type of problem: cups-base -- HPGL buffer overflow vulnerability.
Reference: <http://www.FreeBSD.org/ports/portaudit/40a3bca2-6809-11d9-a9e7-0001020eed82.html>

1 problem(s) in your installed packages found.

You are advised to update or deinstall the affected package(s) immediately.

By pointing a web browser to the URL shown, an administrator may obtain more information about the vulnerability in question. This will include versions affected, by FreeBSD Port version, along with other web sites which may contain security advisories.

In short, Portaudit is a powerful utility and extremely useful when coupled with the Portupgrade port.


14.14 FreeBSD Security Advisories

Contributed by Tom Rhodes.

Like many production quality operating systems, FreeBSD publishes “Security Advisories”. These advisories are usually mailed to the security lists and noted in the Errata only after the appropriate releases have been patched. This section will work to explain what an advisory is, how to understand it, and what measures to take in order to patch a system.


14.14.1 What does an advisory look like?

The FreeBSD security advisories look similar to the one below, taken from the freebsd-security-notifications mailing list.

=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-XX:XX.UTIL                                     Security Advisory
                                                          The FreeBSD Project

Topic:          denial of service due to some problem(1)

Category:       core(2)
Module:         sys(3)
Announced:      2003-09-23(4)
Credits:        Person@EMAIL-ADDRESS(5)
Affects:        All releases of FreeBSD(6)
                FreeBSD 4-STABLE prior to the correction date
Corrected:      2003-09-23 16:42:59 UTC (RELENG_4, 4.9-PRERELEASE)
                2003-09-23 20:08:42 UTC (RELENG_5_1, 5.1-RELEASE-p6)
                2003-09-23 20:07:06 UTC (RELENG_5_0, 5.0-RELEASE-p15)
                2003-09-23 16:44:58 UTC (RELENG_4_8, 4.8-RELEASE-p8)
                2003-09-23 16:47:34 UTC (RELENG_4_7, 4.7-RELEASE-p18)
                2003-09-23 16:49:46 UTC (RELENG_4_6, 4.6-RELEASE-p21)
                2003-09-23 16:51:24 UTC (RELENG_4_5, 4.5-RELEASE-p33)
                2003-09-23 16:52:45 UTC (RELENG_4_4, 4.4-RELEASE-p43)
                2003-09-23 16:54:39 UTC (RELENG_4_3, 4.3-RELEASE-p39)(7)
CVE Name: CVE-XXXX-XXXX(8)

For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
http://www.FreeBSD.org/security/.

I.   Background(9)

II.  Problem Description(10)

III. Impact(11)

IV.  Workaround(12)

V.   Solution(13)

VI.  Correction details(14)

VII. References(15)
(1)
The Topic field indicates exactly what the problem is. It is basically an introduction to the current security advisory and notes the utility with the vulnerability.
(2)
The Category refers to the affected part of the system which may be one of core, contrib, or ports. The core category means that the vulnerability affects a core component of the FreeBSD operating system. The contrib category means that the vulnerability affects software contributed to the FreeBSD Project, such as sendmail. Finally the ports category indicates that the vulnerability affects add on software available as part of the Ports Collection.
(3)
The Module field refers to the component location, for instance sys. In this example, we see that the module, sys, is affected; therefore, this vulnerability affects a component used within the kernel.
(4)
The Announced field reflects the date said security advisory was published, or announced to the world. This means that the security team has verified that the problem does exist and that a patch has been committed to the FreeBSD source code repository.
(5)
The Credits field gives credit to the individual or organization who noticed the vulnerability and reported it.
(6)
The Affects field explains which releases of FreeBSD are affected by this vulnerability. For the kernel, a quick look over the output from ident on the affected files will help in determining the revision. For ports, the version number is listed after the port name in /var/db/pkg. If the system does not sync with the FreeBSD CVS repository and rebuild daily, chances are that it is affected.
(7)
The Corrected field indicates the date, time, time offset, and release that was corrected.
(8)
Reserved for the identification information used to look up vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities Database system.
(9)
The Background field gives information on exactly what the affected utility is. Most of the time this is why the utility exists in FreeBSD, what it is used for, and a bit of information on how the utility came to be.
(10)
The Problem Description field explains the security hole in depth. This can include information on flawed code, or even how the utility could be maliciously used to open a security hole.
(11)
The Impact field describes what type of impact the problem could have on a system. For example, this could be anything from a denial of service attack, to extra privileges available to users, or even giving the attacker superuser access.
(12)
The Workaround field offers a feasible workaround to system administrators who may be incapable of upgrading the system. This may be due to time constraints, network availability, or a slew of other reasons. Regardless, security should not be taken lightly, and an affected system should either be patched or the security hole workaround should be implemented.
(13)
The Solution field offers instructions on patching the affected system. This is a step by step tested and verified method for getting a system patched and working securely.
(14)
The Correction Details field displays the CVS branch or release name with the periods changed to underscore characters. It also shows the revision number of the affected files within each branch.
(15)
The References field usually offers sources of other information. This can include web URLs, books, mailing lists, and newsgroups.

14.15 Process Accounting

Contributed by Tom Rhodes.

Process accounting is a security method in which an administrator may keep track of system resources used, their allocation among users, provide for system monitoring, and minimally track a user’s commands.

This indeed has its own positive and negative points. One of the positives is that an intrusion may be narrowed down to the point of entry. A negative is the amount of logs generated by process accounting, and the disk space they may require. This section will walk an administrator through the basics of process accounting.


14.15.1 Enable and Utilizing Process Accounting

Before making use of process accounting, it must be enabled. To do this, execute the following commands:

# touch /var/account/acct

# accton /var/account/acct

# echo 'accounting_enable="YES"' >> /etc/rc.conf

Once enabled, accounting will begin to track CPU stats, commands, etc. All accounting logs are in a non-human readable format and may be viewed using the sa(8) utility. If issued without any options, sa will print information relating to the number of per user calls, the total elapsed time in minutes, total CPU and user time in minutes, average number of I/O operations, etc.

To view information about commands being issued, one would use the lastcomm(1) utility. The lastcomm command may be used to print out commands issued by users on specific ttys(5), for example:

# lastcomm ls
    trhodes ttyp1

Would print out all known usage of the ls by trhodes on the ttyp1 terminal.

Many other useful options exist and are explained in the lastcomm(1), acct(5) and sa(8) manual pages.

Tags: account, Apache, bsd, catch, cron, database, domain, domain name, email, freebsd, FreeBSD Handbook, ftp, imap, inetd, manage, openbsd, password, pop, protection, raw, sendmail, smtp, software, ssh, ssl, telnet, trojan

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FreeBSD Handbook - Chapter 8 Configuring the FreeBSD Kernel

January 6th, 2009

Updated and restructured by Jim Mock. Originally contributed by Jake Hamby.

8.1 Synopsis

The kernel is the core of the FreeBSD operating system. It is responsible for managing memory, enforcing security controls, networking, disk access, and much more. While more and more of FreeBSD becomes dynamically configurable it is still occasionally necessary to reconfigure and recompile your kernel.

After reading this chapter, you will know:

  • Why you might need to build a custom kernel.

  • How to write a kernel configuration file, or alter an existing configuration file.

  • How to use the kernel configuration file to create and build a new kernel.

  • How to install the new kernel.

  • How to troubleshoot if things go wrong.

All of the commands listed within this chapter by way of example should be executed as root in order to succeed.


8.2 Why Build a Custom Kernel?

Traditionally, FreeBSD has had what is called a “monolithic” kernel. This means that the kernel was one large program, supported a fixed list of devices, and if you wanted to change the kernel’s behavior then you had to compile a new kernel, and then reboot your computer with the new kernel.

Today, FreeBSD is rapidly moving to a model where much of the kernel’s functionality is contained in modules which can be dynamically loaded and unloaded from the kernel as necessary. This allows the kernel to adapt to new hardware suddenly becoming available (such as PCMCIA cards in a laptop), or for new functionality to be brought into the kernel that was not necessary when the kernel was originally compiled. This is known as a modular kernel.

Despite this, it is still necessary to carry out some static kernel configuration. In some cases this is because the functionality is so tied to the kernel that it can not be made dynamically loadable. In others it may simply be because no one has yet taken the time to write a dynamic loadable kernel module for that functionality.

Building a custom kernel is one of the most important rites of passage nearly every BSD user must endure. This process, while time consuming, will provide many benefits to your FreeBSD system. Unlike the GENERIC kernel, which must support a wide range of hardware, a custom kernel only contains support for your PC’s hardware. This has a number of benefits, such as:

  • Faster boot time. Since the kernel will only probe the hardware you have on your system, the time it takes your system to boot can decrease dramatically.

  • Lower memory usage. A custom kernel often uses less memory than the GENERIC kernel, which is important because the kernel must always be present in real memory. For this reason, a custom kernel is especially useful on a system with a small amount of RAM.

  • Additional hardware support. A custom kernel allows you to add in support for devices which are not present in the GENERIC kernel, such as sound cards.


8.3 Finding the System Hardware

Written by Tom Rhodes.

Before venturing into kernel configuration, it would be wise to get an inventory of the machine’s hardware. In cases where FreeBSD is not the primary operating system, the inventory list may easily be created by viewing the current operating system configuration. For example, Microsoft’s Device Manager normally contains important information about installed devices. The Device Manager is located in the control panel.

Note: Some versions of Microsoft Windows have a System icon which will display a screen where Device Manager may be accessed.

If another operating system does not exist on the machine, the administrator must find this information out manually. One method is using the dmesg(8) utility and the man(1) commands. Most device drivers on FreeBSD have a manual page, listing supported hardware, and during the boot probe, found hardware will be listed. For example, the following lines indicate that the psm driver found a mouse:

psm0: <PS/2 Mouse> irq 12 on atkbdc0
psm0: [GIANT-LOCKED]
psm0: [ITHREAD]
psm0: model Generic PS/2 mouse, device ID 0

This driver will need to be included in the custom kernel configuration file or loaded using loader.conf(5).

On occasion, the data from dmesg will only show system messages instead of the boot probe output. In these situations, the output may be obtained by viewing the /var/run/dmesg.boot file.

Another method of finding hardware is by using the pciconf(8) utility which provides more verbose output. For example:

ath0@pci0:3:0:0:        class=0x020000 card=0x058a1014 chip=0x1014168c rev=0x01 hdr=0x00
    vendor     = 'Atheros Communications Inc.'
    device     = 'AR5212 Atheros AR5212 802.11abg wireless'
    class      = network
    subclass   = ethernet

This bit of output, obtained using pciconf -lv shows that the ath driver located a wireless Ethernet device. Using man ath will return the ath(4) manual page.

The -k flag, when passed to man(1) can also be used to provide useful information. From the above, one can issue:

# man -k Atheros

To get a list of manual pages which contain that particular word:

ath(4)                   - Atheros IEEE 802.11 wireless network driver
ath_hal(4)               - Atheros Hardware Access Layer (HAL)

Armed with a hardware inventory list, the process of building a custom kernel should appear less daunting.


8.4 Kernel Drivers, Subsystems, and Modules

Before building a custom kernel, consider the reasons for doing so. If there is a need for specific hardware support, it may already exist as a module.

Kernel modules exist in the /boot/kernel directory and may be dynamically loaded into the running kernel using kldload(8). Most, if not all kernel drivers have a specific module and manual page. For example, the last section noted the ath wireless Ethernet driver. This device has the following information in its manual page:

Alternatively, to load the driver as a module at boot time, place the
following line in loader.conf(5):

    if_ath_load="YES"

As instructed, adding the if_ath_load="YES" line to the /boot/loader.conf file will enable loading this module dynamically at boot time.

In some cases; however, there is no associated module. This is mostly true for certain subsystems and very important drivers, for instance, the fast file system (FFS) is a required option in the kernel. As is network support (INET). Unfortunately the only way to tell if a driver is required is to check for the module itself.

Warning: It is considerably easy to remove built in support for a device or option and have a broken kernel. For example, if the ata(4) driver is pulled from the kernel configuration file, a system using ATA disk drivers may not boot without the line added to loader.conf. When in doubt, check for the module and then just leave support in the kernel.


8.5 Building and Installing a Custom Kernel

First, let us take a quick tour of the kernel build directory. All directories mentioned will be relative to the main /usr/src/sys directory, which is also accessible through the path name /sys. There are a number of subdirectories here representing different parts of the kernel, but the most important for our purposes are arch/conf, where you will edit your custom kernel configuration, and compile, which is the staging area where your kernel will be built. arch represents one of i386, alpha, amd64, ia64, powerpc, sparc64, or pc98 (an alternative development branch of PC hardware, popular in Japan). Everything inside a particular architecture’s directory deals with that architecture only; the rest of the code is machine independent code common to all platforms to which FreeBSD could potentially be ported. Notice the logical organization of the directory structure, with each supported device, file system, and option in its own subdirectory.

This chapter assumes that you are using the i386 architecture in the examples. If this is not the case for your situation, make appropriate adjustments to the path names for your system’s architecture.

Note: If there is not a /usr/src/sys directory on your system, then the kernel source has not been installed. The easiest way to do this is by running sysinstall as root, choosing Configure, then Distributions, then src, then base and sys. If you have an aversion to sysinstall and you have access to an “official” FreeBSD CDROM, then you can also install the source from the command line:

# mount /cdrom
# mkdir -p /usr/src/sys
# ln -s /usr/src/sys /sys
# cat /cdrom/src/ssys.[a-d]* | tar -xzvf -
# cat /cdrom/src/sbase.[a-d]* | tar -xzvf -

Next, move to the arch/conf directory and copy the GENERIC configuration file to the name you want to give your kernel. For example:

# cd /usr/src/sys/i386/conf
# cp GENERIC MYKERNEL

Traditionally, this name is in all capital letters and, if you are maintaining multiple FreeBSD machines with different hardware, it is a good idea to name it after your machine’s hostname. We will call it MYKERNEL for the purpose of this example.

Tip: Storing your kernel configuration file directly under /usr/src can be a bad idea. If you are experiencing problems it can be tempting to just delete /usr/src and start again. After doing this, it usually only takes a few seconds for you to realize that you have deleted your custom kernel configuration file. Also, do not edit GENERIC directly, as it may get overwritten the next time you update your source tree, and your kernel modifications will be lost.

You might want to keep your kernel configuration file elsewhere, and then create a symbolic link to the file in the i386 directory.

For example:

# cd /usr/src/sys/i386/conf
# mkdir /root/kernels
# cp GENERIC /root/kernels/MYKERNEL
# ln -s /root/kernels/MYKERNEL

Now, edit MYKERNEL with your favorite text editor. If you are just starting out, the only editor available will probably be vi, which is too complex to explain here, but is covered well in many books in the bibliography. However, FreeBSD does offer an easier editor called ee which, if you are a beginner, should be your editor of choice. Feel free to change the comment lines at the top to reflect your configuration or the changes you have made to differentiate it from GENERIC.

If you have built a kernel under SunOS or some other BSD operating system, much of this file will be very familiar to you. If you are coming from some other operating system such as DOS, on the other hand, the GENERIC configuration file might seem overwhelming to you, so follow the descriptions in the Configuration File section slowly and carefully.

Note: If you sync your source tree with the latest sources of the FreeBSD project, be sure to always check the file /usr/src/UPDATING before you perform any update steps. This file describes any important issues or areas requiring special attention within the updated source code. /usr/src/UPDATING always matches your version of the FreeBSD source, and is therefore more up to date with new information than this handbook.

You must now compile the source code for the kernel.

Building a Kernel

  1. Change to the /usr/src directory:

    # cd /usr/src
  2. Compile the kernel:

    # make buildkernel KERNCONF=MYKERNEL
  3. Install the new kernel:

    # make installkernel KERNCONF=MYKERNEL

Note: It is required to have full FreeBSD source tree to build the kernel.

Tip: By default, when you build a custom kernel, all kernel modules will be rebuilt as well. If you want to update a kernel faster or to build only custom modules, you should edit /etc/make.conf before starting to build the kernel:

MODULES_OVERRIDE = linux acpi sound/sound sound/driver/ds1 ntfs

This variable sets up a list of modules to build instead of all of them.

WITHOUT_MODULES = linux acpi sound/sound sound/driver/ds1 ntfs

This variable sets up a list of modules to exclude from the build process. For other variables which you may find useful in the process of building kernel, refer to make.conf(5) manual page.

The new kernel will be copied to the /boot/kernel directory as /boot/kernel/kernel and the old kernel will be moved to /boot/kernel.old/kernel. Now, shutdown the system and reboot to use your new kernel. If something goes wrong, there are some troubleshooting instructions at the end of this chapter that you may find useful. Be sure to read the section which explains how to recover in case your new kernel does not boot.

Note: Other files relating to the boot process, such as the boot loader(8) and configuration are stored in /boot. Third party or custom modules can be placed in /boot/kernel, although users should be aware that keeping modules in sync with the compiled kernel is very important. Modules not intended to run with the compiled kernel may result in instability or incorrectness.


8.6 The Configuration File

Updated for FreeBSD 6.X by Joel Dahl.

The general format of a configuration file is quite simple. Each line contains a keyword and one or more arguments. For simplicity, most lines only contain one argument. Anything following a # is considered a comment and ignored. The following sections describe each keyword, in the order they are listed in GENERIC. For an exhaustive list of architecture dependent options and devices, see the NOTES file in the same directory as the GENERIC file. For architecture independent options, see /usr/src/sys/conf/NOTES.

Note: To build a file which contains all available options, as normally done for testing purposes, run the following command as root:

# cd /usr/src/sys/i386/conf && make LINT

The following is an example of the GENERIC kernel configuration file with various additional comments where needed for clarity. This example should match your copy in /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/GENERIC fairly closely.

machine        i386

This is the machine architecture. It must be either alpha, amd64, i386, ia64, pc98, powerpc, or sparc64.

cpu          I486_CPU
cpu          I586_CPU
cpu          I686_CPU

The above option specifies the type of CPU you have in your system. You may have multiple instances of the CPU line (if, for example, you are not sure whether you should use I586_CPU or I686_CPU), but for a custom kernel it is best to specify only the CPU you have. If you are unsure of your CPU type, you can check the /var/run/dmesg.boot file to view your boot messages.

ident          GENERIC

This is the identification of the kernel. You should change this to whatever you named your kernel, i.e. MYKERNEL if you have followed the instructions of the previous examples. The value you put in the ident string will print when you boot up the kernel, so it is useful to give the new kernel a different name if you want to keep it separate from your usual kernel (e.g., you want to build an experimental kernel).

#To statically compile in device wiring instead of /boot/device.hints
#hints          "GENERIC.hints"         # Default places to look for devices.

The device.hints(5) is used to configure options of the device drivers. The default location that loader(8) will check at boot time is /boot/device.hints. Using the hints option you can compile these hints statically into your kernel. Then there is no need to create a device.hints file in /boot.

makeoptions     DEBUG=-g          # Build kernel with gdb(1) debug symbols

The normal build process of FreeBSD includes debugging information when building the kernel with the the -g option, which enables debugging information when passed to gcc(1).

options          SCHED_4BSD         # 4BSD scheduler

The traditional and default system scheduler for FreeBSD. Keep this.

options          PREEMPTION         # Enable kernel thread preemption

Allows threads that are in the kernel to be preempted by higher priority threads. It helps with interactivity and allows interrupt threads to run sooner rather than waiting.

options          INET              # InterNETworking

Networking support. Leave this in, even if you do not plan to be connected to a network. Most programs require at least loopback networking (i.e., making network connections within your PC), so this is essentially mandatory.

options          INET6             # IPv6 communications protocols

This enables the IPv6 communication protocols.

options          FFS               # Berkeley Fast Filesystem

This is the basic hard drive file system. Leave it in if you boot from the hard disk.

options          SOFTUPDATES       # Enable FFS Soft Updates support

This option enables Soft Updates in the kernel, this will help speed up write access on the disks. Even when this functionality is provided by the kernel, it must be turned on for specific disks. Review the output from mount(8) to see if Soft Updates is enabled for your system disks. If you do not see the soft-updates option then you will need to activate it using the tunefs(8) (for existing file systems) or newfs(8) (for new file systems) commands.

options          UFS_ACL           # Support for access control lists

This option enables kernel support for access control lists. This relies on the use of extended attributes and UFS2, and the feature is described in detail in Section 14.12. ACLs are enabled by default and should not be disabled in the kernel if they have been used previously on a file system, as this will remove the access control lists, changing the way files are protected in unpredictable ways.

options          UFS_DIRHASH       # Improve performance on big directories

This option includes functionality to speed up disk operations on large directories, at the expense of using additional memory. You would normally keep this for a large server, or interactive workstation, and remove it if you are using FreeBSD on a smaller system where memory is at a premium and disk access speed is less important, such as a firewall.

options          MD_ROOT           # MD is a potential root device

This option enables support for a memory backed virtual disk used as a root device.

options          NFSCLIENT         # Network Filesystem Client
options          NFSSERVER         # Network Filesystem Server
options          NFS_ROOT          # NFS usable as /, requires NFSCLIENT

The network file system. Unless you plan to mount partitions from a UNIX file server over TCP/IP, you can comment these out.

options          MSDOSFS           # MSDOS Filesystem

The MS-DOS file system. Unless you plan to mount a DOS formatted hard drive partition at boot time, you can safely comment this out. It will be automatically loaded the first time you mount a DOS partition, as described above. Also, the excellent emulators/mtools software allows you to access DOS floppies without having to mount and unmount them (and does not require MSDOSFS at all).

options          CD9660            # ISO 9660 Filesystem

The ISO 9660 file system for CDROMs. Comment it out if you do not have a CDROM drive or only mount data CDs occasionally (since it will be dynamically loaded the first time you mount a data CD). Audio CDs do not need this file system.

options          PROCFS            # Process filesystem (requires PSEUDOFS)

The process file system. This is a “pretend” file system mounted on /proc which allows programs like ps(1) to give you more information on what processes are running. Use of PROCFS is not required under most circumstances, as most debugging and monitoring tools have been adapted to run without PROCFS: installs will not mount this file system by default.

options          PSEUDOFS          # Pseudo-filesystem framework

6.X kernels making use of PROCFS must also include support for PSEUDOFS.

options          GEOM_GPT          # GUID Partition Tables.

This option brings the ability to have a large number of partitions on a single disk.

options          COMPAT_43         # Compatible with BSD 4.3 [KEEP THIS!]

Compatibility with 4.3BSD. Leave this in; some programs will act strangely if you comment this out.

options          COMPAT_FREEBSD4   # Compatible with FreeBSD4

This option is required on FreeBSD 5.X i386 and Alpha systems to support applications compiled on older versions of FreeBSD that use older system call interfaces. It is recommended that this option be used on all i386 and Alpha systems that may run older applications; platforms that gained support only in 5.X, such as ia64 and Sparc64, do not require this option.

options          COMPAT_FREEBSD5   # Compatible with FreeBSD5

This option is required on FreeBSD 6.X and above to support applications compiled on FreeBSD 5.X versions that use FreeBSD 5.X system call interfaces.

options          SCSI_DELAY=5000  # Delay (in ms) before probing SCSI

This causes the kernel to pause for 5 seconds before probing each SCSI device in your system. If you only have IDE hard drives, you can ignore this, otherwise you can try to lower this number, to speed up booting. Of course, if you do this and FreeBSD has trouble recognizing your SCSI devices, you will have to raise it again.

options          KTRACE            # ktrace(1) support

This enables kernel process tracing, which is useful in debugging.

options          SYSVSHM           # SYSV-style shared memory

This option provides for System V shared memory. The most common use of this is the XSHM extension in X, which many graphics-intensive programs will automatically take advantage of for extra speed. If you use X, you will definitely want to include this.

options          SYSVMSG           # SYSV-style message queues

Support for System V messages. This option only adds a few hundred bytes to the kernel.

options          SYSVSEM           # SYSV-style semaphores

Support for System V semaphores. Less commonly used but only adds a few hundred bytes to the kernel.

Note: The -p option of the ipcs(1) command will list any processes using each of these System V facilities.

options         _KPOSIX_PRIORITY_SCHEDULING # POSIX P1003_1B real-time extensions

Real-time extensions added in the 1993 POSIX®. Certain applications in the Ports Collection use these (such as StarOffice).

options          KBD_INSTALL_CDEV  # install a CDEV entry in /dev

This option is required to allow the creation of keyboard device nodes in /dev.

options          ADAPTIVE_GIANT    # Giant mutex is adaptive.

Giant is the name of a mutual exclusion mechanism (a sleep mutex) that protects a large set of kernel resources. Today, this is an unacceptable performance bottleneck which is actively being replaced with locks that protect individual resources. The ADAPTIVE_GIANT option causes Giant to be included in the set of mutexes adaptively spun on. That is, when a thread wants to lock the Giant mutex, but it is already locked by a thread on another CPU, the first thread will keep running and wait for the lock to be released. Normally, the thread would instead go back to sleep and wait for its next chance to run. If you are not sure, leave this in.

Note: Note that on FreeBSD 8.0-CURRENT and later versions, all mutexes are adaptive by default, unless explicitly set to non-adaptive by compiling with the NO_ADAPTIVE_MUTEXES option. As a result, Giant is adaptive by default now, and the ADAPTIVE_GIANT option has been removed from the kernel configuration.

device          apic               # I/O APIC

The apic device enables the use of the I/O APIC for interrupt delivery. The apic device can be used in both UP and SMP kernels, but is required for SMP kernels. Add options SMP to include support for multiple processors.

Note: The apic device exists only on the i386 architecture, this configuration line should not be used on other architectures.

device          eisa

Include this if you have an EISA motherboard. This enables auto-detection and configuration support for all devices on the EISA bus.

device          pci

Include this if you have a PCI motherboard. This enables auto-detection of PCI cards and gatewaying from the PCI to ISA bus.

# Floppy drives
device          fdc

This is the floppy drive controller.

# ATA and ATAPI devices
device          ata

This driver supports all ATA and ATAPI devices. You only need one device ata line for the kernel to detect all PCI ATA/ATAPI devices on modern machines.

device          atadisk                 # ATA disk drives

This is needed along with device ata for ATA disk drives.

device          ataraid                 # ATA RAID drives

This is needed along with device ata for ATA RAID drives.

device          atapicd                 # ATAPI CDROM drives

This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI CDROM drives.

device          atapifd                 # ATAPI floppy drives

This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI floppy drives.

device          atapist                 # ATAPI tape drives

This is needed along with device ata for ATAPI tape drives.

options         ATA_STATIC_ID           # Static device numbering

This makes the controller number static; without this, the device numbers are dynamically allocated.

# SCSI Controllers
device          ahb        # EISA AHA1742 family
device          ahc        # AHA2940 and onboard AIC7xxx devices
options         AHC_REG_PRETTY_PRINT    # Print register bitfields in debug
                                        # output.  Adds ~128k to driver.
device          ahd        # AHA39320/29320 and onboard AIC79xx devices
options         AHD_REG_PRETTY_PRINT    # Print register bitfields in debug
                                        # output.  Adds ~215k to driver.
device          amd        # AMD 53C974 (Teckram DC-390(T))
device          isp        # Qlogic family
#device         ispfw      # Firmware for QLogic HBAs- normally a module
device          mpt        # LSI-Logic MPT-Fusion
#device         ncr        # NCR/Symbios Logic
device          sym        # NCR/Symbios Logic (newer chipsets + those of `ncr')
device          trm        # Tekram DC395U/UW/F DC315U adapters

device          adv        # Advansys SCSI adapters
device          adw        # Advansys wide SCSI adapters
device          aha        # Adaptec 154x SCSI adapters
device          aic        # Adaptec 15[012]x SCSI adapters, AIC-6[23]60.
device          bt         # Buslogic/Mylex MultiMaster SCSI adapters

device          ncv        # NCR 53C500
device          nsp        # Workbit Ninja SCSI-3
device          stg        # TMC 18C30/18C50

SCSI controllers. Comment out any you do not have in your system. If you have an IDE only system, you can remove these altogether. The *_REG_PRETTY_PRINT lines are debugging options for their respective drivers.

# SCSI peripherals
device          scbus      # SCSI bus (required for SCSI)
device          ch         # SCSI media changers
device          da         # Direct Access (disks)
device          sa         # Sequential Access (tape etc)
device          cd         # CD
device          pass       # Passthrough device (direct SCSI access)
device          ses        # SCSI Environmental Services (and SAF-TE)

SCSI peripherals. Again, comment out any you do not have, or if you have only IDE hardware, you can remove them completely.

Note: The USB umass(4) driver and a few other drivers use the SCSI subsystem even though they are not real SCSI devices. Therefore make sure not to remove SCSI support, if any such drivers are included in the kernel configuration.

# RAID controllers interfaced to the SCSI subsystem
device          amr        # AMI MegaRAID
device          arcmsr     # Areca SATA II RAID
device          asr        # DPT SmartRAID V, VI and Adaptec SCSI RAID
device          ciss       # Compaq Smart RAID 5*
device          dpt        # DPT Smartcache III, IV - See NOTES for options
device          hptmv      # Highpoint RocketRAID 182x
device          rr232x     # Highpoint RocketRAID 232x
device          iir        # Intel Integrated RAID
device          ips        # IBM (Adaptec) ServeRAID
device          mly        # Mylex AcceleRAID/eXtremeRAID
device          twa        # 3ware 9000 series PATA/SATA RAID

# RAID controllers
device          aac        # Adaptec FSA RAID
device          aacp       # SCSI passthrough for aac (requires CAM)
device          ida        # Compaq Smart RAID
device          mfi        # LSI MegaRAID SAS
device          mlx        # Mylex DAC960 family
device          pst        # Promise Supertrak SX6000
device          twe        # 3ware ATA RAID

Supported RAID controllers. If you do not have any of these, you can comment them out or remove them.

# atkbdc0 controls both the keyboard and the PS/2 mouse
device          atkbdc     # AT keyboard controller

The keyboard controller (atkbdc) provides I/O services for the AT keyboard and PS/2 style pointing devices. This controller is required by the keyboard driver (atkbd) and the PS/2 pointing device driver (psm).

device          atkbd      # AT keyboard

The atkbd driver, together with atkbdc controller, provides access to the AT 84 keyboard or the AT enhanced keyboard which is connected to the AT keyboard controller.

device          psm        # PS/2 mouse

Use this device if your mouse plugs into the PS/2 mouse port.

device          kbdmux        # keyboard multiplexer

Basic support for keyboard multiplexing. If you do not plan to use more than one keyboard on the system, you can safely remove that line.

device          vga        # VGA video card driver

The video card driver.

device          splash     # Splash screen and screen saver support

Splash screen at start up! Screen savers require this too.

# syscons is the default console driver, resembling an SCO console
device          sc

sc is the default console driver and resembles a SCO console. Since most full-screen programs access the console through a terminal database library like termcap, it should not matter whether you use this or vt, the VT220 compatible console driver. When you log in, set your TERM variable to scoansi if full-screen programs have trouble running under this console.

# Enable this for the pcvt (VT220 compatible) console driver
#device          vt
#options         XSERVER          # support for X server on a vt console
#options         FAT_CURSOR       # start with block cursor

This is a VT220-compatible console driver, backward compatible to VT100/102. It works well on some laptops which have hardware incompatibilities with sc. Also set your TERM variable to vt100 or vt220 when you log in. This driver might also prove useful when connecting to a large number of different machines over the network, where termcap or terminfo entries for the sc device are often not available — vt100 should be available on virtually any platform.

device          agp

Include this if you have an AGP card in the system. This will enable support for AGP, and AGP GART for boards which have these features.

# Power management support (see NOTES for more options)
#device          apm

Advanced Power Management support. Useful for laptops, although this is disabled in GENERIC by default.

# Add suspend/resume support for the i8254.
device           pmtimer

Timer device driver for power management events, such as APM and ACPI.

# PCCARD (PCMCIA) support
# PCMCIA and cardbus bridge support
device          cbb               # cardbus (yenta) bridge
device          pccard            # PC Card (16-bit) bus
device          cardbus           # CardBus (32-bit) bus

PCMCIA support. You want this if you are using a laptop.

# Serial (COM) ports
device          sio               # 8250, 16[45]50 based serial ports

These are the serial ports referred to as COM ports in the MS-DOS/Windows world.

Note: If you have an internal modem on COM4 and a serial port at COM2, you will have to change the IRQ of the modem to 2 (for obscure technical reasons, IRQ2 = IRQ 9) in order to access it from FreeBSD. If you have a multiport serial card, check the manual page for sio(4) for more information on the proper values to add to your /boot/device.hints. Some video cards (notably those based on S3 chips) use IO addresses in the form of 0x*2e8, and since many cheap serial cards do not fully decode the 16-bit IO address space, they clash with these cards making the COM4 port practically unavailable.

Each serial port is required to have a unique IRQ (unless you are using one of the multiport cards where shared interrupts are supported), so the default IRQs for COM3 and COM4 cannot be used.

# Parallel port
device          ppc

This is the ISA-bus parallel port interface.

device          ppbus      # Parallel port bus (required)

Provides support for the parallel port bus.

device          lpt        # Printer

Support for parallel port printers.

Note: All three of the above are required to enable parallel printer support.

device          plip       # TCP/IP over parallel

This is the driver for the parallel network interface.

device          ppi        # Parallel port interface device

The general-purpose I/O (“geek port”) + IEEE1284 I/O.

#device         vpo        # Requires scbus and da

This is for an Iomega Zip drive. It requires scbus and da support. Best performance is achieved with ports in EPP 1.9 mode.

#device         puc

Uncomment this device if you have a “dumb” serial or parallel PCI card that is supported by the puc(4) glue driver.

# PCI Ethernet NICs.
device          de         # DEC/Intel DC21x4x (“Tulip”)
device          em         # Intel PRO/1000 adapter Gigabit Ethernet Card
device          ixgb       # Intel PRO/10GbE Ethernet Card
device          txp        # 3Com 3cR990 (“Typhoon”)
device          vx         # 3Com 3c590, 3c595 (“Vortex”)

Various PCI network card drivers. Comment out or remove any of these not present in your system.

# PCI Ethernet NICs that use the common MII bus controller code.
# NOTE: Be sure to keep the 'device miibus' line in order to use these NICs!
device          miibus     # MII bus support

MII bus support is required for some PCI 10/100 Ethernet NICs, namely those which use MII-compliant transceivers or implement transceiver control interfaces that operate like an MII. Adding device miibus to the kernel config pulls in support for the generic miibus API and all of the PHY drivers, including a generic one for PHYs that are not specifically handled by an individual driver.

device          bce        # Broadcom BCM5706/BCM5708 Gigabit Ethernet
device          bfe        # Broadcom BCM440x 10/100 Ethernet
device          bge        # Broadcom BCM570xx Gigabit Ethernet
device          dc         # DEC/Intel 21143 and various workalikes
device          fxp        # Intel EtherExpress PRO/100B (82557, 82558)
device          lge        # Level 1 LXT1001 gigabit ethernet
device          msk        # Marvell/SysKonnect Yukon II Gigabit Ethernet
device          nge        # NatSemi DP83820 gigabit ethernet
device          nve        # nVidia nForce MCP on-board Ethernet Networking
device          pcn        # AMD Am79C97x PCI 10/100 (precedence over 'lnc')
device          re         # RealTek 8139C+/8169/8169S/8110S
device          rl         # RealTek 8129/8139
device          sf         # Adaptec AIC-6915 (“Starfire”)
device          sis        # Silicon Integrated Systems SiS 900/SiS 7016
device          sk         # SysKonnect SK-984x & SK-982x gigabit Ethernet
device          ste        # Sundance ST201 (D-Link DFE-550TX)
device          stge       # Sundance/Tamarack TC9021 gigabit Ethernet
device          ti         # Alteon Networks Tigon I/II gigabit Ethernet
device          tl         # Texas Instruments ThunderLAN
device          tx         # SMC EtherPower II (83c170 “EPIC”)
device          vge        # VIA VT612x gigabit ethernet
device          vr         # VIA Rhine, Rhine II
device          wb         # Winbond W89C840F
device          xl         # 3Com 3c90x (“Boomerang”, “Cyclone”)

Drivers that use the MII bus controller code.

# ISA Ethernet NICs.  pccard NICs included.
device          cs         # Crystal Semiconductor CS89x0 NIC
# 'device ed' requires 'device miibus'
device          ed         # NE[12]000, SMC Ultra, 3c503, DS8390 cards
device          ex         # Intel EtherExpress Pro/10 and Pro/10+
device          ep         # Etherlink III based cards
device          fe         # Fujitsu MB8696x based cards
device          ie         # EtherExpress 8/16, 3C507, StarLAN 10 etc.
device          lnc        # NE2100, NE32-VL Lance Ethernet cards
device          sn         # SMC's 9000 series of Ethernet chips
device          xe         # Xircom pccard Ethernet

# ISA devices that use the old ISA shims
#device         le

ISA Ethernet drivers. See /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/NOTES for details of which cards are supported by which driver.

# Wireless NIC cards
device          wlan            # 802.11 support

Generic 802.11 support. This line is required for wireless networking.

device          wlan_wep        # 802.11 WEP support
device          wlan_ccmp       # 802.11 CCMP support
device          wlan_tkip       # 802.11 TKIP support

Crypto support for 802.11 devices. These lines are needed if you intend to use encryption and 802.11i security protocols.

device          an         # Aironet 4500/4800 802.11 wireless NICs.
device          ath             # Atheros pci/cardbus NIC's
device          ath_hal         # Atheros HAL (Hardware Access Layer)
device          ath_rate_sample # SampleRate tx rate control for ath
device          awi        # BayStack 660 and others
device          ral        # Ralink Technology RT2500 wireless NICs.
device          wi         # WaveLAN/Intersil/Symbol 802.11 wireless NICs.
#device         wl         # Older non 802.11 Wavelan wireless NIC.

Support for various wireless cards.

# Pseudo devices
device   loop          # Network loopback

This is the generic loopback device for TCP/IP. If you telnet or FTP to localhost (a.k.a. 127.0.0.1) it will come back at you through this device. This is mandatory.

device   random        # Entropy device

Cryptographically secure random number generator.

device   ether         # Ethernet support

ether is only needed if you have an Ethernet card. It includes generic Ethernet protocol code.

device   sl            # Kernel SLIP

sl is for SLIP support. This has been almost entirely supplanted by PPP, which is easier to set up, better suited for modem-to-modem connection, and more powerful.

device   ppp           # Kernel PPP

This is for kernel PPP support for dial-up connections. There is also a version of PPP implemented as a userland application that uses tun and offers more flexibility and features such as demand dialing.

device   tun           # Packet tunnel.

This is used by the userland PPP software. See the PPP section of this book for more information.

device   pty           # Pseudo-ttys (telnet etc)

This is a “pseudo-terminal” or simulated login port. It is used by incoming telnet and rlogin sessions, xterm, and some other applications such as Emacs.

device   md            # Memory “disks”

Memory disk pseudo-devices.

device   gif           # IPv6 and IPv4 tunneling

This implements IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling, IPv4 over IPv6 tunneling, IPv4 over IPv4 tunneling, and IPv6 over IPv6 tunneling. The gif device is “auto-cloning”, and will create device nodes as needed.

device   faith         # IPv6-to-IPv4 relaying (translation)

This pseudo-device captures packets that are sent to it and diverts them to the IPv4/IPv6 translation daemon.

# The `bpf' device enables the Berkeley Packet Filter.
# Be aware of the administrative consequences of enabling this!
# Note that 'bpf' is required for DHCP.
device   bpf           # Berkeley packet filter

This is the Berkeley Packet Filter. This pseudo-device allows network interfaces to be placed in promiscuous mode, capturing every packet on a broadcast network (e.g., an Ethernet). These packets can be captured to disk and or examined with the tcpdump(1) program.

Note: The bpf(4) device is also used by dhclient(8) to obtain the IP address of the default router (gateway) and so on. If you use DHCP, leave this uncommented.

# USB support
device          uhci          # UHCI PCI->USB interface
device          ohci          # OHCI PCI->USB interface
device          ehci          # EHCI PCI->USB interface (USB 2.0)
device          usb           # USB Bus (required)
#device         udbp          # USB Double Bulk Pipe devices
device          ugen          # Generic
device          uhid          # “Human Interface Devices”
device          ukbd          # Keyboard
device          ulpt          # Printer
device          umass         # Disks/Mass storage - Requires scbus and da
device          ums           # Mouse
device          ural          # Ralink Technology RT2500USB wireless NICs
device          urio          # Diamond Rio 500 MP3 player
device          uscanner      # Scanners
# USB Ethernet, requires mii
device          aue           # ADMtek USB Ethernet
device          axe           # ASIX Electronics USB Ethernet
device          cdce          # Generic USB over Ethernet
device          cue           # CATC USB Ethernet
device          kue           # Kawasaki LSI USB Ethernet
device          rue           # RealTek RTL8150 USB Ethernet

Support for various USB devices.

# FireWire support
device          firewire      # FireWire bus code
device          sbp           # SCSI over FireWire (Requires scbus and da)
device          fwe           # Ethernet over FireWire (non-standard!)

Support for various Firewire devices.

For more information and additional devices supported by FreeBSD, see /usr/src/sys/i386/conf/NOTES.


8.6.1 Large Memory Configurations (PAE)

Large memory configuration machines require access to more than the 4 gigabyte limit on User+Kernel Virtual Address (KVA) space. Due to this limitation, Intel added support for 36-bit physical address space access in the Pentium Pro and later line of CPUs.

The Physical Address Extension (PAE) capability of the Intel Pentium Pro and later CPUs allows memory configurations of up to 64 gigabytes. FreeBSD provides support for this capability via the PAE kernel configuration option, available in all current release versions of FreeBSD. Due to the limitations of the Intel memory architecture, no distinction is made for memory above or below 4 gigabytes. Memory allocated above 4 gigabytes is simply added to the pool of available memory.

To enable PAE support in the kernel, simply add the following line to your kernel configuration file:

options            PAE

Note: The PAE support in FreeBSD is only available for Intel IA-32 processors. It should also be noted, that the PAE support in FreeBSD has not received wide testing, and should be considered beta quality compared to other stable features of FreeBSD.

PAE support in FreeBSD has a few limitations:

  • A process is not able to access more than 4 gigabytes of VM space.

  • Device drivers that do not use the bus_dma(9) interface will cause data corruption in a PAE enabled kernel and are not recommended for use. For this reason, a PAE kernel configuration file is provided in FreeBSD which excludes all drivers not known to work in a PAE enabled kernel.

  • Some system tunables determine memory resource usage by the amount of available physical memory. Such tunables can unnecessarily over-allocate due to the large memory nature of a PAE system. One such example is the kern.maxvnodes sysctl, which controls the maximum number of vnodes allowed in the kernel. It is advised to adjust this and other such tunables to a reasonable value.

  • It might be necessary to increase the kernel virtual address (KVA) space or to reduce the amount of specific kernel resource that is heavily used (see above) in order to avoid KVA exhaustion. The KVA_PAGES kernel option can be used for increasing the KVA space.

For performance and stability concerns, it is advised to consult the tuning(7) manual page. The pae(4) manual page contains up-to-date information on FreeBSD’s PAE support.


8.7 If Something Goes Wrong

There are four categories of trouble that can occur when building a custom kernel. They are:

config fails:

If the config(8) command fails when you give it your kernel description, you have probably made a simple error somewhere. Fortunately, config(8) will print the line number that it had trouble with, so that you can quickly locate the line containing the error. For example, if you see:

config: line 17: syntax error

Make sure the keyword is typed correctly by comparing it to the GENERIC kernel or another reference.

make fails:

If the make command fails, it usually signals an error in your kernel description which is not severe enough for config(8) to catch. Again, look over your configuration, and if you still cannot resolve the problem, send mail to the FreeBSD general questions mailing list with your kernel configuration, and it should be diagnosed quickly.

The kernel does not boot:

If your new kernel does not boot, or fails to recognize your devices, do not panic! Fortunately, FreeBSD has an excellent mechanism for recovering from incompatible kernels. Simply choose the kernel you want to boot from at the FreeBSD boot loader. You can access this when the system boot menu appears. Select the “Escape to a loader prompt” option, number six. At the prompt, type unload kernel and then type boot /boot/kernel.old/kernel, or the filename of any other kernel that will boot properly. When reconfiguring a kernel, it is always a good idea to keep a kernel that is known to work on hand.

After booting with a good kernel you can check over your configuration file and try to build it again. One helpful resource is the /var/log/messages file which records, among other things, all of the kernel messages from every successful boot. Also, the dmesg(8) command will print the kernel messages from the current boot.

Note: If you are having trouble building a kernel, make sure to keep a GENERIC, or some other kernel that is known to work on hand as a different name that will not get erased on the next build. You cannot rely on kernel.old because when installing a new kernel, kernel.old is overwritten with the last installed kernel which may be non-functional. Also, as soon as possible, move the working kernel to the proper /boot/kernel location or commands such as ps(1) may not work properly. To do this, simply rename the directory containing the good kernel:

# mv /boot/kernel /boot/kernel.bad
# mv /boot/kernel.good /boot/kernel
The kernel works, but ps(1) does not work any more:

If you have installed a different version of the kernel from the one that the system utilities have been built with, for example, a -CURRENT kernel on a -RELEASE, many system-status commands like ps(1) and vmstat(8) will not work any more. You should recompile and install a world built with the same version of the source tree as your kernel. This is one reason it is not normally a good idea to use a different version of the kernel from the rest of the operating system.

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FreeBSD Handbook - Chapter 2 Installing FreeBSD

January 6th, 2009

Restructured, reorganized, and parts rewritten by Jim Mock. The sysinstall walkthrough, screenshots, and general copy by Randy Pratt.

2.1 Synopsis

FreeBSD is provided with a text-based, easy to use installation program called sysinstall. This is the default installation program for FreeBSD, although vendors are free to provide their own installation suite if they wish. This chapter describes how to use sysinstall to install FreeBSD.

After reading this chapter, you will know:

  • How to create the FreeBSD installation disks.

  • How FreeBSD refers to, and subdivides, your hard disks.

  • How to start sysinstall.

  • The questions sysinstall will ask you, what they mean, and how to answer them.

Before reading this chapter, you should:

  • Read the supported hardware list that shipped with the version of FreeBSD you are installing, and verify that your hardware is supported.

Note: In general, these installation instructions are written for i386 (“PC compatible”) architecture computers. Where applicable, instructions specific to other platforms (for example, Alpha) will be listed. Although this guide is kept as up to date as possible, you may find minor differences between the installer and what is shown here. It is suggested that you use this chapter as a general guide rather than a literal installation manual.


2.2 Hardware Requirements

2.2.1 Minimal Configuration

The minimal configuration to install FreeBSD varies with the FreeBSD version and the hardware architecture.

Information about the minimal configuration is available in the Installation Notes on the Release Information page of the FreeBSD web site. A summary of this information is given in the following sections. Depending on the method you choose to install FreeBSD, you may also need a floppy drive, a supported CDROM drive, and in some case a network adapter. This will be covered by the Section 2.3.7.


2.2.1.1 FreeBSD/i386 and FreeBSD/pc98

Both FreeBSD/i386 and FreeBSD/pc98 require a 486 or better processor and at least 24 MB of RAM. You will need at least 150 MB of free hard drive space for the most minimal installation.

Note: In case of old configurations, most of time, getting more RAM and more hard drive space is more important than getting a faster processor.


2.2.1.2 FreeBSD/alpha

To install FreeBSD/alpha, you will need a supported platform (see Section 2.2.2) and a dedicated disk for FreeBSD. It is not possible to share a disk with another operating system at this time. This disk will need to be attached to a SCSI controller which is supported by the SRM firmware or an IDE disk assuming the SRM in your machine supports booting from IDE disks.

You will need the SRM console firmware for your platform. In some cases, it is possible to switch between AlphaBIOS (or ARC) firmware and SRM. In others it will be necessary to download new firmware from the vendor’s Web site.

Note: Support for the Alpha was removed beginning with FreeBSD 7.0. The FreeBSD 6.X series of releases is the last containing support for this architecture.


2.2.1.3 FreeBSD/amd64

There are two classes of processors capable of running FreeBSD/amd64. The first are AMD64 processors, including the AMD Athlon™64, AMD Athlon64-FX, AMD Opteron™ or better processors.

The second class of processors that can use FreeBSD/amd64